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This Article focuses on the two issues that dominated discussions of
professionalresponsibility standardsfor tax lawyers in the 1985-2015
period: returnposition standardsand tax shelter opinions. It opens with
the ABA's 1965 opinion providing "reasonablebasis" as the standard
for undisclosedreturnpositions and then traces the development of the
"realisticpossibilityof success" and "substantialauthority"standards.
The Article then explores the post-1986 second wave of corporate tax
shelters and the responses of Congress, the Treasury Department, the
Justice Department, and the tax bar. In addition to documenting the
extensive interactionbetween the federal government and the tax bars,
the Article also chronicles the rise andfall of the prominence of Circular 230 and Treasury's role in regulating tax lawyers.
The Article concludes with reflectionson the 1985-2015 period
in light of the 1945-1985 history covered in two earlierarticles, and it
then suggests how to move the professionalresponsibility discussion
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forward. By the end of 2015, with the ABA opinion on return position
standardspre-emptedby statute and Circular230 evisceratedby courts,
professional ethics for tax lawyers had been largely replaced by penalty standardsand uncertainties. To improve the deliberationson how
best to develop standardsfrom the currentsituation, empiricalresearch
into the practice realities of tax lawyers is suggested, giving attention
to the diversity of the tax bar and the geographical,firm size, and specialization variationsof the tax bar.
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On my second day as Director, I met with thenCommissioner-Shulman. He asked me what the "plan"
was. I told him I would like to scrap Circular230 and
startover. He thoughtI was kidding.
Karen Hawkins, Director (2009-2015), IRS Office
of Professional Responsibility1

I. INTRODUCTION

This Article is third in a series exploring the development of professional
responsibility standards for tax lawyers, beginning in 1945.2 This Article concludes the series with a focus on 1985-2015. While tax lawyers
face the same professional ethics issues as all lawyers, such as duties of
competence and confidentiality, and though they face some important
and unique issues, such as advising a client when a mistake is discovered on an already filed return, the issues that dominated their professional responsibility discussions from 1985-2015 are return position
standards and tax shelter opinions. The return position issue is as to when
a return with a questionable position may be filed without disclosing the
questionability to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Presuming all tax
advice will be reflected on a return eventually, the answer is relevant
not only if the lawyer is literally preparing the return (which is not usually the work of tax lawyers) but also to the lawyer's pre-return transaction planning. The tax shelter opinion issue involves the substance of
written opinions covering unusual tax minimization plans most assuredly to be rejected by the IRS if detected. Unlike written advice for usual
tax planning, tax shelter opinions are not provided to help the taxpayer
understand the plan but rather to provide a defense from penalties if the
plan is rejected not only by the IRS but the courts.

1. Karen L. Hawkins, 2017 Erwin N. Griswold Lecture Before the
American College of Tax Counsel:A (Not So) Modest Proposal,70 TAX LAw.
647, 654 (2017).
2. The first article in the series was Michael Hatfield, Legal Ethics
and Federal Taxes, 1945-1965: Patriotism, Duties, and Advice, 12 FLA. TAX
REV. 1 (2012) [hereinafter Hatfield, 1945-1965]; and the second, Michael
Hatfield, Committee Opinions and Treasury Regulation: Tax Lawyer Ethics,
1965-1985, 15 FLA. TAX REV. 675 (2014) [hereinafter Hatfield, 1965-1985].
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The first article in this series covers the 1945-1965 period, which
was one in which tax lawyers writing about their professional duties
invoked Cold War patriotism and concerns about communism, consumerism, and the commercialization of the profession.3 They wrote about
natural law and tax jurisprudence as well as client and competitive business pressures. 4 They called for the moral improvement of both tax lawyers and their clients.5 They pondered the relationship of their duties to
their clients and their duties to the tax system. 6 Most importantly, in retrospect, the members of the Section of Taxation (Tax Section) of the
American Bar Association (ABA) appointed a committee to study their
various ethical questions.' That committee, the Committee on Standards
of Tax Practice, then posed the return position question to the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility (PR Committee).8 In
1965, the PR Committee responded by translating the question into the
vocabulary of the ABA canons of ethics and answering it from an
advocacy-oriented perspective. 9 Twenty years on, with pressure from
Congress, Treasury, and the tax bar, the PR Committee replaced that
opinion with one updated in vocabulary but not perspective. 10 Part II of
this Article picks up the development of the return position issue at the
time of that second opinion, 1985.
The second article in this series covered 1965-1985, including
the intensification of the government's war on tax shelters." In 1980,
Robert Mundheim, the Treasury General Counsel, targeted tax shelter
opinions.12 He said the opinions helped promote shelters to investors
on the theory that the tax opinion provided the investor assurance that
a negligence or fraud penalty would not be assessed even if the anticipated tax benefits were disallowed.13 His aim was to limit the unprofessional conduct of the tax lawyers who provided the opinions."4 In a

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Hatfield, 1945-1965, supranote 2, at 1, 8, 11-15.
Id. at 46-47.
Id. at 49-50.
Id. at 50-51.
Hatfield, 1965-1985, supra note 2, at 683.
Id.
Id. at 686-89.
Id. at 697-98, 703-04.
Id. at 700-01.
Id. at 700.
Id. at 701.
Id.

832

FloridaTax Review

[Vol 24:2

short period, both the PR Committee and Treasury developed strategies to constrain that conduct." In 1982, the PR Committee issued
Opinion 346 setting forth the requirements for a professionally responsible tax shelter opinion. 16 In 1984, Treasury mirrored the same requirements in regulations." This was the first instance in which Treasury
claimed the right to regulate the substance of tax lawyering, and it generated resistance from some tax lawyers who doubted Treasury had the
legal authority and were sure it had a conflict of interest. 18 Part III of
this Article picks up the tax shelter opinion issue after the ABA and
Treasury issued guidance.
With reference to the history covered in the prior two articles,
Part IV of this Article notes the most significant elements of the 19852015 period, such as the rise of legal standards and the fall of Treasury
as the primary regulator of tax professionals. It also suggests the way to
guide the future development of professional standards is empirical
research into the diversity of the tax bar and the variations in practices
across the country in order to develop better strategies for articulating
professional standards and better strategies for supporting lawyers in
meeting those standards.
II. POSITION STANDARDS: 1985-2015

Between 1985 and 2015, the Tax Section, Treasury, and Congress proposed, commented, acted, and reacted on return position standards with
considerable frequency. 19 One can only speculate as to the number of
work hours put into their projects. In 1985, the ABA PR Committee
reacted to congressional penalties by issuing Opinion 85-352, which
announced the "realistic possibility of success" standard for return

15. Id. at 702-05.
16. ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Opinion
346 (Revised) (Jan. 29, 1982), in 68 ABA J. 471, 471 (1982) [hereinafter ABA
Opinion 346]; Hatfield, 1965-1985, supra note 2, at 703-05.
17. Hatfield, 1965-1985, supranote 2, at 704-05.
18. Id. at 709-12.
19. There were important contributions made by others, especially
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). However, as
this Article is focused on tax lawyers, only incidental references to the work
of non-lawyer organization will be made.
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positions.2 0 Not entirely happy with the PR Committee's opinion, in
1986 a task force of the Tax Section (the "Opinion Task Force") issued
an interpretation that the realistic possibility of success standard could
be quantified at about a one-in-three chance of success on the merits."
Also not entirely happy with Opinion 85-352, in 1986 Treasury proposed amending Circular 230 to use the realistic possibility standard as
a default for tax return preparation but require that the "substantial
authority" position standard be met in many, if not most situations.22
After a series of hearings and reports, Congress changed the penalty statutes and followed the ABA's lead by adopting the realistic possibility
standard for preparers, setting into motion Treasury issuing penalty
regulations and Circular 230 modifications to reflect the quantified
meaning of realistic possibility of success. The regulations were finalized over the tax bar's objections to the quantified approach, despite the
approach having originated with the Tax Section's Opinion Task Force.
Nevertheless, by the end of 1989, the realistic possibility of success
standard had prevailed: it was the preparer standard not only for legal
ethics purposes but as a matter of statute and two sets of regulations. It
remained in these places until Congress, after ignoring penalty studies it mandated, suddenly raised, without consultation with the tax bar
or Treasury, the preparer position standard to more likely than not in
2007. Though it had resisted the substantial authority standard for
decades, confronted with the suddenly enacted more likely than not
standard, the tax bar united behind substantial authority and convinced
Congress to enact it in 2008 with retroactive effect. Thus, in 2008, the
preparer standards for lawyers were much as Treasury had first proposed in 1986. Though Treasury then seemed largely successful in the
long-term negotiations over the standards, its move in 2011 to subject
commercial return preparers to the same standards under Circular 230
backfired, not only knocking out Treasury's claim to regulate those
preparers but also knocking out its claim to regulate lawyers who were
not representing clients in IRS proceedings.

20. ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Opinion
85-352 (July 7, 1985), in 39 TAX LAW. 631 (1986) [hereinafter ABA Opinion
85-352].
21. Paul J. Sax, James P. Holden, Theodore Tannenwald, Jr.,
David E. Watts & Bernard Wolfman, Report of the Special Task Force on
Opinion 85-352, 39 TAX LAW. 635 (1986).
22. See infra Part II.A.3.
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A. 1986: Tax Section and Treasury in Reaction
By 1986, Congress had enacted statutory penalties on both taxpayers
and tax return preparers for inappropriate return positions. In 1985, the
ABA PR Committee issued its second formal opinion in 20 years on
the appropriate tax return position standard for tax lawyers. 23 This Opinion 85-352 did not align the professional standards for tax lawyers with
the penalty standards for return positions. The Tax Section reacted by
appointing the Opinion Task Force to interpret Opinion 85-352, which
it did, also suggesting that Congress and Treasury use the Opinion Task
Force's interpretation for modifying the return preparer position penalty statute and Circular 230. Treasury reacted by asserting its claim on
regulating the return positions of tax lawyers by proposing to align the
professional standards of Circular 230 with the penalty standard. The
proposal was not well received by the tax bar.
1. Congress: SubstantialAuthority and Reasonable Basis
Through penalty sections in the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.), Congress has legislated return position standards for both taxpayers and
return preparers. Under current law, though the penalties are separate,
the standards are the same for both taxpayers and return preparers. Both
@ 6662 for taxpayers and @ 6694 for return preparers require a "reasonable basis" for disclosed return positions and "substantial authority" for
undisclosed positions.24 Each of those standards has its own history, and
the penalties for taxpayers and the penalties for return preparers have
their own separate histories as well.
Over 50 years before either @ 6694 or @ 6662 were enacted (in
1976 and 1982, respectively), taxpayers were subjected to a civil penalty

23. The PR Committee issues opinions based on the model ethical
rules for lawyers promulgated by the ABA.
24. Section 6662 imposes penalties on taxpayers for underpayments attributable to an understatement of tax liability, if the underpayment is
attributable to an undisclosed position without substantial authority or a disclosed position without a reasonable basis. I.R.C. § 6662(a), (d)(2)(B), (d)(3).
Section 6694 imposes penalties on tax return preparers for understatement of
a taxpayer's liability on similar conditions. I.R.C. § 6694(a).
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for negligence." Section 6653(a) penalized underpayments due to negligence or disregard of rules or regulations.2 6 There were no @ 6653 regulations that precluded the penalty from being applied when the taxpayer's
position had a reasonable basis, but it was such well-established practice of the IRS not to impose the penalty in those situations that it was
noted in other regulations that a reasonable basis would prevent the imposition of the @ 6653 negligence penalty. 27 The negligence penalty also
could be defeated by proving reasonable reliance on advice of a professional tax advisor. 28 Thus, either a reasonable basis for the position or
reasonable reliance on tax advice was a defense against the negligence
penalty.

25. Section 250(b) of the Revenue Act of 1921 penalized any part
of a deficiency "due to fraud with intent to evade tax" and "due to negligence
or intentional disregard of authorized rules and regulations with knowledge
thereof, but without intent to defraud." Penalties Task Force, ABA Sec. of
Tax'n, Penalties Study Report 12 (1988) [hereinafter ABA, 1988 Report], in
Review of the Civil Penalty Provisions Contained in the Internal Revenue
Code: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways
& Means, March 31 and July 28, 1988, Serial 100-75, 100th Cong. 366, 377
(1989) [hereinafter 1988 House Penalty Hearings]; see also JOINT COMM. ON
TAX'N, 94TH CONG., JCS-33 -76, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT
OF 1976, at 345, 351 (1976) [hereinafter JCT, 1976 BLUEBOOK]. There was also,
of course, a long-standing criminal fraud penalty. For the history of the fraud
and negligence penalties before the Revenue Act of 1921, see Donald Arthur
Winslow, Tax Penalties "They Shoot Dogs, Don't They?," 43 FLA. L. REV.
811, 825, 828-30 (1991).
26. I.R.C. § 6653(a) (1987) (added by Internal Revenue Code of
1954, Pub. L. No. 591 ch. 736, § 6653, 68A Stat. 822; and subsequently
amended multiple times-for example, by Technical Amendments Act of
1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, tit. I, § 86, 72 Stat. 1606, 1665; An Act to Reform
the Income Tax Laws, Pub. L. No. 91-172, §§ 101(j)(50) & 943(c)(6), 83 Stat.
487, 531, 729 (1969); An Act to Amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
Pub. L. No. 91-679, § 2, 84 Stat. 2063, 2063 (1971); An Act to Provide for
Pension Reform, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 1016(a)(18), 88 Stat. 829, 931 (1974)).
27. Reg. § 1.6661-3(a)(2) (1985), T.D. 8017, 50 Fed. Reg. 12,012,
12,016 (Mar. 27, 1985); Michael C. Durst, The Tax Lawyer's Professional
Responsibility, 39 FLA. L. REV. 1027, 1068 (1987); Lawrence Zelenak, Reforming Penalty Reform: Congress Should Eliminate the Profusion of Accuracy
Standards, 52 TAX NOTES 471 (July 22, 1991).
28. This was a mistake of law defense. ABA, 1988 Report, supra
note 25, at 17; Winslow, supra note 25, at 835.
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Even though reliance on tax advice might defeat a negligence
penalty on the taxpayer, so long as the preparer was not engaged in criminal fraud, there was no civil penalty constraint on the preparer who
advised the position. 29 In 1976, Congress concluded that having only
criminal sanctions available against problematic return preparers was
"inappropriate, cumbersome, and ineffective" because of "the cost and
length of time involved" in establishing criminal cases. 30 Along with a
number of other civil penalties applicable to return preparers, Congress
enacted @ 6694, which penalized a return preparer if any part of a client's
understatement was due to "a negligent or intentional disregard of rules
and regulations" by the preparer. 31 For these purposes, a "preparer" was
not only one who literally prepared the return but also one who gave
advice on a completed transaction if the advice was directly related to
an entry on a return. 32 Congress intended the new @ 6694 negligence penalty on preparers to be interpreted similarly to the @ 6653 negligence
penalty on taxpayers. 33 Accordingly, a preparer taking a "good faith" and
"reasonable basis" position would not be penalized even without disclosure; a disclosed position would not be penalized so long as it was not

29. JCT, 1976 BLUEBOOK, supra note 25, at 345-46.
30. Id. at 346.
31. I.R.C. § 6694(a) (1977) (added by Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-455, § 1203(b)(1), 90 Stat. 1520, 1689). While I.R.C. § 6653 (1987)
distinguished between negligence and the disregard of rules, the text of the
new § 6694 collapsed the distinction by referencing negligent disregard of
rules. "Rules" included I.R.C. sections. Reg. § 1.6694-1(a)(3) (1978), T.D.
7519, 42 Fed. Reg. 59,561, 59,968 (Nov. 23, 1977). Section 6694 (1977) also
penalized willful and intentional misconduct by the preparer, but those penalties are not considered in this Article. The other requirements imposed on
preparers in the Tax Reform Act of 1976, supra: to file information returns
(I.R.C. § 6060 (1977)); to furnish a copy of the return to the taxpayer and
retain a copy or list (I.R.C. § 6107 (1977)); to furnish an identification number
(I.R.C. § 6695(c) (1977)); and to sign returns (I.R.C. § 6695(b) (1977)).
32. See JCT, 1976 BLUEBOOK, supra note 25, at 351. The Tax Reform
Act of 1976 also added § 7701(a)(36), defining income tax return preparers, to
the Code's definition section. § 1203(a), 90 Stat. at 1688-89. Tax advice on
events being contemplated did not transform an advisor into a preparer. Reg.
§ 301.7701-15(a)(2) (1978), 42 Fed. Reg. at 59,971. The advice also had to
relate to a substantial portion of the return. Reg. § 301.7701-15(b)(2) (1978),
42 Fed. Reg. at 59,972.
33. JCT, 1976 BLUEBOOK, supra note 25, at 351.
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frivolous.34 Although the aggressive tax advising related to tax shelters
was on the congressional agenda in 1976, it was not the motivation for
@ 6694.35 With @ 6694, Congress was focused instead on the preparers of
"tax returns for individuals and families of moderate income." 36 The
number of such commercial preparers had substantially increased, and
there had been significant abuses, such as guarantees of refunds. 37
By 1982, Congress decided the @ 6653 taxpayer negligence penalty was insufficient to deter taxpayers from playing the audit lottery.
The Joint Committee on Taxation (Joint Committee) explained:
Congress believed that an increasing part of the compliance gap is attributable to taxpayers playing the "audit
lottery." The audit lottery is played by taxpayers who
take questionable positions not amounting to fraud or
negligence on their returns in the hope that they will
not be audited. If the taxpayer is audited and the questionable position challenged, then the taxpayer pays the
additional tax owing plus [significantly below market
rate 38] interest.... Taxpayers relied on opinions of tax
advisors to avoid the possibility of fraud or negligence
penalties in taking such questionable positions, even
though the advisor's opinion may have clearly indicate[d] that if the issue were challenged by the Internal
Revenue Service, the taxpayer would probably lose the
contest. 39

34. Reg. § 1.6694-1(a)(1) & (4) (1978), 42 Fed. Reg. at 59,968.
35. For example, the Tax Reform Act of 1976 added I.R.C. § 465 to
limit taxpayer deductions to the amount economically at risk in the investment. § 204, 90 Stat. at 1531.
36. JCT, 1976 BLUEBOOK, supra note 25, at 346.
37. Id.
38. These words were not in the committee report but are essential to
understanding why the interest charge was not a deterrent. In that period, the
prime interest rate was near 20% and inflation was over 10%, so the 5% negligence penalty and the 6% interest rate meant that it could be to a taxpayer's
financial advantage to have a deficiency. 1988 House Penalty Hearings, supra
note 25, at 426 (statement of Charles J. Muller, Member, ABA Tax Section).
39.

JOINT COMM.

ON TAX'N,

JCS-38-82,

97TH

CONG.,

GENERAL

EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE TAX EQUITY AND FISCAL

RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1982, at 216 (1982)

[hereinafter JCT, 1982 BLUEBOOK].
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Congress enacted @ 6661 (now @ 6662(b)(2), (d)) to deter taxpayers
from playing the audit lottery by penalizing the use of undisclosed
questionable reporting positions.4 Congress exempted "low and moderate income taxpayers from the scope of the penalty because of the
greater access of higher income taxpayers to professional tax advice." 4 1
This exemption was effected through a threshold amount for @ 6661 to
apply.42
The @ 6661 penalty could be avoided either by adequately disclosing the relevant facts related to the tax position when the return was
filed or by there being "substantial authority" for the position. 43 These
alternative justifications were provided, rather than requiring that only
correct positions escape the penalty, in order to recognize that taxpayers and the IRS may "reasonably differ over the sometimes complex Federal tax laws" and that, "in some circumstances, tax advisors may be
unable to reach" a definitive conclusion.4 4
Unlike the reasonable basis standard, the substantial authority
standard had no history of use in tax administration; its lack of settled
meaning was considered an advantage by Congress, which intended the
courts "be free to look at the purpose of this new provision" when interpreting it. 45 The standard was to be "more stringent" than the longfamiliar reasonable basis standard, but less stringent than self-defined
"more likely than not," to be upheld in litigation. 46 It required a

40. Id. at 216.
41. Id. at 217.
42. Id.; I.R.C. § 6661(a)-(b) (1983) (added by Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 323(a), 96 Stat. 324, 613;
amended by Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1504(a), 100 Stat.
2085, 2743; repealed and replaced by I.R.C. § 6662 in the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7721(a) & (c)(2), 103 Stat.
2106, 2395-97, 2399). The understatement of tax was substantial only if it
exceeded the greater of (i) 10% of the tax required to be shown on the return
for the taxable year, or (ii) $5,000 for a non-corporate taxpayer/$10,000 for a
corporation. I.R.C. § 6661(b)(1) (1983). Thus, the understatement had to be at
least $5,000, which meant it would not be relevant to a lower income taxpayer
whose total income tax liability might not even be $5,000.
43. I.R.C. § 6661(b)(2) (1983).
44. JCT, 1982 BLUEBOOK, supra note 39, at 216-17.
45. Id. at 218.
46. Id.; see also Reg. § 1.6661-3(a)(2) (1985), T.D. 8017, 50 Fed.
Reg. 12,012, 12,016 (Mar. 27, 1985). These final Treasury Regulations
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"weighing" of authorities for and against the position, and it was met if
the weight of those authorities was "substantially" in favor of the position taken.4 7 The weighing was to be done in the same manner as a court
would in its analysis.4 8 Since a court would not be bound by law review
articles, opinion letters, or private letter rulings, those and other specifically identified documents were explicitly excluded from the list of
"authorities" to be weighed.4 9 The standard was objective, meaning that
the taxpayer's belief as to whether or not the standard was met was irrelevant, but discretion was given to the IRS to waive the penalty if the
taxpayer acted in good faith and there was reasonable cause for the
understatement."
Thus, by 1986, there were civil penalties applicable to both taxpayers and return preparers for taking return positions below certain
standards. For all taxpayers, return positions with a reasonable basis
would avoid the @ 6653 negligence penalty." For taxpayers at higher

reflected the legislative intention for the meaning of substantial authority, as
described by the Joint Committee General Explanation. JCT, 1982 BLUEBOOK,
supra note 39, at 216-17.
47. JCT, 1982 BLUEBOOK, supra note 39, at 216-17; Reg. § 1.66613([b])(1) (1985), 50 Fed. Reg. at 12,016.
48. Reg. § 1.6661-3([b])(3) (1985), 50 Fed. Reg. at 12,016.
49. Reg. § 1.6661-3([b])(2) (1985), 50 Fed. Reg. at 12,016.
50. I.R.C. § 6661(c) (1983) (for enactment and post-enactment history, see supra note 42); Reg. § 1.6661-6(a) & (b) (1985), 50 Fed. Reg. at
12,018.
51. I.R.C. § 6653 (1987) did not provide different standards for disclosed and undisclosed positions. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying
text. There was uncertainty as to whether disclosure might ever protect a taxpayer from the I.R.C. § 6653 (1987) penalty. See James R. Rowen, When May
a Lawyer Advise a Client That He May Take a Position on His Tax Return?,
29 TAX LAW. 237, 256, n.36 (1976). When portions of I.R.C. § 6653 (1987)
were repealed and replaced by the negligence prong of § 6662, disclosure of a
not frivolous position would protect the taxpayer from the negligence penalty.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, §§ 7721(a)
& (c)(1), 7732(a) (return preparer), 103 Stat. 2106, 2395-97, 2399, 2402.
Regulation § 1.6662-3(c) (1992) provided an exception for adequate
disclosure of a not frivolous position, as did Reg. § 1.6662-4(e) (1992) for the
understatement penalty, and Reg. §§ 1.6694-2(c) (1992) &-3(c)(2) (1992)
provided similarly for the preparer penalty. See T.D. 8381, 56 Fed. Reg. 67,492
(Dec. 31, 1991) (publishing regulations under I.R.C. §§ 6662 & 6664 (1991));
T.D. 8382, 56 Fed. Reg. 67,509 (Dec. 31, 1991) (publishing regulations under
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income levels, a @ 6661 penalty applied if the return position lacked substantial authority but was not disclosed to the IRS when the return was
filed. Under @ 6694, return preparers were not subject to the substantial
authority standard but rather to the reasonable basis standard for undisclosed positions and to the not frivolous standard if the position was
disclosed."
2. ABA Reacts: Realistic Possibility
In 1964, the Tax Standards Committee asked the PR Committee to opine
on when a tax lawyer preparing a return must disclose a position that
was uncertain but had "reasonable grounds." 5 3 The position having
"reasonable grounds" meant the client would not be subjected to the
negligence penalty for such a position. 4 Thus, the issue was whether a
lawyer preparing a return had a duty to advise disclosure even if the

I.R.C. § 6694 (1991)); see also Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993,
Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13251(a), 107 Stat. 312, 531 (amending § 6662(d)(2)(B)
to require reasonable basis to obtain penalty reduction for disclosure); H.R.
COMM. ON WAYS

&

MEANS, 103D. CONG.,

WMCP 103-11,

FISCAL YEAR 94 BUD-

316-17 (Comm. Print 1993) [hereinafter WMCP 103-11] (explanation for replacing not frivolous standard with
reasonable basis standard).
52. As to the not frivolous standard, see supra note 51 and accompanying text.
53. The Tax Standards Committee asked the PR Committee to
opine on three scenarios involving disclosure. In addition to the position scenario, an opinion was sought on settlement negotiation and litigation scenarios. See Hatfield, 1965-1985, supra note 2, at 686-87; Merle H. Miller
John H. Grosvenor, Jr, Report of Special Committee on Standards of Tax
Practice, 17 BULL. SEC. TAX'N, July 1964, at 269. The Tax Standards Committee had been created in 1962 to "ascertain what ethical problems . .. are peculiar to the tax field" and "to raise the ethical level of practice in the [tax] field."
Randolph W. Thrower, Chairman'sPage, 15 BULL. SEC. TAX'N, Apr. 1962, at
1, 3; Hatfield, 1965-1985, supra note 2, at 683.
54. For an equation of the "reasonable grounds" with "reasonable
basis" in avoiding the negligence penalty, see Winslow, supra note 25, at 842
& n.162 (1990) (citing 2 JACOB RABKIN & MARK H. JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME,
GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION 4041 (1945)). While "reasonable grounds" was the
phrase from negligence cases, the phrase "reasonable basis" was in use
among tax lawyers at the time. See Hatfield, 1945-1965, supra note 2, at 32
(quoting its use in Mark H. Johnson, Does the Tax PractitionerOwe a Dual
&
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taxpayer-client would not be penalized if the position were not disclosed
but failed to be sustained.
In 1965, the PR Committee responded with its Opinion 314: there
was no disclosure duty so long as there was a reasonable basis for the
position." The PR Committee did not explicitly consider the negligence
penalty standards for the taxpayer-client, the lawyer's duties under Circular 230, or the tax bar's significant accumulation of ethics literature.5 6
It framed disclosure as in tension with the duty of zealous representation and reasoned that the tax lawyer was an advocate and that the IRS
was a mere "brother lawyer" that was not owed any special duties (such
as disclosure) that would be a check on zealous representation.5 7 It added
that prudence in considering a shorter statute of limitation or being free
of a claim of fraud might recommend disclosure even of a return position with reasonable basis, but the lawyer's professional ethics obligations did not require it. 58
Though the reasonable basis standard of Opinion 314 was
accepted by the tax bar, the PR Committee's rationale was debated. 59
Some thought it a good standard because it was similar to the "reasonable support" standard of the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (AICPA), while others liked its consistency with the
taxpayer-client's reporting obligations. 60 However, increasingly over the
years, and especially after anti-tax shelter legislation was enacted in

Responsibilityto his Client and to the Government? The Theory, 15 U.S.C.
L. SCH. INST. ON MAJOR TAX PLANNING 25, 32 (1963)).
55. ABA Comm. on Pro. Ethics, Formal Opinion 314 (1965), in 51
A.B.A. J. 671 (1965) [hereinafter ABA Opinion 314]; Hatfield, 1965-1985,
supra note 2, at 687-89.
56. The Opinion makes no mention of the potential applicability of
the negligence penalty or any other penalty or duty of compliance under the
Internal Revenue Code, nor does it mention the potential relevance of Circular 230 for lawyers practicing before the IRS, nor does it mention any of the
extensive consideration of this and similar ethics question by tax lawyers
before 1965. Indeed, the very question the PR Committee sought to answer
was debated at length at NYU's 1952 Tax Law Review banquet. Hatfield,
1945-1965, supra note 2, at 29; Hatfield, 1965-1985, supra note 2, at 687-89.
57. ABA Opinion 314, supra note 55, at 672.
58. Id.
59. Hatfield, 1965-1985, supra note 2, at 691-93.
60. See Frederic G. Corneel, Ethical Guidelinesfor Tax Practice,
28 TAX L. REV. 1, 8 (1972); Rowen, supra note 51, at 250.
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1976, Opinion 314 was criticized for allowing taxpayers to play the audit
lottery because arguing a position with a mere reasonable basis could
be highly questionable. 61 By 1978, the Tax Standards Committee was
deliberating whether the reasonable basis standard should be replaced. 62
Deliberations were complicated by Congress enacting the @ 6661
substantial understatement penalty on taxpayers in 1982. Even after
@ 6661 was enacted, the principal penalty for taxpayers remained the
@ 6653 negligence penalty, which was avoidable by a reasonable basis for
a position. However, the new @ 6661 imposed the substantial authority
standard when the threshold dollar requirements was met. Thus, to the
extent that @ 6661 applied, the convenient coincidence of the taxpayer
negligence standard and the Opinion 314 reasonable basis standard for
lawyers was irrelevant. If taxpayers, at least in some situations, needed
return positions to meet the substantial authority standard to avoid penalties, should an ABA formal ethics opinion permit a lesser standard for the
lawyer advising the taxpayer? Some in the tax bar argued that Opinion
314 did not need to be changed by the ABA because Congress could
impose the substantial authority through the I.R.C., if it chose to do so,
but it had not. 63 If Congress had changed the law to increase the standards on some taxpayers but not their return preparers, why should the
ABA step in to increase its standard on lawyer-preparers? Some in the
tax bar, however, believed the ABA standard should be increased to
reflect in some way the higher standard of @ 6661. But even those who
favored moving in that direction did not argue for incorporating the substantial authority standard of @ 6661 into the ABA standard because the
technical definition of substantial authority excluded resources lawyers
needed for practical advising (e.g., treatises), and so they proposed similar concepts but with different names, such as "substantial basis." 64

61. Discussion on "Questionable Positions," 32 TAX LAW. 13, 1721, 23-27 (1978) (ABA Tax Section panel discussion in May 1978 with thenIRS Commissioner Jerome Kurtz and attorneys William H. Smith, Mac
Asbill, Jr., and Harry K. Mansfield).
62. Frederic G. Corneel, Report of the Committee on Standards of
Tax Practice, 32 TAX LAW. 933, 933-34 (1979).
63. Special Comm. on the Law.'s Role in Tax Prac., Ass'n of the
Bar of the City of N.Y., The Lawyer's Role in Tax Practice, 36 TAX LAW. 865,
883-84 (1983).
64. See id.; Lee A. Sheppard, Ethics Opinion 314 and Tax Shelters
Addressed atABA Meeting, 22 TAX NOTES 757 (Feb. 27, 1984).
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Ultimately the Tax Standards Committee proposed that the Tax
Section support revising Opinion 314.65 The Committee cited several reasons for the revision. Its most important were two. First, since Opinion
314 in 1965, the ABA had adopted new ethics guidance that reflected
the differing roles of the lawyer as advisor, intermediary, evaluator, or
advocate. 66 Second, the Opinion 314 standard had been used to exploit the
audit lottery with weak positions, which had prompted Congress to enact
the @ 6661 penalty on taxpayers in order to penalize undisclosed positions that lacked substantial authority. 67 In articulating its proposal, the
Committee began with the premise that a "tax return is not a submission in an adversary proceeding" but rather serves a "disclosure and
assessment function," and thus it "must provide a fair report of matters
affecting tax liability." 68 It emphasized the return position must not be
frivolous, which meant it must have a "good faith argument on the merits . . [or] a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law." 69 In advising the client, the lawyer should advise
"whether the position would be sustained by the courts," whether there
were potentially applicable penalties, and, when relevant, "whether or
not there was 'substantial authority' for the position and the effect of
adequate disclosure."? However, the position that did not have substantial authority need not necessarily be disclosed. 71 The disclosure issue
is whether the position is "meritorious," meaning "advanced in good faith
as evidenced by a practical and realistic possibility of success" on the
merits. 72 While disclosure was not required simply because the position
lacked substantial authority, disclosure would establish "the requisite
good faith" in "extraordinary circumstances where it is unclear whether
a proposed tax position" had a realistic possibility of success. 73 It

65.
Sax et al., supra note 21, at 635.
66. ABA Sec. of Tax'n, Proposed Revision to Formal Opinion 314,
May 21, 1984 [hereinafter 1984 Proposal], in BERNARD WOLFMAN & JAMES P.
HOLDEN, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE 71, 71 (2d ed. 1985).

67. Id.
68. Id. According to the Committee, the process becomes adversarial when an audit commences.
69. Id. at 72 (quoting Commentary on 1983 Model Rules of Professional Conduct).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 73.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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provided that the realistic possibility of success standard should apply
not only to return preparation but all tax planning advice.7 4
After reviewing the Tax Section proposal, the PR Committee
issued Opinion 85-352.75 While it accepted that its effectiveness as a standard had been eroded, the PR Committee was not persuaded that the
reasonable basis standard was inherently problematic, and it claimed that
the proper application of that standard would not facilitate playing the
audit lottery.76 Nevertheless, in response to concerns over the standard,
and in light of updated ethical rules, it issued a new standard. The PR
Committee intended the new return position standardto blend the standards of advocate and advisor, emphasizing the return as potentially the
"first step in a process that may result in an adversary relationship."??
The PR Committee held that professional ethics required a good faith
belief that the return position have some realistic possibility of success
if the matter is litigated and that there was no disclosure duty if there is
such a possibility, even if the position did not have substantial authority.78 The PR Committee added that, of course, as an advisor the lawyer
should address the likelihood of the position being sustained and, for
@ 6661 purposes, whether the position had substantial authority, the
potential penalty exposure, and the potential benefits of disclosure. 79
Despite concluding with (almost) the same standard, the
approaches of the Tax Section and PR Committee differed in important
ways. 80 Indeed, the differences were so significant, some saw the PR
Committee as rejecting the Tax Section's proposal. 81 In response, the Tax

74. Id. at 71.
75. ABA Opinion 85-352, supra note 20.
76. Id. at 632.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 633.
79. Id.
80. As to difference in conclusion, the Tax Standards Committee
described a "practical and realistic possibility of success" (1984 Proposal,
supra note 66, at 73), while the Opinion descried "some realistic possibility of
success." Opinion 85-352, supra note 20, at 631.
81. Opinion 85-352 "could be read to have rejected the standard
proposed by the Section of Taxation and to have restated a low minimum
standard of tax reporting." Theodore C. Falk, Tax Ethics, Legal Ethics, and
Real Ethics: A Critique of ABA Opinion 85-352, 39 TAx LAw. 643, 644 n.8
(1986) (quoting June 4, 1985, letter from James B. Lewis, then ABA Tax Section chair, to Robert O. Hetledge, ABA Ethics Committee); see also ABA
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Section in 1986 appointed the Opinion Task Force to interpret how the
opinion should be applied.8 2 In its report on the opinion, the Opinion
Task Force clarified that a tax return is not an adversarial filing but rather
"a citizen's report to the government of his or her relevant activities for
the year," which serves a "disclosure, reporting, and self-assessment
function." 83 It emphasized all tax advice should meet the realistic possibility of success standard.84 It explicitly said that the chances of an audit
must not be taken into account when deciding whether or not there was
a realistic possibility of success. 85 It took good faith as the "touchstone"
for the standard.8 6 Good faith in this context was not subjective but objective, meaning that the possibility of success had to be "realistic," which
it equated with "substantial." 7 The Opinion Task Force concluded that
"a position having a likelihood of success closely approaching one-third"
would be a substantial possibility of success and thus meet the Opinion
85-352 standard. 88 The task force understood the new standard to be
"measurably elevate[d]" over the reasonable basis standard of Opinion
314.89 It suggested that, insofar as the realistic possibility of success
standard was implied by the duty of good faith, Congress might legislate to include meeting the standard as a defense to the tax preparer penalty.90 It also suggested Treasury might amend Circular 230 to reflect
the realistic possibility of success standard. 91
By 1986, Congress had legislated the substantial authority standard for taxpayer's undisclosed positions and a reasonable basis for undisclosed positions advised by preparers, and the ABA PR Committee had
declined to increase the position standard for lawyer-preparers to substantial authority. Instead, the PR Committee had articulated the realistic possibility of success standard for lawyer-preparers. This left the

Ethics Committee Revises "Reasonable Basis" Standard, ABA SEC. TAX'N
NEWSL., Fall 1985, at 1, 6 (discussing critique and also mentioning letter written by James Lewis).
82. Sax et al., supra note 21, at 635.
83. Id. at 640.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 638.
86. Id. at 641.
87. Id. at 638.
88. Id. at 638-39.
89. Id. at 638.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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lawyer-preparer ethics standards with no clear relationship to the statutory standards for taxpayers or preparers. What was the relationship
between the reasonable basis and realistic possibility standards? Was the
latter more of a restatement or a rejection of the former? In its refusal to
criticize the reasonable basis standard even while articulating the realistic possibility standards in its 1985 formal opinion, the PR Committee arguably considered it a mere restatement. However, in its 1986
reaction to Opinion 85-352, the Opinion Task Force, expressing greater
concern for the audit lottery problem and choosing to quantify the meaning of the realistic possibility standard, described the realistic possibility standard as "measurably elevated" over the reasonable basis standard.
As the debate over the meaning of realistic possibility continued for years
to come, the Opinion Task Force's quantified approach would eventually be enacted as part of the Treasury Regulations, over continuous and
almost universal criticism of the Tax Section itself 92
3. Treasury Reacts: SubstantialAuthority
Apparently some at Treasury were disappointed that the PR Committee had not used the substantial authority standard in Opinion 85-352,
as within a year of the opinion being issued, Treasury proposed direct
regulation of lawyer-preparers using both the realistic possibility and substantial authority standards, depending upon the taxpayer-client's situation. 93 Since the 19th century, Treasury had been authorized to regulate
tax professionals who represented others, and since 1921 had done so
through regulations commonly known as "Circular 230."94 Attorneys

92. See Reg. §§ 1.6662-3(a), -2(b); Paul J. Sax, The Section's Role
in Ethics and Standardsof Tax Practice, 68 TAX LAW. 59, 63 (2014) ("Of fundamental importance [to the 1986 Opinion Task Force] was to attach a percentage likelihood of success ... to the RPOS words, reasoning that the
absence of such a benchmark was what caused 'reasonable basis' to be
degraded by the inevitable push of forces pursuing aggressive tax positions.
The quantification seems to have worked, despite initial fierce objections
within the Section.").
93. 51 Fed. Reg. 29,113 (Aug. 14, 1986) (proposed regulations to be
promulgated at 31 C.F.R. pt. 10).
94. Act of July 7, 1884, ch. 334, 23 Stat. 236, 258-59; Pub. L.
No. 97-258, 96 Stat. 877, 884 (1982) (adding title 31 to the U.S. Code and codifying Treasury's authority to regulate at 31 U.S.C. § 330). It is referred to as
"Circular 230" as it was the 230th circular issued by Treasury when first
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became subject to Circular 230 by filing their representative status for
a client with the IRS. 95 Neither tax advising nor return preparation was
considered "practice before the IRS," though a practitioner who had filed
his or her power of attorney for a client with the IRS (and thereby became
subject to Circular 230) was required by Circular 230 @ 10.22 to use due
diligence in preparing documents relating to IRS matters, including
returns.96 In 1984, Treasury added @ 10.33 to Circular 230, which bound
those already subject to Circular 230 to meet certain requirements with
respect to tax shelter opinions. 97 Treasury claiming the right to directly
regulate the substance of tax advising won the formal support of the Tax
Section as part of its cooperation in the war on tax shelters, but there
was dissent within the tax bar, mostly on the conflict of interest of the
agency that collected taxes regulating the substance of tax advice. 98

published in

1921. ARTHUR H. BOELTER

&

HERTSEL SHADIAN, TAX PREPARER

§ 1:2 (2020) (discussing practice
regulations); Durst, supra note 27, at 1049-50 nn.80-81.
95. 31 C.F.R. § 10.3(a)-(b), 31 Fed. Reg. 10,773, 10,774 (Aug. 13,
1966) (amended by 44 Fed. Reg. 4944, 4946 (Jan. 24, 1979); 36 Fed. Reg. 8671
(May 11, 1971); 35 Fed. Reg. 13,205, 13,205 (Aug. 19, 1970)).
96. 31 C.F.R. § 10.2(a), 31 Fed. Reg. at 10,773-74 (amended by 42
Fed. Reg. 38,350, 38,352 (July 28, 1977); 37 Fed. Reg. 1016, 1017 (Jan. 21,
1972)); 31 C.F.R. § 10.22.
97. The new § 10.33 only applied to those attorneys who were considered "practitioners" as a result of filing the authorization to represent a
client. 31 C.F.R. § 10.33(a), (c)(1), 49 Fed. Reg. 6719, 6722 (Feb. 23, 1984) (as
corrected by 49 Fed. Reg. 7116 (Feb. 27, 1984); subsequently amended). That
it would not apply except to those lawyers who chose to be involved in administrative proceedings was one of the criticisms of the new section, especially
to the extent that those who were not so involved were likely less qualified to
advise on such matters. See, e.g., Hatfield, 1965-1985, supra note 2, at 70708; Jacques T. Schlenger, Comments on the Proposed Regulations on Tax
Shelter Opinions, 59 TAXES 173, 180 (1981); ABA Sec. of Tax'n, Statement on
Proposed Rule Amending Circular 230 with Respect to Tax Shelter Opinions,
34 TAX LAW. 745, 747 (1981).
98. N.Y. St. Bar Ass'n Tax Section, Circular 230 and the Standards Applicable to Tax Shelter Opinions, 12 TAX NOTES 251, 261 (Feb. 9,
1981); Incoming Treasury Letters: Proposed Regulations on Tax Shelter
Opinions Said to Threaten Adversary System, 11 TAX NOTES 1009 (Nov. 24,
1980); see also Mark J. Gimenez, Tax Shelter Opinions Securities and Tax
Liabilities After TEFRA, 35 BAYLOR L. REV. 25, 46 (1983); Hatfield, 19651985, supra note 2, at 709-11; Dean Marsan, Tax Shelter Opinions: Ethical
PENALTIES AND CIRCULAR 230 ENFORCEMENT
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In 1986, Treasury proposed to extend its claim further by setting a substantive standard for return preparation. 99 It cited two motivations. First was the concern that professional responsibility standards
had "eroded over the years." 0 0 Second was to assert that tax professionals had dual responsibilities: obligations both to the client and the
tax system." 1 This latter obligation was to be "fair and honest" with the
IRS and "to foster confidence by their clients in our tax system and in
tax compliance."0 2 Accordingly, Treasury reasoned that it was important for tax professionals to understand that a "tax return is not a submission in an adversary proceeding[]" but rather "a citizen's report to
the government of his [] relevant activities." 103 This meant a professional
duty to ensure the positions taken are "supportable by the law." 0 4
Treasury proposed modifying the @ 10.22 due diligence requirement to reflect this duty. The modified @ 10.22 would explicitly require
the professional to exercise due diligence in preparing returns, meaning the professional was to ensure a return position was "in compliance
with and supportable by" the tax law.105 This meant a position could not
be intended to exploit the audit lottery or to be used as leverage in the
settlement process, and it also meant that a position must have a

Responsibilitiesof the TaxAttorney, 9 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 237, 254-55 (1982);
Kim Masters, Bar Groups Hit Tax Shelter Proposals, LEGAL TIMES WASH. 4
(Dec. 1, 1980).
99. 51 Fed. Reg. 29,113 (Aug. 14, 1986) (proposed regulations to
be promulgated at 31 C.F.R. pt. 10). One did not need to be admitted to practice before the IRS in order to prepare returns. The definition of "practice" in
§ 10.2 had once explicitly excluded return preparation but, by 1986, that point
was explicit in § 10.7 rather than § 10.2. 31 C.F.R. § 10.7(c), 31 Fed. Reg. at
10,775 (amended by 51 Fed. Reg. 2875, 2878 (Jan. 22, 1986); 49 Fed. Reg. at
6722; 35 Fed. Reg. at 13,205).
100. 51 Fed. Reg. at 29,113. Treasury said that Congress expressed
its concerned through taxpayer penalty provisions in 1982 TEFRA, and that
the ABA expressed its concerned through Opinion 346, supra note 16, concerning opinions used in marketing tax shelters and in Opinion 85-352, supra
note 20, dealing with advice related to tax returns. 51 Fed. Reg. at 29,113.
101. 51 Fed. Reg. at 29,113.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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"practical and realistic possibility of being sustained in the courts."106
Thus, generally, Treasury accepted the realistic possibility standard for
preparers. Indeed, this part of the proposal read similarly to the Opinion Task Force's interpretation of Opinion 85-352.
But Treasury also proposed adding @ 10.34 to address professional responsibility when dealing with a @ 6661 matter. 107 The realistic
possibility standard would be the default under @ 10.22, but, when applicable under @ 6661, @ 10.34 would impose a higher standard. 108 This proposed modification to Circular 230 was the first to connect the professional
standards of Circular 230 to an I.R.C. provision.109 It would require the
professional to determine that the client would not be subject to the
@ 6661 penalty as a result of the return position." In practice, this
meant that Circular 230 would now require advising that either positions of higher-income taxpayers have "substantial authority" or be
disclosed to the IRS. 111
Treasury's proposal sparked considerable response.n2 On one
extreme was the view that the Treasury had launched a "pernicious

106. Id. at 29,114.
107. Id.
108. Curiously, given the difference between "mandate" and "suggest," Treasury identified § 6661 as a situation in which "the revenue laws
mandate or suggest a higher standard" but also said the higher standard "must
be" followed. 51 Fed. Reg. at 29,114.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Tax shelter items were subject to a higher standard under
§ 6661: the position had to have substantial authority and the taxpayer had to
reasonably believe the position was "more likely than not" the proper treatment of the tax item. Disclosure of the position was irrelevant for tax shelter
items. I.R.C. § 6661 (1983); see supra note 42 (noting codification, amendment, and repeal history of I.R.C. § 6661 (1983)). After 1989, § 6662 continued this treatment for tax shelter items, but it was eliminated for corporate
taxpayers in 1994 and for all taxpayers in 2004. American Jobs Creation Act
of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 812(b), 118 Stat. 1418, 1578-79 (2004); Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 744(b)(1), 108 Stat.
4809, 5011 (1994). The § 6664 reasonable cause exception remains, however.
Nevertheless, Reg. § 1.6662-4(g)(1) remains, describing the former law for
noncorporate taxpayers and tax shelter items under § 6662.
112. IRS Urged to Rewrite ProposalTying Ethics Standardfor Tax
Return Preparersto Taxpayer UnderstatementPenalty, DAILY REP. FOR EXECS.
(BNA), Feb. 24, 1987, at K-1 [hereinafter IRS Urged to Rewrite Proposal];
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attack" on the tax bar, justifying militant resistance.113 On the other
extreme was an exceptional enthusiasm for Treasury's domination of the
tax bar, an enthusiasm expressed especially by tax law professors Bernard Wolfman and Michael Graetz. Professor Wolfman commended
Treasury for advancing its direct professional regulation claims." 4 He
agreed that Treasury had rightly reminded tax attorneys of their dual
obligations to the tax system and to clients," 5 and he encouraged Treasury to meet its "obligation to adopt regulations that make the system
work." 116 Both Professor Wolfman and Professor Graetz criticized the
tax bar and the recent Opinion 85-352. The former said that the Opinion "stops short of what it could and should do," while the latter characterized it as a "giggle test"-that is, that it authorized any return positions
the lawyer could articulate without a giggle." Professor Wolfman said
that the state bars have "never shown any inclination to enforce the standards" of any tax-related ABA ethics opinion,118 and Professor Graetz
said that "relying on the . . . professionals to prescribe appropriate standards of professional conduct . .. is an idea whose time has surely
passed." 119

Lin M. Trucksess, Note, Painting the Gray Zone Grayer: Why Substantial
Authority Fails as a Replacement for the Reasonable Basis Standard in
Assessing PractitionerConduct Under Circular 230, 8 VA. TAX REV. 743,
745-749 (1989); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Filling the Ethical Void: Treasury's
1986 Circular 230 Proposal, 112 TAX NOTES 691 (Aug. 21, 2006).
113. Doug Briggs, Tax Attorneys Debate Merits of Amendment to
Circular 230, 35 TAX NOTEs 635 (May 18, 1987) (describing comments made
by Jules Ritholtz at May 14, 1987, D.C. Bar program on tax practice ethics).
114. Letter from Bernard Wolfman, Professor, Harvard L. Sch., to
Leslie S. Shapiro, IRS Dir. of Prac. (Feb. 9, 1987), in Wolfman Recalls History
of Circular230, Suggests What Should Constitute SubstantialAuthority, 87
TAX NOTEs TODAY 30-24 (Feb. 9, 1987) [hereinafter 1987 Wolfman Letter].
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.; IRS Urged to Rewrite Proposal, supra note 112, at K-6
(comments of Professor Graetz). Professor Graetz did believe that the "giggle
test" of Opinion 85-352, supra note 20, was an improvement over the "laugh
out loud" test of Opinion 314, supra note 55.
118. 1987 Wolfman Letter, supra note 114.
119. IRS Urged to Rewrite Proposal, supra note 112, at K-6 (second omission in original).
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The weight of the comments was more moderate. There was general support for Treasury imposing a uniform standard on all tax practitioners (i.e., lawyers, CPAs, and enrolled agents), which Circular 230,
but not Opinion 85-352, would do.120 There was almost consensus that
Treasury should follow the lead of the ABA's Opinion 85-352, which
required advice as to the relevance of @ 6661 and advice with a realistic
possibility of success on the merits, but nothing else. 121 The AICPA concurred, emphasizing the importance of a uniform standard across the
tax professions. 122

There was near universal criticism of the technical definition of
"substantial authority" and near universal agreement that the mechanics of applying @ 6661 made it ill-suited for professional disciplinary purposes. Indeed, even Professor Wolfman, who was enthused for Treasury's
proposals and critical of the bar's resistance, argued that "substantial
authority" needed to be defined differently. 123 The consensus was that

120. See, e.g., Letter from Jane C. Bergner, Chair, Steering Comm.,
D.C. Bar Sec. of Tax'n, to Leslie S. Shapiro, IRS Dir. of Prac. (Feb. 13, 1987),
in Tax Section ofD.C. Bar Opposes Certain ProposedAmendments to Circular 230, 87 TAX NOTES TODAY 43-15 (Feb. 13, 1987) [hereinafter 1987 Bergner
Letter]; Letter from John B. Jones, Jr., Chair, ABA Sec. of Tax'n, to Leslie S.
Shapiro, IRS Dir. of Prac. (Feb. 12, 1987) [hereinafter 1987 Jones Letter], in
Paul J. Sax, Ethics in Tax Practice: CurrentIssues, 38TH ANN. TUL. TAX INST.,
Sept. 26-28, 1988, § 18, 57-58 (1988) [hereinafter Sax, Ethics].
121. See 1987 Bergner Letter, supra note 120; 1987 Jones Letter,
supra note 120; Jan. 9, 1987 Letter from David Sachs, Chair, N.Y.C. Bar
Ass'n, to Leslie S. Shapiro, IRS Dir. of Prac. (Jan. 9, 1987), in New York City
Bar Association Objects to ProposedSection 6661 Penalties, 87 TAX NOTES
TODAY 25-44 (Jan. 9, 1987) [hereinafter 1987 Sachs Letter].
122. At the time of its comments on the proposals, the AICPA
maintained that "reasonable basis" or "reasonable support" was an appropriate standard. However, acknowledging the importance of Opinion 85-352 for
lawyers and the usefulness of a uniform standard, the AICPA followed the
ABA's lead into the realistic possibility of success standard. Letter from Herbert J. Lerner, Chair, AICPA Fed. Tax'n Exec. Comm., & Leonard Podolin,
Chair, AICPA Resps. in Tax Prac. Subcomm., to Leslie S. Shapiro, IRS Dir.
of Prac. (Feb. 13, 1987), in Sax, Ethics, supra note 120, at 79-85. On the
nuances between the ABA and the eventually formalized AICPA versions of
the realistic possibility of success standard, see J. Timothy Philipps et al.,
What Partof RPOS Don't You Understand?:An Update and Survey of Standardsfor Tax Return Positions, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1163 (1994).
123. 1987 Wolfman Letter, supra note 114.
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the list of relevant authorities in that definition was simply inadequate,
especially in a time in which there had been such profound tax reform
and there was an ongoing backlog of regulations and guidance." According to the Tax Section, there was inadequate authority for resolving a
large proportion of tax issues." Professor Wolfman argued that the definition should be revised to be "more sensible and flexible," such as by
including proposed regulations and private letter rulings as authority.12
The mechanics of @ 6661 made it inappropriate in the professional disciplinary context, the tax bars complained, as it required considering
events subsequent to the advice and return positions unrelated to the
advice. 127
There was wide agreement that the enforcement of the proposed
standards had serious problems. One problem was the sanctions of suspension and disbarment from practice before the IRS. 12' Tax lawyers'
risked their livelihoods under Circular 230 in contrast to the small fine
($100) Congress imposed under @ 6694 on return preparers for negligence.129 In further contrast, the proposed standard under Circular 230
was no-fault, meaning a tax lawyer could be disbarred for good faith
advice that turned out to be mistaken.130 Whereas @ 6661 had a

124. 1987 Bergner Letter, supra note 120; 1987 Jones Letter, supra
note 120; 1987 Sachs Letter, supra note 121; IRS Urged to Rewrite Proposal,
supra note 112; Sterling L. Weaver & Anne M. Barr, NYSBA Tax Section,
Comments on Proposed Modifications of Circular 230 (1987), in NYSBA Tax
Section Lodges Opposition to ProposedAmendments to Circular230, 87 TAx
NOTES TODAY

35-10 (Feb. 23, 1987).

125. ABA Sec. of Tax'n, Comments on Notice of Proposed Rule
Making Under 31 CFR, Part 10 (Feb. 13, 1987), in Sax, Ethics, supra note
120, at 71-73 [hereinafter 1987 ABA Tax Section Comments].
126. 1987 Wolfman Letter, supra note at 114.
127. See, e.g., 1987 ABA Tax Section Comments, supra note 125;
1987 Sachs Letter, supra note 121.
128. 1987 Bergner Letter, supra note 120; 1987 Sachs Letter, supra
note 121.
129. From 1976 until 1989, § 6694(a) provided for a $100 per return
penalty. See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1203(b)(1), 90
Stat. 1520, 1689; Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L.
No. 101-239, § 7732, 103 Stat. 2106, 2402; see also 1987 ABA Tax Section
Comments, supra note 125.
130. 1987 Bergner Letter, supra note 120; 1987 Sachs Letter, supra
note 121.
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discretionary reasonable cause exception for taxpayers, there was no such
exception for tax professionals in the Circular 230 proposal.131 Compounding this problem was that a single instance of good faith, but mistaken, advice could result in disbarment. 132 Even Professor Wolfman
thought this problematic.133
In addition to criticizing technicalities of the Treasury proposal, the tax bars expressed general caution on several points.134
Unlike Professors Wolfman and Graetz, who urged Treasury to proceed regardless of resistance from the bars, the Tax Section warned
that professional principles can only be effective if widely accepted
by the professional community.135 The D.C. tax section warned that if
Treasury used a standard generally considered unfair, the system
would be overwhelmed with protests.136 The tax sections of the City
of New York Bar Association and the New York State Bar Association (NYSBA) predicted Treasury's efforts to enforce its proposals
would prove ineffective as courts would be unwilling to disbar attorneys under the proposed standards. 137 Treasury was warned that its
approach would simply encourage taxpayers to find more aggressive
advisors. 138 Caution was expressed as to the need of protecting important aspects of the U.S. legal system that transcended tax. One was
that the reasoned development of law required the fair consideration

131. Weaver & Barr, supra note 124.
132. 1987 Bergner Letter, supra note 120.
133. 1987 Wolfman Letter, supra note 114.
134. While there was a consensus on the technical points related to
substantial authority, I.R.C. § 6661 (1983), and the disciplinary penalties, there
were differences on more minor technical points. For one there was disagreement as to whether Treasury's use of the term "due diligence" was consistent
with ordinary usage, which tended to be less about exercising judgement and
more about investigating circumstances. On a second minor point, the ABA
Tax Section (and the AICPA) expressed concern for Treasury's proposal to
modify the title of Subpart B as it was apparently intended to subject a tax
practitioner to disbarment for not complying with the standards on the practitioner's personal return. Unlike the other parts of its 1986 proposals, Treasury
had not provided much of an explanation for this one. 1987 ABA Tax Section
Comments, supra note 125; 1987 Jones Letter, supra note 120.
135. 1987 Jones Letter, supra note 120.
136. 1987 Bergner Letter, supra note 120.
137. 1987 Sachs Letter, supra note 121.
138. 1987 Jones Letter, supra note 120.
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of different interpretations, and the impact of the proposals would be
to damage the give-and-take of the legal process, encouraging lockstep adherence to IRS views regardless of their legal basis or logic.139
Another was as to the conflicts of interest imposed by Treasury's proposals, especially as to relevance of the attorney-client privilege, which
made it problematic to question taxpayers as to the advice the attorney gave with respect to @ 6661.140 This would put the client in the
dilemma of waiving the privilege or jeopardizing the attorney's right
to practice.14 1 The New York tax bar worried that the availability of
the sanction of disbarment might be used by Treasury to extract settlements in audits of clients.14 2 Another worrisome conflict was Treasury acting as both prosecutor and judge in disciplinary proceedings
over those who practiced before it.143 Accordingly, both the ABA and
NYSBA tax sections proposed the incorporation of independent parties in the proceedings. 144
Treasury's 1986 Circular 230 proposals stalled. The response
to the proposals highlighted the importance of resolving the relationship between the Circular 230 professional standards and the @ 6661
penalty provision for taxpayers and the @ 6694 penalty provision for
preparers. Consideration of the proposed changes by Treasury were
suspended until Congress reviewed the I.R.C.'s penalty regime. 145
The 1986 proposals as such were eventually withdrawn. 14 6 Even though

&

139. 1987 Bergner Letter, supra note 120; IRS Urged to Rewrite
Proposal, supra note 112.
140. 1987 Sachs Letter, supra note 121; 1987 Bergner Letter, supra
note 120; IRS Urged to Rewrite Proposal, supra note 112.
141. 1987 Sachs Letter, supra note 121.
142. Id.; IRS Urged to Rewrite Proposal, supra note 112, at K-5
(Gregory Nowak of Stradley, Ronon, Stevens & Young in Philadelphia
expressed concern about the IRS using the threat of penalties in negotiations
as the "ultimate bargaining chip."); Weaver & Barr, supra note 124.
143. See, e.g., 1987 ABA Tax Section Comments, supra note 125.
144. 1987 ABA Tax Section Comments, supra note 125; Weaver
Barr, supra note 124.
145. See IRS Official Says Circular230 Tied to Resolution of Section 6661 Penalty, DAILY REP. FOR EXECS. (BNA), Oct. 5, 1988, at G-7; Standards of Tax Practice, 42 TAX LAW. 1493, 1493-94 (1989).
146. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Withdrawal of Proposed
Rule: Regulations Governing the Practice of Attorneys, Certified Public
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the proposals failed, some argued the proposals "performed a significant service by shifting the focus of analysis from an inevitably
fruitless attempt to derive a practitioner standard from the rules of
legal ethics, to a direct examination of the law governing taxpayer
behavior."147
B. Congress and Treasury Follow ABA's Lead
While Treasury had paused its push to increase its regulation of tax
lawyers until the I.R.C.'s penalties had been thoroughly reviewed, it
was not Circular 230 issues driving that penalty review. Driven by
concern over compliance generally and tax shelters particularly, the
number of penalty provisions had skyrocketed. 14 8 The tax acts in 1981,
1982, 1984, and 1986 had added so many penalties piecemeal that
there were more than 150 by 1988.149 There had been no integrated or
coherent penalty plan, and the result was that a single instance of noncompliance could be subject to so many penalties that the aggregate
penalty could be greater than the tax itself " The penalty structure

Accountants, Enrolled Agents, and Enrolled Actuaries Before the Internal
Revenue Service, 57 Fed. Reg. 46,356 (Oct. 8, 1992).
147. Durst, supra note 27, at 1052.
148. IRS Penalty Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Private Retirement Plansand Oversight of the InternalRevenue Service of the S.
Fin. Comm., 100th Cong. 1 (1988) [hereinafter S. Fin. PenaltyReform Hearing] (opening statement of Sen. David Pryor, Subcomm. Chair); Thomas R.
Hoffman, Note, Studies of the Code's Tax Penalty Structure: A Fitful Step
Towards Reform, 43 TAX LAW. 201, 201 (1989).
149. ABA, 1988 Report, supra note 25, at 6. Among other penalties,
especially those that targeted tax shelter promotors and investors specifically,
from 1981-1986, Congress had enacted penalties for substantial understatements
(including valuation misstatements); aiding and abetting understatements;
failure to file information returns; and filing frivolous returns; Congress also
added information reporting requirements and, generally, increased the penalties on a range of offenses. For an overview, see Hoffman, supranote 148, at
202-03; see also Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1501 et seq., 100
Stat. 2085, 2732 et seq.; Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369,
§ 141 et seq., 98 Stat. 494, 677 et seq.
150. ABA, 1988 Report, supra note 25, at 6-7.
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had become "a morass of inconsistency and irrationality."" As a result,
bar associations, the IRS, and Congress focused on restructuring taxpayer penalties."
1. CongressModifies § 6694: Realistic Possibility
In November 1987, the IRS Commissioner appointed an Executive Task
Force on Civil Penalties.153 With respect to the taxpayer understatement
penalty of @ 6661, the task force initially recommended a three-tier penalty to prompt taxpayers to use reasonable care with respect to taking
only undisclosed positions that were more likely than not to succeed or
disclosed positions that had a realistic possibility of success." With
respect to the @ 6694 preparer penalties and Circular 230, the initial

151. S. Fin. Penalty Reform Hearing, supra note 148, at 1 (statement of Sen. David Pryor, Subcomm. Chair); see also Hoffman, supra note
148, at 201.
152. See H.R. REP. No. 101-386, at 651-55 (1989); H.R. REP. No.
101-247, at 1387-94 (1989); JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 100TH CONG., JCX-11-89,
DESCRIPTION OF H.R. 2528 (IMPROVED PENALTY ADMINISTRATION AND COMPLI-

ANCE TAX ACT OF 1989) (1989); 1988 House Penalty Hearings, supra note 25,
at 6 (comments by Rep. J.J. Pickle, Subcomm. Chair); S. Fin. PenaltyReform
Hearing, supra note 148, at 1; ABA, 1988 Report, supra note 25, at 6;
Charles M. Morgan III, NYSBA Section of Taxation on Civil Penalties,38 TAX
NOTES 511 (Feb. 1, 1988); Winslow, supra note 25, at 851.
153. See Hoffman, supra note 148, at 201. Over the next two years,
it issued three reports: the first, which was focused on the philosophy of civil
tax penalties, in June 1988; the second, which was a working draft of a selection of chapters, in December 1988; and the final, 400-page report in February 1989. EXEC. TASK FORCE, IRS COMMISSIONER'S PENALTY STUDY, REPORT ON

CIVIL TAX PENALTIES (1989), in IRS Task Force Releases Penalty Reform Proposals, 89 TAX NOTES TODAY 45-36 (Feb. 22, 1989) [hereinafter 1989 TASK
FORCE REPORT]; EXEC. TASK FORCE, IRS COMMISSIONER'S PENALTY STUDY, WORKING DRAFT, CHAPTERS 1-4, 8: REPORT ON CIVIL TAX PENALTIES (1988), in IRS

Study Group Issues Working Draft Chapters of Study on Civil Tax Penalties,
88 TAX NOTES TODAY 247-8 (Dec. 8, 1988) [hereinafter 1988 DRAFT TASK FORCE
REPORT]; Exec. Task Force, IRS Commissioner's Penalty Study, A Philosophy
of Civil Tax Penalties(1988), in DAILY REP. FOR EXECS. (BNA), June 9, 1988, at
L-1. For a more detailed review and a critique of the reports, see Hoffman,
supra note 148, at 201; and Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., IRS Penalty Study: A Callfor
Objective Standards, 112 TAX NOTES 1183 (Sept. 25, 2006).
154. 1988 DRAFT TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 153, at 11, 32.
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recommendation was for it to reflect the @ 6661 taxpayer standards."
However, the task force's finalized recommendations for @ 6661 dropped
the more likely than not standard for undisclosed positions and proposed revising the substantial authority standard instead. 15 6 The revision would permit a greater range of authorities to be considered, but
the standard would be quantified and at only slightly below more
likely than not: greater than a 45% chance and approaching a 51%
chance of success." For both @ 6694 and Circular 230, the task force
proposed that preparers be required to use reasonable care to determine the taxpayer standards were met.158
While the IRS task force was at work reviewing penalties, so
too were the Tax Section and other tax professional organizations, which
were soon given the opportunity to testify before the House Ways and
Means Committee as it considered legislation to improve tax penalties. 159
The Tax Section had appointed a Penalties Task Force, which submitted a report to the Committee. The report recorded both the agreements
and disagreements within the task force. There was near unanimous
agreement that the definition of substantial authority for @ 6661 purposes
was problematic. First, it was not defined statutorily, which the task force
thought important for a penalty statute. 160 Second was Treasury's list of
relevant authorities. 161 Given the paucity of authority, practitioners had
to use certain documents in their research, such as private letter rulings,
and those same documents were also used by IRS personnel but were

155.

Id. at 34-35.
1989 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 153, ch. 8, at 39-43.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 46.
159. For a discussion of this report and the final recommendation,
along with a critique, see Winslow, supra note 25, at 880-81. The New York
State Bar Association Section of Taxation also produced a report on civil penalties, though it addressed broad issues rather than, for example, the § 6661
penalty. Morgan, supra note 152; see also Review of the Civil Penalty Provisions Contained in the Internal Revenue Code: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight ofthe H. Comm. on Ways & Means, on Recommendations
for Civil Tax PenaltyReform and H.R. 2528, 101st Cong. 7 (1989) [hereinafter
1989 House Hearings] (statement of Lawrence B. Gibbs, Jr., IRS Comm'r);
1988 House Penalty Hearings, supra note 25, at 2 (reprintingsubcomm. press
release of Mar. 7, 1988).
160. ABA, 1988 Report, supra note 25, at 23.
161. Id.

156.
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not included in the list of acceptable authorities."12 Third, the legislative
history defined substantial authority with reference to the more likely
than not standard, which suggested the tax lawyers would need to calculate chances of success in court, which they claimed could not be done
so precisely.163 While they agreed on the substantial authority problems,
the task force was divided on the bigger question: should @ 6661 be
retained? A minority favored retaining @ 6661 as it was the only sanction (other than negligence) on aggressive (but not fraudulent) positions. 164
The majority, however, argued that Congress had enacted @ 6661 out of
an inadequate understanding of the @ 6653 negligence standard and that,
especially in permitting escape from the penalty for a position taken in
good faith and with reasonable cause, the @ 6661 understatement penalty was effectively merged with, or at least significantly overlapped,
the @ 6653 negligence penalty 165 But the legislative process moved along,
and as it became clear that the task force was an outlier in supporting
elimination of @ 6661, Tax Section leaders feared becoming irrelevant.
The plenary session of the Tax Section voted in favor of retaining the
@ 6661 penalty but recommending the definition of "substantial authority" be broadened and the penalty imposed only if the taxpayer had not
used reasonable care and good faith. 166
Building on these hearings, the Improving Penalty Administration and Compliance Tax (IMPACT) Act of 1989 was enacted as part of
the Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act of 1989.167 It won support

162. Id.
163. Substantial authority was to be considered less stringent than
a more likely than not standard. "If probability of success would mean a
greater than 50 percent chance of success in court, then a return preparer is
left with attempting to calculate the odds on some lesser chance of success.
Trial lawyers cannot calculate chances of success on such a refined basis." Id.
164. Id. at 25.
165. Id.
166. 1988 House Penalty Hearings, supra note 25, at 455 (comments of Rep. J.J. Pickle, Subcomm. Chair); Actions Taken by Section of Taxation at the 1989 May Meeting, ABA SEC. TAX'N NEWSL., Summer 1989, at 63;
Pat Jones, Where Congress Stands on Penalties;ABA Tax Section Retreats,
43 TAX NOTES 935, 935 (May 22, 1989).
167. IMPACT (H.R. 2528, 101st Cong. (1989)) became part of the
Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1989. H.R. REP. No. 101-247 (1989); S. FIN.
COMM. EXPLANATION OF "REVENUE RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1989" (TITLE

VI)

OF

FISCAL 1990 BUDGET RECONCILIATION LEGISLATION, AS APPROVED BY COMMITTEE
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from both tax administrators and tax professionals.168 It consolidated the
@ 6661 taxpayer understatement penalty, the @ 6653 negligence penalty,
and various valuation penalties into a single I.R.C. section: @ 6662.169 It
added @ 6664, which precluded imposition of a @ 6662 penalty if there
was reasonable cause and the taxpayer had acted in good faith.170 It also
lengthened the list of authorities relevant for determining substantial
authority and required the IRS to publish a list of positions that it did
not consider to have substantial authority.171 It did not quantify the standard. Given its persistent criticism of the definition of substantial authority, especially its list of relevant authorities, the changes were significant
improvements from the tax bar's perspective.
During the legislative process, great attention had been paid to
the @ 6661 substantial understatement penalty for taxpayers, but much
less attention, however, had been paid to its counterpart in @ 6694 for
preparers. 1 2 Prior to 1989, @ 6694 penalized a return preparer for negligence or intentional disregard of rules and regulations, and Treasury Regulations had long interpreted this to protect from the penalty any position

OCT. 4, 1989, AND COMM. PRESS RELEASE (M-11) ON ACTIONS TAKEN, DATED

OCT. 19, 1989 (1989). The Revenue Reconciliation Act was passed as part of
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7721,
103 Stat. 2106, 2395. It was codified in part at I.R.C. §§ 6662-66 and 6694.
168. For a detailed discussion of the legislative process and the
eventual wide support for the final version, see Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Tax Politics and a New Substantial Understatement Penalty, 113 TAX NOTES 91
(Oct. 2, 2006).
169. Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7721(a), 103 Stat. at 2395-97.
170. Id. at 2398.
171. Id. at 2396. The section was renumbered as J.R.C.§ 6662(d)(3)
and rephrased in its current form in 2004. American Jobs Creation Act of
2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, §§ 812(b), (d), (e)(1), 819(a)-(b), 118 Stat. 1418,
1578-80, 1584-85; see also Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii), 56 Fed. Reg. 67,492,
67,501-02 (Dec. 31, 1991).
172. The IRS Commissioner's Advisory Group worried that return
preparer penalties had not received the attention or analysis devoted to taxpayer accuracy penalties and reported that while the group differed on what
preparer penalties should be, they agreed greater study was needed. Letter
from John B. Jones, Jr., Chair, Commissioner's Advisory Group, to Michael J.
Murphy, Acting IRS Comm'r (June 19, 1989), in CAG Indicates Approval of
Penalty Reform Bill, but Cautions Against Restrictive Standardsfor Return
Preparers,89 TAX NOTES TODAY 134-20 (June 19, 1989).
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taken "in good faith and with a reasonable basis." 173 For the most part,
the Tax Section's Penalty Task Force favored @ 6694 as it was, with the
Task Force reporting the penalty had contributed to improved compliance and the IRS had provided good guidance. 1 4 Perhaps out of a better sense of the politics of the penalty reform than the ABA had, the
AICPA, however, recommended changing @ 6694 to reflect the realistic
possibility standard of Opinion 85-352.175 Indeed, the AICPA had recently
amended its own professional standards to reflect the ABA standard. 17 6

173.

In its original version, § 6694(b) read as follows:

(b) Willful Understatement of Liability.-If any part of any
understatement of liability with respect to any return or
claim for refund is due to a willful attempt in any manner to
understate the liability for a tax by a person who is an
income tax return preparer with respect to such return or
claim, such person shall pay a penalty of $500 with respect
to such return or claim. With respect to any return or claim,
the amount of the penalty payable by any person by reason
of this subsection shall be reduced by the amount paid by
such person by reason of subsection (a).
Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1203(b)(1), 90 Stat. 1520, 1689
(emphasis added). Treasury Regulations interpreting § 6694 were added in
1977. 42 Fed. Reg. 59,968-69 (Nov. 23, 1977).
174. ABA, 1988 Report, supra note 25, at 34-35. The Task Force
encouraged the IRS to issue additional guidance, and it suggested that a disciplinary review board be incorporated into the § 6694 case process.
175. 1989 House Hearings, supra note 159, at 123 (statement of
Arthur S. Hoffman, Fed. Tax'n Exec. Comm. Chair, AICPA).
176. Before 1988, the AICPA standard was "reasonable support,"
but it was changed in 1988 to be realistic possibility of success, using language
very similar to ABA Opinion 85-352, supra note 20. AICPA, Statement on
Responsibilities in Tax Practice no. 1 (1988 rev.); see also AICPA Revises
Guidelines on Responsibilitiesof Tax Practice,DAILY REP. FOR EXECS. (BNA),
Sept. 14, 1988, at G-1. The AICPA opposed expressing the realistic possibility
of success in terms of percentages odds. AICPA, Comments on Proposed
Regulations 1.6694 Preparer Penalties, in AICPA Tax Division Comments on
Penalty Regs., 91 TAX NOTES TODAY 124-22 (May 22, 1991); see also AICPA
Suggests Modifications to Disclosure Penalty's 'RealisticPossibility of Success' Standard, 90 TAX NOTES TODAY 153-14 (July 24, 1990). Some argued that
the AICPA and ABA positions differed in terms of percentages odds: the
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It urged Congress to adopt the realistic possibility standard for undisclosed positions and the not frivolous standards for disclosed ones, which
it said would conform the penalty with the professional standards and
allow differences of legal interpretations but require "a higher standard
of practitioner conduct than the existing reasonable basis standard."'?
Given that the Tax Section's concerns for the definition of substantial authority had been addressed and given that the IRS Task Force
had recommended using the same standards for taxpayers as return preparers, it is surprising that Congress did not modify @ 6694 to subject
return preparers to the substantial authority standard. It also did not follow the Tax Section's Penalty Task Force recommendation to leave
@ 6694 as it was. Instead, it followed the AICPA recommendation to
align @ 6694 with ABA Opinion 85-352 and the corresponding AICPA
standard. Congress revised @ 6694 to penalize a preparer for any understatement of tax on a return due to an undisclosed position for which
there was not a realistic possibility of being sustained on the merits or
a disclosed position that was frivolous.17 8
2. § 6694 Regulations Follow Tax Section's Opinion
Task Force
What would realistic possibility of success mean for @ 6694 purposes?
The IRS wasted no time and issued preliminary guidance in 1990, which
previewed the regulations that were finalized by the end of 1991.179
Although the organized tax bar had pledged allegiance to the realistic
possibility standard in response to Treasury's Circular 230 proposal to

AICPA realistic possibility standard being about a 25% chance of success,
and the ABA realistic possibility standard being about a 30% chance. Randall W. Roth & Douglas C. Smith, CurrentEthical Problems in Advising Clients, C482 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 773, 815 (1990).
177. 1989 House Hearings, supra note 159, at 123 (statement of
Arthur S. Hoffman, Fed. Tax'n Exec. Comm. Chair, AICPA). ABA Opinion
85-352, supra note 20, only addressed disclosure with respect to those items
that lacked substantial authority and thus might subject the taxpayer to the
§ 6661 penalty. It did not provide a standard lower than realistic possibility for
disclosed positions.
178. Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1203(b)(1), 90 Stat. at 1689, amended by
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7737, 103
Stat. 2106, 2404.
179. Notice 90-20, 1990-1 C.B. 328.
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impose the substantial authority standard in 1986, insisting no other standard should govern their professional advising, the codification of the
standard in @ 6694 revealed considerable uncertainty within that bar as
to what the standard meant. Reflecting on these disagreements, the ABA
Civil Penalties Task Force commented on the IRS's proposed guidance:
by "adopting the professional conduct standard, Congress has entered
the professional debate about the meaning of the standard," yet the "meaning of the 'realistic possibility' language is still debated in the Tax Section."180 There was consensus among the tax bar that this language was
preferable to the language of substantial authority, but there was no consensus as to what it meant.
One issue was the relationship of reasonable basis to realistic
possibility. Some were not convinced that the realistic possibility standard was stricter than the reasonable basis standard.181 They understood
the standard in Opinion 85-352 to be more a restatement than a rejection of the reasonable basis standard.1 2 This, of course, was quite a different understanding than that of the Opinion Task Force, which had
explicitly rejected the reasonable basis standard and insisted that the realistic possibility standard was measurably elevated over the reasonable
basis standard. Congress had consolidated the former @ 6653 negligence
standard into the new @ 6662, and Treasury proposed regulations that
an undisclosed position that lacked a reasonable basis would be subject
to the penalty, while disclosed positions would be subject to the penalty
only if frivolous.183 Thus, the bar wondered what the difference was not
only between realistic possibility and reasonable basis but also between

180. ABA Civil Penalties Task ForceMembers Release Comments
on Notice 90-20, 90 TAX NOTES TODAY 178-4 (Aug. 16, 1990) [hereinafterABA
Notice Comments].
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Interestingly, while reasonable basis had long been the working standard for the negligence penalty, Treasury never issued a regulation
under § 6653 (1987) formalizing it as the standard. Treasury had acknowledged it as the negligence standard in the regulations on the substantial understatement penalty under § 6661. T.D. 8017, 50 Fed. Reg. 12,012 (Mar. 27,
1985). Following the codification of § 6662 (see supra note 167 and accompanying text), Treasury proposed formalizing this in Prop. Regs. § 1.6662-3(c)(1)
(1991) (negligence penalty) and § 1.6662-(4)(e) (1991) (substantial understatement). 56 Fed. Reg. 8943, 8949, 8953 (Mar. 4, 1991) (notice of proposed
rulemaking). For discussion, see Zelenak, supra note 27, at 475.
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reasonable basis and not frivolous. Legislative history made clear Congress considered the three standards to be different, ranging from not
frivolous to realistic possibility in terms of strictness. 184 Yet the Chair
of the Tax Section had equated reasonable basis and realistic possibility
of success in his testimony to Congress, and, in its report on the proposed regulations, the Tax Section argued that reasonable basis and nonfrivolous were identical standards.185 To the extent Opinion 85-352 derived
the realistic possibility standard from the minimal justification for litigation, equating it with "not frivolous" was consistent with the litigation standards of the Tax Court (with "reasonable basis" being dropped
from usage due its history of confusion).186 Nevertheless, it was clear
that this was not Treasury's perspective on how the phrases related.
There were also questions on the other end of the spectrum: how
does realistic possibility relate to substantial authority? The realistic possibility standard originated in Opinion 85-352, and that Opinion explicitly stated that there might be a realistic possibility of success even where
there is no substantial authority. 187 Treasury proposed that the substantial authority standard was lower than the more likely than not standard,

184. H.R. REP. No. 101-247, at 1388, 1393 (1989); Zelenak, supra
note 27, at 472-73.
185. ABA Sec. of Tax'n, Comments Concerning Proposed Regulations Under Code Sections 6662, 6664, and 6694 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986, at 8-9, 11-12, in Penalties:ABA Task Force Members Instruct
Service on Reforming Reform, 91 TAX NOTES TODAY 123-46 (June 3, 1991)
[hereinafter 1991 ABA Comments]; Zelenak, supra note 27, at 473. Professor
Calvin Johnson also considered the realistic possibility language to be a
restatement, a clarification of reasonable basis, not a rejection of it. Calvin H.
Johnson, Tax Return Positions in Contempt of Civil Penalties, 33 TAX NOTES
501, 502 (Nov. 3, 1986).
186. The Tax Section Task Force on Civil Penalties concluded that
use of the term "reasonable basis" was confusing and served no purpose. In
contrast, the term "frivolous" connotated a position that failed to meet the
standards required for litigation. It was the lower limit of permissible positions that could be advanced in the Tax Court under applicable procedural
rules. Thus, a frivolous position was negligent, and should be penalized, even
if disclosed. 1991 ABA Comments, supra note 185; see also Zelenak, supra
note 27, at 472-73.
187. Opinion 85-352, supra note 20, at 633.
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and no one in the bar questioned this. 188 But the Treasury's reference to
the "rare case" position that had substantial authority but not a realistic
possibility left the bar puzzled. 189 It is possible this idea originated in
the Opinion Task Force's report providing that "ordinarily" a position
with substantial authority would also have a realistic possibility of success. 190 But, regardless, in the end, the "rare case" reference was dropped
in the final regulations. 191 This left a simpler scheme: not frivolous, reasonable basis, realistic possibility, substantial authority, and more likely
than not ran along a continuum.
Treasury proposed that this continuum could be quantified, at
least with respect to the more likely than not and realistic possibility standards. It proposed:
[A] position will be considered to have satisfied the realistic possibility standard if a reasonable and wellinformed analysis by a person knowledgeable in the tax
law would lead such a person to conclude that the position has approximately a one in three, or greater, likelihood of being sustained on its merits. 192
It was the Tax Section's Opinion Task Force that had first quantified
the realistic possibility standard as being met with a one-in-three
chance of success. 193 Despite the approach originating in that 1986 task
force, there was not now much enthusiasm in the tax bar for the approach.

188. See Prop. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(2) (1991), 56 Fed. Reg. at 8952.
This was the AICPA position too. See AICPA Tax Div., Statement on Responsibilities in Tax Practice, Interpretation No. 1-1 (1990), in DAILY REP. FOR
ExEcs. (BNA), Dec. 13, 1990, at L-17.
189. N.Y. St. Bar Ass'n Tax Section Comm. on Compliance & Penalties, Report on Proposed Regulations Relating to the Accuracy-Related
Penalty, in N.Y. State Bar Releases Report on ProposedAccuracy-Related
Penalty Regs., 91 TAX NOTES TODAY 193-16 (Sept. 13, 1991); Zelenak, supra
note 27, at n.20.
190. Sax et al., supra note 21, at 639.
191. T.D. 8382, 56 Fed. Reg. 67,509 (Dec. 31, 1991).
192. Id. at 67,511.
193. The Opinion Task Force had reported a "position having a
likelihood of success closely approaching one-third should meet the standard" (emphasis added). Sax et al., supra note 21, at 638-39. Treasury's standard was somewhat different: "approximately a one in three, or greater." 56
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It seemed sufficient to the Commissioner's Advisory Group for the regulations to avoid quantification of the standard and simply to describe
'realistic possibility' as being somewhat less stringent than 'substantial authority' and somewhat more stringent than 'reasonable basis.'"'194
Some members of the Tax Section's Civil Penalties Task force were willing to accept the one-in-three approach as a "helpful" and "simple rule
of thumb" for preparers making choices when preparing returns, but not
as more than that.1 95 Other members of that task force objected not to
the principle of quantification so much as the odds given, arguing that
one-in-three was "inappropriately high" for a realistic possibility of success, which perhaps only required a 10-20% chance. 196 Many commentators voiced the concern that the quantified approach was simply too
difficult given the messiness of the real world and the uncertainty of much
tax law. 197 The Commissioner's Advisory Group said that it amounted
to a second test: first, the preparer would analyze authorities to determine if there was a realistic possibility and then determine if the onein-three test were met. 198 Some members of the Civil Penalties Task Force
insisted that the standard should be based on the conduct of the preparer
rather than the preparer's ability to forecast outcomes. 199 The consensus of the Task Force was that, even if the quantified approach was useful as a simple rule of thumb, making the test turn on the preparer's
predictions created an wholly impractical standard:
In litigation over the penalty, for example, if the practitioner against whom the penalty is asserted is able to
produce another practitioner willing to testify, "I
think this position had about a one-in-three chance

Fed. Reg. at 67,511 (emphasis added). Often, the Opinion Task Force's position is summarized as the latter rather than the former.
194. Commissioner's Advisory Grp., Comments on Proposed Regulations (1991), in Commissioner'sAdvisory Group Comments on Preparer
PenaltyRegs., 91 TAX NOTES TODAY 122-53 (May 14, 1991) [hereinafter CAG
Comments].
195. ABA Notice Comments, supra note 180.
196. Id.
197. Zelenak, supra note 27, at 473-74; T.D. 8382, 56 Fed. Reg.
67,509 (Dec. 31, 1991) (Treasury discussion of public comments on proposed
regulations).
198. CAG Comments, supra note 194.
199. ABA Notice Comments, supra note 180.
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of prevailing," what is the Service's response? Is it to
put on a witness who says, "I think it had less than a
one- in-three chance of prevailing." Who is right?
Could either side really find a qualified witness who,
in good faith, could assess the odds of winning a fairly
close case in litigation? Will a district judge be able to
tell? What kind of analysis could he put in an opinion?
Will that opinion be of any precedential use in future
penalty proceedings?2 0 0
Despite the criticism, Treasury retained the one-in-three language in the final regulations. 201 It justified the retention on the theory
that "a numerical benchmark helps prevent erosion of the standard and
because other definitions suggested by commentators would not provide
any more meaningful guidance." 202 Thus, the Tax Section's Opinion Task
Force cemented its influence: its one-in-three interpretation became finalized in Treasury Regulations five years later, over the objections of many
tax lawyers.
One of Treasury's proposals that had no counterpart in the work
of the Opinion Task Force was to limit the authorities that could be used
in determining whether there was a realistic possibility of success. Treasury proposed limiting those authorities to the ones permitted for use
in determining substantial authority for the taxpayer penalty provisions.
While Congress had lengthened the list of authorities approved for that
purpose, the Commissioner's Advisory Group objected to using that list
for determining the realistic possibility for a position because the realistic possibility standard was intended to be less stringent than the substantial authority standard. 203 By tying the two together, the realistic
possibility standard of @ 6694 would have a different meaning than the
realistic possibility standard of Opinion 85-352.204 There was also concern that the list remained too short still insofar as it did not include "wellreasoned treatises and articles which are commonly used in professional
tax research and often cited by the courts." 205 Ultimately, Treasury

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

1991 ABA Comments, supra note 185, at 46.
56 Fed. Reg. at 67,511.
Id.
CAG Comments, supra note 194.
Philipps et al., supra note 122, at 1169-70.
CAG Comments, supra note 194.
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finalized the regulations without expanding the list to treatises and articles and other secondary sources, having concluded "it would be too difficult to administratively determine which of these secondary sources
were well-reasoned or were otherwise accurate expressions of the tax
law" and that, in any event, "the regulations provide sufficient protection to preparers by allowing them to rely on the authorities underlying
the conclusions in the secondary sources." 2 06
While there were other criticisms and suggestions of bar members in response to Treasury's proposals, the real problem was the relationship between the preparer's penalty standard and the taxpayer's. 2 07
The attempt to simplify the penalty regime had resulted in "four different accuracy standards-substantial authority, realistic possibility, reasonable basis, and not frivolous-all of them somewhere south of more
likely than not and north of frivolity." 208 The relationship of the standards was not simple, and they did not align for preparers and their clients. 2 09 For example, a return preparer would not be subject to a @ 6694
penalty for an undisclosed position that had a realistic possibility of success, while that same position, if it were short of substantial authority,
would subject the taxpayer-client to a @ 6662 penalty if the dollar amounts
were sufficient. Or, if the amount was not sufficient to implicate the
@ 6662 substantial understatement penalty, a position with a reasonable

206. 56 Fed. Reg. at 67,511.
207. As to other criticisms, consider, for example, the Tax Section's
Civil Penalties Task Force argued that "the crux of the new standard provided
in section 6694 rests in the requirement that the preparer 'knew (or reasonably
should have known)' that the position taken fell short of a 'realistic possibility
of being sustained,' not whether a 'realistic possibility' in fact existed." ABA
Notice Comments, supra note 180. That Task Force also argued that an undisclosed position contrary to a revenue ruling should not constitute disregard of
a rule because a revenue ruling is not a "rule." 1991 ABA Comments, supra
note 185, at 46; and the Commissioner's Advisory Group suggested that, if for
any reason a numeric test is deemed necessary, it should be stated as a safe
harbor rather than as a minimum standard. CAG Comments, supra note 194.
208. Zelenak, supra note 27, at 472.
209. As will be discussed in Part IIC.1, infra, § 6662 was amended
in 1993 to modify the taxpayer disclosure requirements. After the modifications, to avoid the § 6662 substantial understatement penalty, a disclosed
position had to have a reasonable basis. As to the § 6662 negligence penalty,
disclosure was no longer relevant as the underlying standard had been raised
from "not frivolous" to reasonable basis.
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basis but not a realistic possibility of success would need to be disclosed
to protect the preparer from penalty but could remain undisclosed without exposing the taxpayer to penalty."'
Some asked Treasury for more time before finalizing the new
realistic possibility of success regulations under @ 6694. They insisted
that Treasury work with the members of the bar and other professional
organizations to arrive at a consensus on the standards, so that the same
standards would apply for penalty purposes as for professional ethics
purposes.2 " Treasury, however, would not wait. The regulations were
finalized by the end of 1991, two years after the IMPACT penalty reform
and six years after the Tax Section had first coined the phrase "realistic
possibility of success." There were still variations in what that phrase

210. Zelenak, supra note 27, at 471-72. Professor Zelenak put the
failure of the standards to align in the historical context:
The argument for eliminating one or the other of the two
standards is strengthened by the observation that the existence of two such similar standards is the result of an historical accident. Persons familiar with the deliberations which
resulted in the introduction of the realistic possibility standard by ABA Opinion 85-352 indicate that the ABA might
well have been willing to adopt substantial authority as the
ethical standard for return preparation and advice, but for
dissatisfaction with the narrow view of the regulations as to
what items could be considered in making the substantial
authority determination. The 1989 legislation then adopted
the realistic possibility standard from Opinion 85-352 (with
minor modifications) as the preparer penalty standard. The
coexistence of the two standards in the code's penalty provisions can thus be traced to practitioner unhappiness with
the narrow regulatory definition of what constituted valid
authorities for purposes of the substantial authority determination. Ironically, the legislative history of the 1989
amendments disapproved of that narrow regulatory definition, and Notice 90-20 and the proposed regulations have
expanded the definition accordingly. Having both a realistic
possibility standard and a substantial authority standard is
thus an anachronism.
Id. at 476 (footnotes omitted).
211. 1991 ABA Comments, supra note 185, at 46.
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meant, but Treasury had settled what it would mean for penalizing return
preparers under @ 6694.
3. Circular230 Incorporates§ 6694 and Realistic Possibility
Once Treasury had finalized the @ 6694 regulations at the end of 1991,
it returned to considering Circular 230.212 It withdrew the 1986 proposal
to impose substantial authority that had been so vigorously resisted.2 1 3
It proposed aligning Circular 230 with @ 6694, which now included the
realistic possibility standard from Opinion 85-352.214 The proposed
@ 10.34 would require a practitioner not advise a client to take an undisclosed position without a realistic possibility of success or a disclosed
position that was frivolous. A practitioner would be prohibited from signing a return that failed those standards. 2 After announcing the proposal,
Treasury fast-tracked the process: a mere month-long comment period
followed by a public hearing in December. 216 When the regulations were
finalized in 1994, there were only minor revisions. 217
The leaders of both the Tax Section and the AICPA united behind
the realistic possibility of success standard as uniform for all preparers. 211
Although the Tax Section had vigorously resisted the substantial authority standard in the 1986 proposal, the Chair of its Tax Standards Committee now claimed that the proposal had been a good thing "because it

212. IA-20-92, 57 Fed. Reg. 46,356 (Oct. 8, 1992) (notice of proposed rulemaking).
213. Rita L. Zeidner, Service Proposes New Return Preparer
Guidance, 57 TAX NOTES 296, 297-98 (Oct. 19, 1992).
214. Although both Circular 230 and the § 6694 regulations restricted
the relevant authority types for determining realistic possibility to those listed
for substantial authority purposes in Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii) (1991), the
§ 6694 regulation but not Circular 230 required the same type of analysis for
realistic possibility analysis as for substantial authority analysis. Reg. § 1.66942(b)(1) (1991); see also Philipps et al., supra note 122, at 1168 n.27.
215. 57 Fed. Reg. at 46,359-60.
216. Id. at 46,356; see also Zeidner, supra note 213, at 296. The
regulations were proposed in Oct. 1992; the public hearing was on Dec. 1992;
and the regulations were finalized in June 1994. T.D. 8545, 59 Fed. Reg.
31,523 (June 20, 1994).
217. 59 Fed. Reg. at 31,523.
218. Zeidner, supra note 213, at 297-98.
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got everybody to the table."2 1 9 Michael Durst, who chaired the Tax Section's Tax Standards Committee while much of the debate over the conduct rules was taking place, thought Treasury had "made the right
decision in making the regulations consistent with the" new @ 6694.220
In general, the tax bar and other professional groups supported the new
approach, though many also thought it needed to be "fine-tun[ed]" in
some respects.2 " The Tax Section of the D.C. Bar suggested that the Internal Revenue Manual be modified to require the standard also be met by
IRS employees. 2
A few commentators were more critical, largely echoing the critics of the @ 6694 regulations. Some argued that the realistic possibility
language was, in fact, not a higher standard than not frivolous.2 2 3 Others did not wonder where on the continuum of standards it was but did
take issue with Circular 230 incorporating the one-in-three success standard. One criticism along that line was that the one-in-three language
was not part of the official language in Opinion 85-352 (or the AICPA
counterpart) but rather originated with the Opinion Task Force report
on Opinion 85-352, which should be given no weight.22 4 More generally
it was criticized for being impractical, especially given that any disputes
as to whether the standard had been met by a given practitioner would
lead to an intractable battle of expert witnesses.225 It was suggested the
focus instead should be on whether the practitioner had been sufficiently
conscientious in his or her research, reaching a well-reasoned conclusion in good faith, rather than premising the penalty on "a hindsight
debate over odds-making acumen." 2 26 Others accepted the quantified
approach but urged a longer list of authorities that could support the

219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.; see also D.C. Bar Tax'n Sec., Comments on the Proposed
Amendments to Circular 230 (1992), in D.C. Bar Tax Section Responds to
Circular 230 Proposal, 92 TAX NOTES TODAY 259-21 (Dec. 22, 1992) [hereinafter D.C. Bar Comments].
222. D.C. Bar Comments, supra note 221.
223. See T.D. 8545, 59 Fed. Reg. 31,523, 31,524 (June 20, 1994).
224. Letter from Steven C. Salch, to IRS (Nov. 12, 1992), in Commentator Is Critical of ProposedRules on Practice Before the IRS, 92 TAX
NOTEs TODAY 235-68 (Nov. 12, 1992) [hereinafter Salch Letter].
225. See T.D. 8545, 59 Fed. Reg. at 31,524-25; Salch Letter, supra
note 224; D.C. Bar Comments, supra note 221.
226. Salch Letter, supra note 224.
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realistic possibility determination, specifically including "well-reasoned
treatises, articles in recognized professional tax publications, and
other reference tools commonly used by practitioners." 2 2 7 Some critics
worried that requiring practitioners to advise taxpayer-clients of potential penalties would invite questions on audit as to information protected by the attorney-client privilege.2 2 In general, Treasury defended its
approach on all these issues in Circular 230 by its similarity with the
@ 6694 approach, and, on the quantification issue specifically, it emphasized the usefulness of the quantified approach to defending erosion of
the standard over time. 229
With its 1986 proposals, Treasury had suffered serious criticism
as to the harsh discipline-suspension or disbarment-a practitioner
could face from a single failure to meet the return position standard. Treasury had learnt its lesson and, as for the new proposals, made clear that
discipline would be warranted only for those who failed the standard
"willfully, recklessly, or through gross incompetence" and that those
acting with reasonable cause and good faith would be protected. 2 1 While
most of the tax bar and others seemed generally content with this
approach, some criticized the complexity of the cross references in

227. T.D. 8545, 59 Fed. Reg. at 31,524; CAG Comments, supra
note 194; D.C. Bar Comments, supra note 221.
228. D.C. Bar Comments, supra note 221.
229. T.D. 8545, 59 Fed. Reg. at 31,524. As to protecting the standard for erosion, Steven Salch responded:
Subsequent to the publication of the Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, the Director of Practice has been quoted as
explaining the "one in three benchmark" was included to
"prevent erosion of the standard." In the context of Circular
230, that seems both unnecessary and inappropriate. At
least initially, Treasury will be enforcing its own standard. . . . Presumably at the initial phase, Treasury can protect itself against the erosion of its own standard by its own
decisions.
Salch Letter, supra note 224.
230. IA-20-92, 57 Fed. Reg. 46,356, 46,357 (Oct. 8, 1992) (notice of
proposed rulemaking).
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@ 10.34, and others objected to the burden of proof being placed on the
practitioner.231
Beyond these technical concerns, the alignment of Circular 230
and @ 6694 was significant for two reasons. First, it meant that Treasury
took return preparation advice, not just tax shelter opinions, under its
Circular 230 regulation for the first time, and it did so without significant resistance from the tax bar to Treasury's claim of authority. Second, Circular 230 would reflect @ 6694 preparer standards, which were
different from @ 6662 taxpayer standards. Return preparers and their
taxpayer-clients being subject to different standards created problems. 2 32
For a position that was not sufficiently large in terms of tax dollars to
be subject to the substantial understatement penalty prong of @ 6662,
the taxpayer needed only a reasonable basis to avoid the negligence penalty prong of @ 6662 while the return preparer needed to meet the realistic possibility standard of both @ 6694 and now Circular 230. This meant
that if the taxpayer prepared his or her own return, the reasonable basis
standard would apply, while if a professional were involved, he or she
would need to demand the realistic possibility standard. 233 Of course,
as this problem was caused by aligning Circular 230 with @ 6694, it was
not a problem that could be wholly solved by amending Circular 230.
The problem was the misalignment of @ 6662 and @ 6694.
C. SubstantialAuthority Wins
Although Congress and Treasury had followed the ABA's lead in adopting the realistic possibility standard for preparers, the substantial authority standard would eventually prevail. Some relatively minor changes
in the @ 6662 taxpayer penalty standard after the 1989 IMPACT Act
prompted a reconsideration of the reasonable basis standard, including

231.

D.C. Bar Comments, supra note 221; Barbara Kirchheimer,

IRS' Shapiro Gives Insight into Circular230 ProposedRules, 92 TAX NOTES
TODAY 227-6 (Nov. 12, 1992).
232. Letter from Michael C. Durst, Att'y, to IRS (Nov. 9, 1992), in
Circular 230 Amendments Incorporate Different Return Standardsfor Preparers and Taxpayers, Attorney Says, 92 TAX NOTEs TODAY 231-25 (Nov. 9,
1992) [hereinafter Durst Letter]; F.R. Nagle, News Roundup from the ABA
Tax Section's Midyear Meeting: Practitioners Complain to IRS 's Shapiro
over Circular230 Rules, 58 TAX NOTES 841 (Feb. 15, 1993).
233. See Durst Letter, supra note 232; Nagle, supra note 232.
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discussion of its relationship to the realistic possibility standard. As part
of a broader IRS reform effort, Congress mandated that the Joint Committee and Treasury prepare reports on the penalty provisions and recommendations for their improvement. Despite the considerable focus on
the issue for several years, Congress took no action until it unexpectedly inserted the more likely than not standard into the @ 6694 preparer
penalty provision. This triggered a loud rallying of the tax bar around
the substantial authority standard as its replacement. The bar was successful in its support of the standard it had once rallied so loudly against.
By 2010, Opinion 85-352, along with the legal ethics regime that was
its source, had become practically irrelevant as substantial authority was
incorporated into both @ 6694 and Circular 230, replacing the realistic
possibility standard.
1. Reasonable Basis

Again

After the IMPACT Act of 1989, the @ 6662 taxpayer negligence and
understatement penalties and the @ 6694 preparer penalty could be
avoided by disclosure so long as the position was not frivolous. 23 4 That
meant a position that was not "patently improper."235 "Concerned that
the not frivolous standard did not "sufficiently discourage taxpayers"
from "taking unreasonable return positions" and that a "tougher standard" was needed, Congress replaced the @ 6662 not frivolous standard
with reasonable basis in 1993.236 The definition of reasonable basis was
left to Treasury, which invited comments and issued temporary and
proposed regulations in spring 1994.237

234. As for the negligence penalty, Reg. § 1.6662-3(c) provided an
exception for adequate disclosure of a not frivolous position, as did Reg.
§ 1.6662-4 for the understatement penalty, and §§ 1.6694-2(c) & -3(c)(2) provided similarly for the preparer penalty. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13251, 107 Stat. 312, 531; WMCP 103-11,
supra note 51, at 316.
235. WMCP 103-11, supra note 51, at 317. Under Regs. §§ 1.66623(b)(3) (1992), 1.6662-4(e)(2)(i) (1992), 1.6694-2(c)(2) (1992), and 1.6694-3(c)(2)
(1992), "frivolous" meant "patently improper." T.D. 8381, 56 Fed. Reg. 67,492,
67,495 (Dec. 31, 1991); T.D. 8382, 56 Fed. Reg. 67,509, 67,512 (Dec. 31, 1991).
236. WMCP 103-11, supra note 51, at 317.
237. T.D. 8533, 59 Fed. Reg. 12,547 (Mar. 17, 1994).
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Tax practitioners were surprised to find the reasonable basis standard resurrected for debate. 23 Some repeated the argument that the realistic possibility of success standard did not replace but only restated the
reasonable basis standard.2 39 Thus, in their comments on how the implementing regulations should be drafted-and reasonable basis thus
defined-they wanted the regulations to equate the two. 2 ' Other tax
practitioners, however, pointed out that reasonable basis was already
defined in the @ 6662 regulations when Congress modified @ 6662 and
so argued that the existing definition should be used. 24 The existing regulation defined reasonable basis as a position that "is arguable, but fairly
unlikely to prevail in court." 2 4 2 In the end, the Treasury sided with neither: final regulations merely provided that the reasonable basis standard was "significantly higher than the not frivolous standard applicable
to preparers under @ 6694."243 Thus, according to the new Treasury Regulations the taxpayers' lowest standard under @ 6662 (reasonable basis)
was significantly higher than the lowest standard for tax return preparers under @ 6694 (not frivolous).

238. See Rita L. Zeidner, Conferees' Double Standard Is Good
News for Preparers,Not Taxpayers, 60 TAX NOTES 689 (Aug. 9, 1993); ABA
Sec. of Tax'n, Comments Concerning Proposed Amendments to Accuracy
Related Penalty, IRC Section 6662 (1994), in ABA Members Suggest Definition of 'ReasonableBasis'forAccuracy-Related PenaltyRegs, 94 TAX NOTES
TODAY 141-48 (July 14, 1994) [hereinafter ABA 1994 Comments]; July 17,
1994 Letter from C.J. Muller, Att'y, to Margaret Milner Richardson, IRS
Comm'r (June 17, 1994), in Penalty Standardfor Taxpayers Should Be on a
Par with Standardfor Return Preparers, Attorney Asserts, 94 TAX NOTES
TODAY 131-29 (June 17, 1994) [hereinafter Muller Letter].
239. See, e.g., ABA 1994 Comments, supra note 238; Muller Letter, supra note 238.
240. See ABA 1994 Comments, supra note 238; Muller Letter,
supra note 238. In arguing for the same standard, the Tax Section acknowledged that a taxpayer's assessment should not be expected to be as sophisticated as that of a tax professional. ABA 1994 Comments, supra note 238.
241. Juliann Avakian Martin, Definition of 'Reasonable Basis'
Considered at Penalty Reg Hearing, 94 TAX NOTES TODAY 135-1 (July 13,
1994) (reporting the views of Harvey Coustan of the AICPA).
242. T.D. 8381, 56 Fed. Reg. 67,492, 67,501 (Dec. 31, 1991); Reg.
§ 1.6662-4(d)(2) (1992).
243. T.D. 8617, 60 Fed. Reg. 45,661, 45,662 (Sept 1, 1995); Reg.
§ 1.6662-3(b)(3)(ii) (1995).
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Why was the @ 6694 return preparer standard for disclosed positions also not shifted up from not frivolous to reasonable basis? Initially,
it was to be. But in the end, @ 6694 was left unchanged due to the Senate's "Byrd rule."24 4 Under the Byrd rule, a provision that does not increase
revenue cannot be enacted in the budget reconciliation process.2 4 The
proposed shift upward in the preparer standard was scored as a zero revenue raiser on the theory that the preparer would already be complying
with the reasonable basis standard as it applied to the taxpaying client.2 46
Thus, as it was not expected to increase revenue, the @ 6694 standard
could not be increased.
That the revenue scoring was determinative is explained by the
fact that the modification of @ 6662 and the failed modification of @ 6694
were not part of a larger plan calculated to refine standards. Rather the
modification to @ 6661 was expected to raise revenue, either through the
collection of penalties or through less controversial return positions. 247
Unlike the penalty revisions in 1989, the 1993 modifications to @ 6662
did not proceed from considerations as to the purpose of penalties, nor
was it in response to evidence that the penalties as they were failed. Section 6662 was modified in order to increase revenue, but @ 6694 could
not be modified because doing so would not increase revenue. 2 48
2. Penalty Studies Again
Within a few years, Congress revisited @ 6662 and @ 6694 but with a
more policy-oriented rather than revenue-oriented agenda. Congress held
hearings in 1996 and 1997 focused on procedural fairness at the IRS,
which resulted in Congress passing the Internal Revenue Service Reform

244. Larry B. Wolod, Stricter Disclosure Standards Under Section 6662: Who Will Step Forwardand Pay the $496 Million Tab?, 94 TAX
NOTES TODAY 34-72 (Feb. 18, 1994); see also Zeidner, supra note 238, at 689
(1993).
245. Wolod, supra note 244.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. It was expected the modifications to § 6662 would rank 22 out
of the act's 35 provisions intended to generate revenue. See Catherine G.
Schultz, Tax Highlightsof the Revenue ReconciliationAct of 1993, ABA SEC.
TAX'N NEWSL., Fall 1993, at 19, 21-22.
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and Restructuring Act of 1998.249 The hearings involved several days
of highly publicized testimony of disgruntled taxpayers in what has been
described as a circus-like show.250 The resulting legislation directed the
IRS to restructure itself and restate its mission and subjected the agency
to an oversight board, among many other changes directed towards perceived abuses of taxpayer rights."' Congress also mandated the Joint
Committee and Treasury study the penalty provisions and give recommendations for improving the provisions and their administration. 2 Both
released their studies in 1999.253
The Joint Committee began by pointing out that taxpayers affirm
under penalties of perjury that their returns are true and complete to the
best of their knowledge." 4 In that context, @ 6662 and @ 6694 were understood to be practical substitutes to the rigors of criminal prosecution for
perjury.2 5 The problem with those sections was that, because the
"thresholds for avoidance of a penalty when taking an aggressive
position on a tax return are so low," taxpayers were not deterred from
the audit lottery.2 6 Thus, the Joint Committee recommended raising
the thresholds. In the report, it quantified the chances of success on the

249. Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (1998) (also called the Taxpayer Bill of Rights III); see also Steve R. Johnson, Reforming Federal Tax
Litigation:An Agenda, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 205, 235-37 (2013).
250. Bryan T. Camp, Theory and Practice in Tax Administration,
29 VA. TAX REV. 227, 270 (2009) ("Congress became very concerned-one
might say hysterical- ... [and] worked itself into a lather, and mostly over
the wrong problem."); Johnson, supra note 249, at 237; Steve R. Johnson, The
Dangers of Symbolic Legislation: Perceptions and Realities of the New
Burden-of-ProofRules, 84 IOWA L. REV. 413, 446-47 (1999).
251. 112 Stat. at 685.
252. Press Release, Joint Comm. on Tax'n (July 22, 1999), in JCT
Release on PenaltyandInterestStudy, 1999 TAX NOTES TODAY 142-89 (July 22,
1999).
253.
JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 106TH CONG., JCS-3-99, STUDY OF
PRESENT-LAW PENALTY AND INTEREST PROVISIONS 148 (July 22, 1999) [hereinaf-

ter JCT STUDY].
254.

Id.; OFF.

OF TAX POL'Y,

U.S.

TREAS. DEP'T, REPORT TO THE CON-

GRESS ON PENALTY AND INTEREST PROVISIONS OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE,

in

TreasuryReleases Penalty and Interest Study, 1999 TAX NOTES TODAY 207-19
(Oct. 25, 1999) [hereinafter TREAS. PENALTY REPORT].
255. JCT STUDY, supra note 253, at 148.
256. Id.
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merits of not only the realistic possibility standard for undisclosed positions under the @ 6694 preparer standard (33%) but also the substantial
authority standard for undisclosed positions under the @ 6662 taxpayer
standard (40%), the reasonable basis standard for disclosed positions
under @ 6662 (20%), and the not frivolous standard (5-10%) for disclosed positions under @ 6694.251 It recommended that both the @ 6662
and @ 6694 standard for undisclosed positions be increased to a reasonable belief that the position was more likely than not to prevail because
anything lower allowed filing returns believed to be probably wrong,
even though filed under penalties of perjury. 25s As for disclosed positions, the recommendation was the substantial authority standard for
both @ 6662 and @ 6694.259 The Joint Committee recommended the taxpayer and preparer positions be aligned as the different standards combined with the @ 6664 reasonable cause exception for taxpayers was
problematic: courts were permitting taxpayers to escape penalties for
positions with less than substantial authority by establishing reasonable reliance on a preparer's advice, even though the preparer's advice
needed only to have a realistic possibility of success. 260 Thus, in addition to increasing and aligning the understatement standards, the Joint
Committee also recommended eliminating the reasonable cause
exception. 261

In its report, Treasury also emphasized the problem of taxpayers avoiding the substantial authority standard of @ 6662 by their reasonably relying on the preparer's advice premised on a realistic possibility
of success. 262 Treasury considered it problematic that, with respect to

257. Id. at 160.
258. Id. at 161.
259. Id. at 163.
260. Id. Reliance may not be reasonable or in good faith if the taxpayer knew, or should have known, that the advisor lacked knowledge in the
relevant aspects of federal tax law or if the taxpayer fails to disclose a fact that
the taxpayer knows, or reasonably should know, to be relevant to the proper
tax treatment of an item. Reg. §§ 1.6664-1(b)(2); -4(b), (c). Even if the § 6662
and § 6694 standard are aligned (as they now are), the § 6664 exception can
work anomalous results insofar as the taxpayer may be saved from a § 6662
penalty by reasonably relying on an advisor whose advice is below the § 6694
(and § 6662) standard. LINDA GALLER & MICHAEL B. LANG, REGULATION OF TAX
PRACTICE 52 n.9 (2d ed. 2016).
261. JCT STUDY, supra note 253, at 162.
262. TREAS. PENALTY REPORT, supra note 254, ¶ 237.
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disclosed positions, the reasonable basis standard applied to taxpayers
while the lower, not frivolous standard applied to preparers, even though
the preparers should be serving a policing function for the tax system.2 63
Thus, Treasury recommended that the "minimum standard for undisclosed positions be the 'substantial authority' standard and, for disclosed
positions, be the 'realistic possibility of success' standard." 264
The Tax Section sided with Treasury in proposing @ 6694's
undisclosed position standard for preparers be raised from realistic possibility to the substantial authority standard already applicable to taxpayers under @ 6662.265 That the Tax Section would now embrace the
standard it had so vigorously opposed when Treasury proposed it in
1986 for Circular 230 may be explained by the Joint Committee's
alternative recommendation to increase the undisclosed standard to
more likely than not, which the Tax Section complained did not give
adequate weight to the complexity and uncertainty of the tax law and
would encourage difficult factual inquiries into states of mind. 266 The
Tax Section praised the substantial authority standard as objective,
long-established in the tax law, and with excellent regulations and a
substantial body of case law.267 The Tax Section also rejected the Joint
Committee's recommendation to elevate the standard for disclosed positions to substantial authority. 26s To do so would impose on taxpayers,
most of whom were unsophisticated and spent only a short period of
time on their returns, a standard unlikely to be understood. 2 69 The Tax
Section, on this point too, sided with Treasury in recommending
aligning both @ 6662 and @ 6694 for disclosed positions with the realistic possibility of success standard. 270 The Tax Section described the
realistic possibility of success language as the apt definition for the
negligence standard as it described "the serious effort that a careful
and prudent person should make," even if that person were rather

Id. ¶ 250.
Id. ¶ 252.
Paul J. Sax, Statement on Behalf of the ABA Sec. of Tax'n
Comm. on Fin., in ABA Tax Section Remarks at Hearing on
Code Penalty and Interest Provisions, 2000 TAX NOTES TODAY 48-18 (Mar. 9,
2000) [hereinafter Sax Statement].
266. Id. ¶ 10.
267. Id. ¶ 9.
268. Id. ¶¶ 11-13.
269. Id. ¶ 12.
270. Id. ¶ 13.
263.
264.
265.
Before the S.
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unsophisticated. 271 In describing it as a definition for the negligence
standard, the Tax Section essentially characterized it as a restatement of
the reasonable basis standard, which was a common interpretation but
one squarely at odds with the Joint Committee's quantified continuum.
3. Surprise:More Likely Than Not
Congress declined to take up any 1999 reports-related recommendations
and "kicked around" changing the return preparer standard for several
years. 272 However, in 2006, the Senate Finance Committee decided the
standard had to be raised to discourage scams, schemes, and other abusive transactions. 27 3 Without congressional hearings or fact findings or
even consultations with Treasury, Congress amended @ 6694 to increase
the penalties on preparers and, more importantly, to increase the standard for disclosed and undisclosed positions. 2 4 Undisclosed positions
went from a realistic possibility of success to a reasonable belief that
the position was more likely than not to prevail, and disclosed positions
were altered from not frivolous to reasonable basis, which aligned it with

271. Id.
272. Jeremiah Coder, Old Return PreparerStandardRegs Problematic, PractitionersSay, 56 TAX PRAC. 193 (Dec. 21, 2007).
273. S. REP. No. 109-336, at 50-52 (2006).
274. No hearings were held to discuss the new standards within the
bill, and the bill was introduced and became law within a month's time. Section 8246 of the Small Business and Work Opportunity Tax Act of 2007 (Pub.
L. No. 110-28, 121 Stat. 112, 200-03), enacted on May 25, 2007, amended
I.R.C. § 6694. Jonathan S. Brenner, New Standardfor Tax Return PositionsIs
Inappropriate,55 TAX PRAC. 125 (Aug. 24, 2007); Dustin Stamper, Treasury
to Address PreparerDisclosureStandardChanges, DesmondSays, 2007 TAX
NOTES TODAY 108-3 (June 5, 2007). This had been the Senate proposal in the
2004 American Jobs Creation Act. 150 CONG. REC. S8281, S8303 (daily ed.
July 16, 2004). Also, in 2006, the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB) issued Interpretation No. 48 (FIN 48), "Accounting for Uncertainty in
Income Taxes" (June 2006), http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobcol=url

data&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobkey=id&blobwhere= 1175820931560
&blobheader=application%2Fpdf [https://perma.cc/Z6MK-MAHB]. FIN 48
guides CPAs in evaluating the certainty of material positions on income tax
returns for financial accounting purposes. It is a more likely than not standard.
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the @ 6662 standard for taxpayers. 275 The Joint Committee characterized
the amendments to @ 6694 as a revenue provision, presumably packaged
to offset tax cuts contained elsewhere in the new tax law. 276 Treasury
officials said they were blindsided and thought the higher standards were
a real problem in some situations but quickly provided transitional guidance and set out to draft new regulations, including changes to @ 10.34
of Circular 230 to incorporate the new @ 6694 standard. 277
The new @ 6694 standard for preparers flipped the section's relationship to the @ 6662 understatement standard for taxpayers: return preparers were now held to a higher standard than the taxpayers'
understatement standard. Commentators pointed out that preparers were
put into the "position of advising clients that they, as taxpayers, can take
a position [with a realistic possibility of success but not being more likely
than not to prevail] without disclosure, but the [preparer] cannot be
involved with the preparation of the return unless the taxpayer is willing to disclose." 278 Previously, an advisor who was not actually preparing a return was not too concerned as to whether he or she technically
met the preparer definition under @ 6694, which included some posttransaction advisors who were not literally preparing the return. 27 9
However, the increased standard was combined with a significant increase
in the @ 6694 penalty (to the greater of $1,000 or 50% of the fee). More
importantly, Congress had recently enabled the IRS to impose fines equal
to the fee for Circular 230 violations, and such a fine could be imposed

275.

Pub. L. 110-28, § 8246(b).

276.

JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 110TH CONG.,

EXPLANATION OF THE "SMALL BUSINESS AND WORK

JCX-29-07,

OPPORTUNITY

TECHNICAL

TAX ACT OF

2007" AND PENSION RELATED PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN H.R. 2206 AS CONSIDERED BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON MAY 24, 2007, at 34-35 (2007); see

also ABA Sec. of Tax'n, Comments on Changes to Standards for Imposition
of Certain Penalties (2007), in ABA Tax Section Comments on Changes to
Penalties, 2007 TAX NOTES TODAY 223-56 (Nov. 15, 2007) [hereinafter 2007
ABA Comments]. The bill was introduced on May 9, 2007 (H.R. REP. No.
110-143) and became law on May 25 (Pub. L. No. 110-28, 121 Stat. at 112).
277. T.D. 9359, 72 Fed. Reg. 54,540 (Sept. 26, 2007); Coder, supra
note 272; Stamper, supra note 274.
278. Brenner, supra note 274.
279. Reg. § 301.7701-15(a)(1) provided the definition of a nonsigning preparer. T.D. 7519, 1978-1 C.B. 391; Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: How Much Trouble Can You Get Into?, 115 TAX NOTES 1101 (June 18,
2007).
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for a single violation. 20 Once Circular 230 was amended to reflect the
new @ 6694, the risk was not only the @ 6694 fine but the Circular 230
fine. 2 1 Considerably more chilling than the fine, discipline under Circular
230 could include suspension or disbarment. The Circular 230 risks provided an incentive for tax lawyers to take steps to ensure they escaped
the technical meaning of preparer when giving advice, and those steps
would hamper their helping their taxpayer-clients, some argued. 282 The
definition of preparer also took on new significance because the new
@ 6694 abandoned the realistic possibility of success standard of Opinion
85-352, which meant a different standard turned on whether one fit the
@ 6694 definition. 23 A great deal now hinged on the technical definition
of "preparer," which most tax lawyers had never thought much about.
The Tax Section bemoaned these changes, and especially that
Congress had not explored the issues through public hearings and comments. 2 s 4 The Tax Section advised the Senate Finance Committee and the
House Ways and Means Committee that, while they supported the congressional efforts to combat aggressive tax planning, there simply was
a lack of sufficient guidance on which anyone could determine when
many positions were more likely than not correct. 2 5 The standard was
unworkable, for example, even as to simple determinations such as
whether a cost should be expensed or capitalized. 2 6 The Tax Section
warned that uncertainty over who was a preparer under @ 6694, combined with the inability to reach the more likely than not standard, would

280. Notice 2007-39, 2007-1 C.B. 1243; Sheppard, supra note 279;
Sam Young, IRS Monetary PenaltyPolicy Discussed, 2007 TAX NOTES TODAY
94-8 (June 1, 2007).
281. Sheppard, supra note 279.
282. Id.; Jeremiah Coder, Back-to-Back Circular 230 Changes
Reveal Winners, Losers, 2007 TAX NOTEs TODAY 187-1 (Sept 26, 2007).
283. 2007 ABA Comments, supra note 276; Robert W. Wood, Am
I a Return Preparer?,56 TAX PRAC. 89 (Nov. 9, 2007); N.Y. St. Bar Ass'n Tax
Section, Report on the Definition of 'Tax Return Preparer' and Other Issues
Under Code Sections 6694, 6695 and 7701(a)(36) (2007), in NYSBA Members
Comment on Changes to Return PreparerRules Under New Law, 2007 TAX
NOTEs TODAY 247-51 (Dec. 20, 2007).
284. 2007 ABA Comments, supra note 276.
285. The Tax Section made it clear that it was not addressing the
more likely than not standard when used as a tool to combat tax shelters. Id.
286. Id.
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increase professional fees for clients and overwhelm the IRS with
disclosures. 287
The Tax Section believed the mismatch between the preparer
and taxpayer penalties was problematic insofar as it created conflicts of
interest, but it was more alarmed at the suggestions circulating through
the tax community that this mismatch would be removed by raising the
@ 6662 taxpayer understatement penalty to more likely than not in order
to match the recently increased @ 6694 standard. 288 Having already
explained how unworkable the standard would be for preparers and the
additional costs that would be entailed, the Tax Section recommended
that both statutes be tied to the substantial authority standard. 2 9
Congress responded the following year by modifying @ 6694 in
order to reduce the more likely than not standard to substantial authority. The reduction was legislated in 2008, retroactively nullifying any
application of the more likely than not standard. 29 The guidance from
Treasury for @ 6694 was whiplashed. By the end of 2007, Treasury had
issued interim guidance on more likely than not and aimed to propose
regulations, conduct hearings, and finalize regulations by the end of
2008.291 By and large, tax professionals were content with the regulations,
reserving their nit-picking for relatively minor issues. 292 But before the
end of 2008, Congress had amended @ 6694 to incorporate substantial

287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Tax Extenders and Alternative Minimum Tax Relief of 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 506, 122 Stat 3765, 3880; T.D. 9436, 73 Fed. Reg.
78,430 (Dec. 22, 2008).
291. Jeremiah Coder, Year in Review: Preparingfor Penalties:
Updating the PreparerPenalty Standard, 2009 TAX NOTES TODAY 2-6 (Jan. 6,
2009).
292. Id. For the most part, the regulations that Treasury had been
developing could continue to apply, as there were various issues not affected
by the 2008 legislation. For example, issues such as the definition of a "preparer" for § 6694 purposes, the "substantial preparation" safe harbor for nonsigning preparers, the extent to which a preparer can rely on taxpayer-provided
or third-party information, and penalty computation provisions. Jeremiah
Coder, Change in Penalty Standard Will Not Require Total Rewrite of Regs,
60 TAX PRAC. 61 (Oct. 24, 2008); Patricia D. Hopson et al., The Changing
Landscape ofReturn PreparerPenalties, 61 TAX PRAC. 133 (Feb. 27, 2009).
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authority instead. Nevertheless, by the end of 2008, Treasury issued guidance for the substantial authority standard. 2 93
Although the @ 6694 guidance had been issued, Circular 230
guidance had not yet been updated. Because Circular 230 and @ 6694
were linked, Treasury needed to modify Circular 230 to reflect the new
@ 6694 standard. 294 Treasury proposed that @ 10.34 would prohibit a practitioner from willfully, recklessly, or through gross incompetence advising a return position that was without a reasonable basis or was an
"unreasonable position" under @ 6694(a)(2). 29' The latter included an
undisclosed position without substantial authority. 296 In its formal comments in 2009, the Tax Section suggested amending Circular 230 to
require simply that a "practitioner who is a preparer of a tax return . .
satisfy the obligation set forth in section 6694 of the Code and the regulations thereunder." 297
Although Treasury's proposal was largely consistent with the
Tax Section's 2009 suggestion, the Tax Section resisted in 2010. By 2010,
as discussed below, Treasury was on the verge of subjecting hundredsof-thousands of never-before regulated tax return preparers to Circular
230.298 In addition to technical comments, the Tax Section, citing the
influx of these new return preparers who would need to comply with
@ 10.34, proposed that the realistic possibility of success standard be
used instead of substantial authority. 299 The Tax Section, which had
dropped the realistic possibility standard and championed substantial

293. T.D. 9436, 73 Fed. Reg. at 78,430; Notice 2009-5, 2009-1
C.B. 309.
294. Coder, supra note 292.
295. Reg-138637-07, 75 Fed. Reg. 51,713, 51,717 (Aug. 23, 2010).
296. Id.
297. ABA Sec. of Tax'n, Comments on Proposed Amendments to
Circular 230 § 10.34 (2009), in ABA Members SeekReproposed Guidance on
Post-2007 Changesto Circular230, 2009 TAX NOTES TODAY 106-15.
298. See discussion infra Part IID.
299. As for technical comments, for example, it pointed out that a
reference to "unreasonable positions" under I.R.C. § 6694(a)(2) included, by
definition, positions that lacked a reasonable basis, so there was no reason to
separate these in Circular 230 § 10.34. The recommendation for the realistic
possibility standard did not extend to tax shelter positions. ABA Sec. of Tax'n,
Comments on Circular 230 Sections 10.2, 10.3, 10.4, 10.5, 10.6, 10.30 and
10.34 (2010), in ABA Members Comment on ProposedAmendments to Circular 230 Rules, 2010 TAX NOTEs TODAY 235-22 (Dec. 7, 2010) [hereinafter ABA
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authority in 1999 when the Joint Committee proposed more likely than
not, now emphasized the practical importance of the standard of Opinion 85-352: it had a long history as a "straightforward guidepost,"
unlike @ 6694 which was subject to unpredictable legislative changes. 300 The Tax Section complained that substantial authority grounded
"the reporting standard for disciplinary purposes in the presence or
absence of authority, which may or may not correspond to the underlying merits of the position."301 The Tax Section of the Texas bar pushed
its recommendation one step further back in time: it recommended reasonable basis as the new @ 10.34 standard, arguing the lesser standard
was appropriate because the Circular 230 penalties (such as disbarment)
were much greater than the penalties for violating @ 6694 (merely monetary). 302 Treasury, however, declined both tax sections' recommendations, instead finalizing @ 10.34 and its connection to @ 6694 much as it
had proposed.303
Incorporating @ 6694 into Circular 230 ended the relevance of
the realistic possibility of success standard. Having originated in Opinion 85-352 as an alternative to substantial authority, having become the
unifying principle of resistance to Treasury's first attempt to regulate
the substance of return position advising in 1986, and then having been
legislated into @ 6694 after in-depth consideration of penalties by Congress, it was eliminated from the I.R.C., the Treasury Regulations, and
Circular 230.304 The substantial authority standard that had rallied resistance for years, stimulating debates and diatribes on the details of
what counted for authority was now cemented. The disparities between
the preparer and taxpaying client's penalty standards were finally
eliminated-with the standard that Treasury had been prevented by the

2010 Comments]. As for the expansion of Circular 230 to cover mere return
preparers, see discussion infra Part IID.
300. ABA 2010 Comments, supra note 299.
301. Id.
302. Tex. Bar Tax Section, Comments on Proposed Amendments
to Treasury Circular 230, as Published in the Federal Register on August 23,
2010 (2010), in Texas Bar Tax Section Members Comment on IRS Proposals
to Change PracticeStandard, 2010 TAX NOTES TODAY 195-16 (Oct. 6, 2010).
303. T.D. 9527, 76 Fed. Reg. 32,286, 32,292 (June 3, 2011).
304. It was mostly, but not entirely, eliminated from the Treasury
Regulations. It retains a very limited role: a taxpayer is not considered to have
disregarded a revenue ruling or a notice if the position has a realistic possibility of success. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(2).
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bar from implementing in 1986. Of course, it was not only the realistic
possibility of success standard that had been replaced but also Opinion
85-352 and its legal ethics origins, and Treasury had replaced the ABA
as the source of the tax lawyer's standards for return positions.305
D. Circular230 Loses
While Treasury's persistence over three decades to expand its regulation of tax lawyers' return position advising under Circular 230 largely
succeeded, it did not regulate the other end of the tax profession spectrum: the commercial return preparers who served millions of individuals and small businesses. Though in 1994 Treasury established
return preparation standards for lawyers, CPAs, and enrolled agents
under Circular 230, those standards did not apply to the hundreds-ofthousands of commercial preparers serving the masses of American
taxpayers. Section 6694 was the preparer-specific I.R.C. provision that
had become the center of the debate over standards for tax lawyers
under Circular 230, but that section was enacted in 1976 to address
congressional concerns over commercial return preparers, not tax
lawyers.30 6 While that I.R.C. section and others were keyed to the status of preparer, Circular 230 was not.
Why were commercial return preparers-who vastly outnumbered tax lawyers, CPAs, and enrolled agents, and who prepared vastly
more tax returns-not covered by Circular 230 and regulated by Treasury? In 1884, Congress had delegated to Treasury the power to
regulate the practice of representing persons in Department proceedings. 307 But the long-standing consensus was that this did not include

305. As a practical matter, once § 6694 was modified to a standard
different than Opinion 85-352, supra note 20, the lower standard of the latter
was imprudent to follow. Yet, the ABA has undertaken no effort to revise its
guidance. GALLER & LANG, supra note 260, at 137 n. 12. In contrast, the AICPA
modified its standards in 2010 so the standard of the relevant taxing authority
applies, and only if there is no such standard does the realistic possibility
standard apply. AICPA Statement on Standards for Tax Services No. 1, Tax
Return Positions
4-5 (2010), https://future.aicpa.org/resources/article/state
ment-on-standards-for-tax-services-no-1-tax-return-positions [https://perma
.cc/S9FY-3E2R] [hereinafter 2010 AICPA Statement].
306. JCT, 1976 BLUEBOOK, supra note 25, at 351.
307. Act of July 7, 1884, ch. 334, 23 Stat. 236, 258-59; see also
Pub. L. No. 97-258, 96 Stat. 877, 884 (1982) (codifying 31 U.S.C. § 330). Until
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mere return preparation. Indeed, for most of its history, Circular 230
explicitly excluded return preparation from its coverage. 308 For a tax
lawyer who filed his or her power of attorney as a client's representative with the IRS and thereby became subject to Circular 230, @ 10.22
required due diligence in preparing documents relating to IRS matters, including returns.309 But mere return preparers were beyond the
reach of Circular 230.
While there had long been calls for increased oversight of these
return preparers, the calls began turning into action around 2000. In 1998,
before she became National Taxpayer Advocate, Nina Olson testified
before Congress on the problems caused by the low standards of many
commercial return preparers, and after she took office, she reported to
Congress in 2002, urging adoption of rules requiring registration, testing, and ongoing education.310 In 2006, the Taxpayer Advocacy Panel
recommended licensing preparers in order to protect taxpayers from
inaccurate returns.311 Investigations into return preparer practices by
auditors from the Government Accountability Office and the Treasury
Inspector General for Tax Administration documented substantial errors
on the returns filed by commercial preparers. 12 The IRS held public

1982, the statute referred not to "representatives" but rather to "agents, attorneys, or other persons representing claimants." In 1982 the change to "representatives" was made, reportedly for stylistic purposes. See H.R. REP. No.
97-651, at 19 (1982); Steve R. Johnson, Loving and Legitimacy: IRS Regulation of Tax Return Preparation,59 VILL. L. REV. 515, 520 (2014).
308. The definition of "practice" in § 10.2 had once explicitly
excluded return preparation but, by 1986, that point was explicit in § 10.7
rather than § 10.2. 31 C.F.R. § 10.7(c), 31 Fed. Reg. 10,773, 10,775 (Aug. 13,
1966) (amended by 51 Fed. Reg. 2875, 2878 (Jan. 22, 1986); 49 Fed. Reg. 6719,
6722 (Feb. 23, 1984); 35 Fed. Reg. 13,205, 13,205 (Aug. 19, 1970)).
309. 31 C.F.R. § 10.22.
310. IRS Restructuring: Hearings on H.R. 2676 Before the S.
Comm. on Fin., 105th Cong. 337 (1998) (statement of Nina E. Olson, Exec.
Dir., Cmty. Tax L. Project); NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOC., FY 2002 ANNUAL REPORT
TO CONGRESS 216-30 (2002); Johnson, supra note 307.
311. TAXPAYER ADVOCACY PANEL, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 84-85 (2006).
312.

See TREAS. INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN.,

2008-40-171,

MOST TAX RETURNS PREPARED BY A LIMITED SAMPLE OF UNENROLLED PREPARERS
CONTAINED

ERRORS (2008); U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,
PAID TAX RETURN PREPARERS: IN A LIMITED STUDY, CHAIN PRE-

SIGNIFICANT

GAO-06-563T,

PARERS MADE SERIOUS ERRORS (2006); Johnson, supra note 307, at 525.
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hearings and invited public comments on the regulation of return preparers.313 Representatives from consumer advocacy groups, professional
organizations (including the Tax Section), various federal and state
government agencies, and others, were overwhelmingly in favor of registering, monitoring, testing, educating, and establishing quality and
ethics standards for return preparers.314 Before the end of 2009, the IRS
recommended measures to improve and maintain the quality of return
preparation by the heretofore unenrolled preparers.315 Feeling confident,
the IRS concluded:
The IRS believes that increased oversight of paid tax
return preparers does not require additional legislation.... [T]he IRS' intention is to require paid tax return
preparers to register with the IRS through the issuance
of regulations under section 6109 of the Internal Revenue Code. Further, the IRS considers the preparation of
a tax return for compensation as a form of representation before the agency. Thus, the IRS intends to amend
the regulations under 31 U.S.C. 330 to clarify that any
person preparing a tax return for compensation is practicing before the agency and, therefore, must demonstrate good character, good reputation, and the necessary
qualifications and competency to advise and assist other
persons in the preparation of their federal tax returns. 16
Accordingly, Treasury proposed regulations in 2010 that were then
finalized (with support from the Tax Section) and implemented in 2011
without seeking additional congressional authorization.3 17

313. See Notice 2009-60, 2009-2 C.B. 181.
314. IRS PuB. No. 4832, RETURN PREPARER REVIEW 26-29, 31-32
(2009), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p4832.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XM6

-SGCX].
315. Id. at 2-3, 32-33.
316. Id. at 32.
317. See T.D. 9527, 76 Fed. Reg. 32,286 (June 3, 2011) (effective
Aug. 2, 2011); Richard M. Lipton, New Circular 230 Guidance Is Broad
And May Prove to Be Controversial, 115 J. TAX'N 61, 61 (2011); Patrick E.
Tolan, Jr., It's About Time: Registration and Regulation Will Boost Competence and Accountabilityof Paid Tax Preparers,31 VA. TAX REv. 471 (2012).
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Treasury's confidence in its authority to act without additional
congressional authorization soon proved misplaced. Three return preparers not otherwise subject to Circular 230 sued the IRS over the finalized regulations.318 One served low-income clients and declared she would
have to increase her prices to cover the expenses of complying with the
regulations and thus she would lose customers. 319 The second preparer
worked out of his house, and the third was a financial planner who prepared returns for his clients; both the second and third preparers declared
they likely would be forced to close their return preparation businesses
if they had to comply with the regulations. 320 The question for the court
was whether Treasury's long-standing authority under 31 U.S.C. @ 330
to "regulate the practice of representatives" included return preparers.
The District Court ruled in favor of the return preparers, and
the D.C. Circuit affirmed it in 2014.321 Writing for the D.C. Circuit in
Loving v. IRS, then-Judge Kavanaugh identified six considerations that
foreclosed the government's interpretation.32 2 First, the statute refers to
"representatives," which means "agents," and return preparers are not
agents of their clients.3 23 Second, the meaning of "practice . . . before"
refers to an investigation or hearing or proceeding, and until a return is
selected for audit, nothing about return preparation amounts to practice
"before" the IRS.3 2 4 Third, the history of describing the representatives
suggests that representation in contested proceedings has always been
the congressional concern.3 2 ' Fourth, Congress had itself enacted a series
of statutes covering return preparation, which would have been unnecessary if the IRS could have simply regulated return preparers.3 26 Fifth,
if the IRS prevailed, it would be entitled to regulate hundreds-ofthousands of return preparers in a multi-billion dollar industry without
any indication from Congress that this was intended. 327 Sixth, not until

318. Loving v. IRS, 917 F. Supp. 2d 67 (D.D.C. 2013), aff'd, 742
F.3d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
319. 917 F. Supp.2d at 72.
320. Id.
321. Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
322. 742 F.3d at 1016.
323. Id. at 1017.
324. Id. at 1017-18.
325. Id. at 1018.
326. Id. at 1020.
327. Id. at 1022.
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2011 had the IRS ever interpreted the statute to cover return preparers.328
The government did not appeal.
The question as to regulating return preparers who were not lawyers or CPAs or enrolled agents had been answered by the Loving court,
but the remaining question was whether Treasury could regulate return
preparation by lawyers and CPAs and enrolled agents. It was soon
answered. In Ridgely v. Lew, the D.C. Court of Appeals, citing Loving
sided with a CPA who claimed that Circular 230 could not be applied to
his return preparation activities, even if, as a CPA he would be subject
to Circular 230 when engaged in some other tax professional activities,
like representing a client in an audit. 3 29 The CPA filed a client's Ordinary Claim for Refund, which is filed after a return if the taxpayer
believes he or she overpaid taxes when the initial return was filed (i.e.,
it is comparable to filing a return). 330 While it may have been expected
that the claim would result in an examination by the IRS during which
the CPA would represent the client, the CPA had not filed, nor did he
need to file, with the IRS as a representative of the client in order to submit the claim for refund. The CPA charged a fee that was prohibited by
Circular 230 for return preparation. 331 Following the Loving court, the
Ridgely court held that filing an Ordinary Claim for Refund was like
filing a return and not "practice" before the IRS undertaken by a "representative," and so the CPA could not be punished for the fee prohibited under Circular 230.332 The court rejected the IRS's argument that
"simply because CPAs may at times practice before the IRS, the IRS
has authority to regulate their conduct without limit." 333
The Loving and Ridgely cases devastated the attempt to regulate return preparation under Circular 230. Treasury, which had been on
a roll of successes in expanding Circular 230 since 1984, had over-reached
in its 2011 amendments. Reaching to regulate otherwise unregulated
return preparers cost Treasury its claim to regulate return preparation
at all. 334 Loving made clear it could not regulate return preparation by

328. Id. at 1023.
329. 55 F. Supp. 3d 89 (D.D.C. 2014).
330. Id. at 91.
331. Id. at 93.
332. Id. at 95.
333. Id. at 97.
334. See William Garofalo, The Many Problems of Circular 230,
126 J. TAX'N 207 (2017); Jamie P. Hopkins, Loving v. IRS: The IRS's Achilles'
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return preparers that were not otherwise subject to Circular 230, and
Ridgely made it clear that it could not regulate return preparation by
lawyers, CPAs, or enrolled agents who were not otherwise subject to
Circular 230. Thus, unless a lawyer had otherwise become subject to Circular 230, the lawyer was not subject to the substantial authority return
preparation standards incorporated into Circular 230.33' After Ridgely, it
was unclear what actions would subject a lawyer to Circular 230 for the
preparation of a return.336 However, after Ridgely, it was clear that Treasury's efforts over the preceding quarterof a century to expand its Circular 230 regulation of return positions had failed.
III. TAX SHELTERS

Tax shelters had become a significant concern in the 1970s, but the tax
shelter industry shifted after 1986, and so did the government's and bar's
responses. The new shelters were more technical and involved higherend advisors than earlier shelters did. Initially, Congress tweaked the
understatement penalty regime and then modified the tax shelter registration requirements. Several years of reports and hearings followed, and
then in 2004 Congress redesigned the tax shelter penalty and registration scheme and affirmed Treasury's authority to set standards for written
advice, which then Treasury proposed to do with extensive tax shelter
opinion requirements. By 2014, however, those requirements were
repealed, and Treasury's authority to regulate lawyers who were not representatives in proceedings before the IRS was left in great doubt. It was
not Treasury's regulation of tax advisors that ended the second great wave
of tax shelters but rather the in terrorem effect of the Justice Department's criminal prosecutions of high-profile tax shelter advisors, the

Heelfor Regulated Tax Advice?, 34 VA. TAX REV. 191 (2014); Johnson, supra
note 307.
335. The substantial authority standard (implemented by reference
to I.R.C. § 6694) is in 31 U.S.C. § 10.34, but other potentially relevant sections
include, for example, 31 U.S.C. §§ 10.22 (due diligence) and 10.27 (contingent
fees).
336. For example, will filing as a representative of a client in an
audit proceeding for one year subject the lawyer to Circular 230 with respect
to advising on the preparation of a return for a different year? Will filing to
represent one client in audit subject return preparation for other clients to
Circular 230? GALLER & LANG, supra note 260, at 96.
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collapse of significant corporations and firms, and the increased regulation of non-tax aspects of corporate life.
A. The First Wave of Tax Shelters
Tax shelters, which were usually specially designed passive, low-risk
investments (often financed by nonrecourse borrowing) that generated
depreciation and other significant deductions to offset income from other
sources had been around since the 1950s but had increasingly become
problematic by the 1970s.337 In the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the attempted
substantive solution was limiting the deductibility of the losses for investments to the amount the taxpayer was at economic risk.338 Two years
later, Congress tightened those "at-risk"rules. 339 Three years more, Congress imposed valuation penalties that increased the costs for many successfully challenged tax shelters.34 0 Then, in 1982, Congress enacted the
@ 6661 understatement penalty to discourage taxpayers from playing the
audit lottery, and, though @ 6661 required substantial authority for tax
positions generally, if the understatement of a tax liability was related
to a tax shelter investment, avoiding the penalty required not only that
the position have substantial authority but also that the taxpayer had a
reasonable belief that the tax treatment was "more likely than not" the
proper treatment.34 1 At the same time, Congress penalized tax shelter

337.

BERNARD WOLFMAN ET AL., STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE 133-35

(5th ed. 1999); Hatfield, 1965-1985, supra note 2, 699-701.
338. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 204, 90 Stat.
1520, 1531-33 (codified at I.R.C. § 465); WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 337, at
133-34. Some of the shelters were merely fraudulent: "investments" in "mines
with no ore, cattle that did not roam, and videotapes that did not play" (footnotes omitted). Scott A. Schumacher, Magnifying Deterrence by Prosecuting
Professionals,89 IND. L.J. 511, 515 (2014). Others were actual investments but
with limitations on economic risks and high tax avoidance motive.
339.

W.

ELLIOT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN AMERICA:

A

SHORT

HISTORY 135 (2d ed. 2004); Garrison Grawoig DeLee, Note, Abusive Tax Shelters: Will the Latest Tools Really Help?, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 431, 437 (1984); see
also Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 402(a), 92 Stat. 2763, 286768 (codified as former I.R.C. § 1202(a)); Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 301(a), 92 Stat.
at 2820 (codified as former I.R.C. § 11(a)).
340. DeLee, supra note 339, at 446.
341. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L.
No. 97-248, § 323(a), 96 Stat. 324, 613-15 (codified as former I.R.C. § 6661).
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promoters for aiding and abetting the understatement of a tax liability.34 2 The ABA issued Opinion 346, setting forth requirements and
restrictions on tax shelter opinions written by lawyers.3 43 Two years later,
in 1984 Congress curbed the tax shelter industry more by requiring the
registration of tax shelters, the maintenance of lists of investors, and new
reporting obligations. 4 4 In that same year, Treasury asserted its claim
to regulate the substance of tax advice by expanding Circular 230 to
include @ 10.33 to impose requirements on tax shelter opinions.3 45 In the
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Congress enacted @ 469, which precluded an
individual from claiming a loss on an activity in which he or she was a
passive investor.3 4 6 In retrospect, it was not the opinion requirements,
registration schemes, or penalty risks but the 1986 enactment of the

Congress believed that if the principal purpose of a transaction is the reduction of tax (i.e., a tax shelter), the participants should be held to a higher standard of care under § 6661. JCT, 1982 BLUEBOOK, supra note 39, at 219.
342. Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 320(a), 96 Stat. at 611 (codified as former I.R.C. § 6700); Id. § 324(a), 96 Stat. at 615-16 (codified as former I.R.C.
§ 6701).
343. ABA Opinion 346, supra note 16. Opinion 346 prohibited
false opinions and required the lawyer to conduct a factual inquiry that discounted unreasonable facts and operate on what is known but did not require
a more likely than not standard. It also required the lawyer to opine on the
probable outcomes on the merits of each tax issue. See Hatfield, 1965-1985,
supra note 2, 703-05.
344. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 141, 98
Stat. 494, 677-80 (codified as former I.R.C. § 6111); id. § 142(a), 98 Stat. at
681 (codified as former I.R.C. § 6112); id. § 145(a), 98 Stat. at 684-85 (codified
as former I.R.C. § 6050H); id. § 148(a), 98 Stat. at 687-88 (codified as former
I.R.C. § 6050J); id. § 149(a), 98 Stat. at 689 (codified as former I.R.C.
§ 6050K); id. § 155(b)(1), 98 Stat. at 693 (codified as former I.R.C. § 6050L).
345. The new § 10.33 of Circular 230 required practitioners to conduct a factual inquiry, provide an opinion on each material issue, relate law to
facts, and prohibited taking a tax position that would be unreasonable based
on the practitioner's knowledge and experience. Regulations Governing the
Practice of Attorneys, Certified Public Accountants, Enrolled Agents, and
Enrolled Actuaries Before the Internal Revenue Service, 49 Fed. Reg. 6719
(Feb. 23, 1984); Hatfield, 1965-1985, supra note 2, 704-05.
346. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 501(a), 100
Stat. 2085, 2233-41; see also WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 337, at 133-34.
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@ 469 passive activity loss limits that ended the then-most common
varieties of tax shelters.3 47
B. The Second Wave of Tax Shelters
Although it would take a decade for the new generation of tax shelters
to become cases in the docket, the new shelters began by 1988 and became
relatively widespread by the mid-1990s and were exposed in a high profile article in Forbes in 1998.348 The older varieties had been used by
high income individuals and were usually structured to exaggerate tax
losses relative to economic losses by leveraging specific tax preferences
that Congress intended to provide tax benefits (like accelerated depreciations). 34 9 The newer varieties were often used by corporations, which
were not subject to the @ 469 passive activity loss limits. More importantly, the new tax shelter designs were not premised on exaggerating a
benefit intended by Congress but rather on exploiting technical defects
in the I.R.C. or Treasury Regulations to generate benefits never contemplated.350 Structuring the new varieties around different technical
defects rather than merely exaggerating the tax benefits of particular
I.R.C. sections meant that substantive fixes like @ 469 would not be
effective to stop these new shelters. While the earlier tax shelters tended
to involve tax advisors who were not particularly well-regarded, the new

347. The data indicate that tax sheltering by individuals increased
from 1975 until 1986 but then decreased indefinitely after 1986. George K.
Yin, Getting Serious About Corporate Tax Shelters: Taking a Lesson from
History, 54 SMU L. REV. 209, 214 (2001). The consensus is that the passive
activity loss rules were probably the most critical factor curbing tax shelter
activity. Id. at 218-19. "While there may be disagreement as to whether the
passive loss rules were necessary to curtail the tax shelter activity . . . there
seems to be little question that Code § 469 dealt a fatal blow to the traditional
tax shelter investment of the 1970s and 1980s." WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note
337, at 133-34.
348. See, e.g., ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1997-115, 73
T.C.M. (CCH) 2189 (1997), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir.
1998); IAN M. COMISKY ET AL., TAX FRAUD & EVASION ¶ 1.08 (2021); WOLFMAN
ET AL., supra note 337, at 163-67; Janet Novak, The Hustling of XRated Shelters, FORBES (Dec. 14, 1998), https://www.forbes.com/forbes/1998/1214
/6213198a.html?sh=b804fc47ldbl [https://perma.cc/8H6D-KG6S].
349. WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 337, at 132.
350. Id.
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shelters were designed and promoted by large accounting firms and highend law firms long considered the pillars of tax compliance.351 These pillars earned tremendous fees: one accounting firm earned $53 million in
fees from one tax shelter, and a single tax partner in a prominent law
firm earned $95 million for shelter opinions written over a four-year period.3" 2 These high-end advisors were dealing with very sophisticated
clients who had other sophisticated advisors, commonly in-house.353 ABA
Opinion 346 and Circular 230 @ 10.33, which had been designed to cover
opinions delivered to non-clients, did not apply to the opinions on these
new shelters, which were typically not only delivered to clients but negotiated between the client's advisors. 354
1.

1994-1997: CongressionalResponse

By 1994, the growing number of aggressive tax shelter transactions
prompted congressional reaction. 355 Finding that the @ 6662 understatement penalty was an ineffective deterrent to corporate investors in tax
shelters, Congress tightened the standards. 35 6 Since its inception in 1982,
the understatement section had allowed the penalty to be avoided if the
position had substantial authority and the taxpayer had a reasonable belief
that the tax treatment was "more likely than not" the proper treatment. 357

351.
LAND SEC.

PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS,

& GOVERNMENTAL

S.

COMM. ON HOME-

AFFS., THE ROLE OF PROFESSIONAL FIRMS IN THE

U.S. TAX SHELTER INDUSTRY, S. REPT. 109-54 (2005); U.S. Tax Shelter Industry:
The Role of Accountants, Lawyers, and FinancialProfessionals, Hearings
Before the PermanentSub comm. on Investigations, S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, November 18 and 20, 2003, 108th Cong. (2004) [hereinafter Tax
Shelter Hearings]; Comm. on Civil & Crim. Tax Penalties, ABA Sec. of
Tax'n, Panel: The Tax Professional as the Target Du Jour in Criminal Tax
Investigations, in 2011 ABATAX-CLE 0122023 (Jan. 22, 2011) [hereinafter
ABA Panel]; Schumacher, supra note 338, at 522-23.
352. Schumacher, supra note 338, at 522-23.
353. WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 337, at 134-36.
354. Id. at 135.
355. H.R. REP. No. 103-826, pt. 1, at 197-99 (1994).
356. Id.; Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465,
§ 744, 108 Stat. 4809, 5011 (1994) (amending I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C)).
357. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L.
No. 97-248, § 323(a), 96 Stat. 324, 613-15 (codified as former I.R.C. § 6661).
Congress believed that if the principal purpose of a transaction is the
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In 1994, Congress eliminated this exception as it applied to corporate
taxpayers. 358 As a result, a corporate taxpayer would have to prove itself
covered by the @ 6664 reasonable cause exception if it had a tax shelterrelated understatement.35 9 Under @ 6694, a reasonable belief that the more
likely than not standard had been met for the tax shelter item would be
but one of the relevant factors to except a corporate taxpayer from the
understatement penalty. 360
Only three years later, Congress again modified the @ 6662 taxpayer understatement penalty. This time it was to expand the definition
of "tax shelter" from a plan with "the principal" purpose of avoiding or
evading tax to one for which such was merely "a significant" purpose. 361
This was a remarkably broad definition, arguably sweeping in many corporate transactions that customarily would not have been considered shelters. 362 This new definition was part of an extensive revision of the tax
shelter registration provisions. The new @ 6662 definition reflected the
new scheme requiring registration of tax shelters that were promoted
under conditions of confidentiality and by those whose fees exceeded
$100,000.363 Within a short period, it appeared the modified @ 6662

reduction of tax (i.e., a tax shelter), the participants should be held to a higher
standard of care under § 6661. JCT, 1982 BLUEBOOK, supra note 39, at 219.
358. Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 744, 108 Stat. at 5011.
359. See id. This was eliminated for noncorporate taxpayers in
2004. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 812(b), 118
Stat. 1418, 1578-79.
360. H.R. REP. No. 103-826, pt. 1, at 197-99 (1994); Pub. L.
No. 103-465, § 744, 108 Stat. at 5011 (amending I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C)).
361. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1028(c)(2),
111 Stat. 788, 928 (amending I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(iii)); I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)
(C)(iii) (1997) ("For purposes of this subparagraph, the term "tax shelter"
means-a partnership or other entity, any investment plan or arrangement, or
any other plan or arrangement, if a significantpurpose of such partnership,
entity, plan, or arrangement is the avoidance or evasion of Federal income
tax.") (emphasis added).
362. James P. Holden, 1999 Erwin Griswold Lecture, Dealingwith
the Aggressive Corporate Tax Shelter Problem, 52 Tax Law. 369, 371-73
(1999).
363. The purpose of amending the § 6662(d)(2)(C) definition of tax
shelter was to match the definition in the newly enacted § 6111(d) definition.
H.R. REP. No. 105-220, at 539-43 (1997); see also Pub. L. No. 105-34,
§ 1028(a), 111 Stat. at 926-27 (amending I.R.C. § 6111(d)).
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penalty structure was on the right to track to cover all corporate tax
shelters and that the new registration requirements would eliminate
confidentiality requirements, though there was some concern that the
new approach was too broad and put non-shelter planning at risk.364
2. 2000: TreasuryAdvances
In 2000, Treasury stepped up its war against tax shelters. It created the
Office of Tax Shelter Analysis as a clearing house for tax shelter activity information, and it issued rulings and notices describing specific tax
shelters. 365 It released temporary and proposed regulations relating to the
disclosure of tax shelters by corporate investors, the registration of confidential tax shelters by promotors, and the maintenance of lists of investors in potentially abusive tax shelters. 366 At the hearings on the temporary
and proposed regulations, tax lawyers and other professionals expressed
concern that, as drafted, the regulations were overly broad, including
routine and uncontroversial transactions, and thereby putting the wrong
taxpayers at risk of penalty.367 But the Tax Section encouraged the administrative efforts to curtail sheltering, though it cautioned the Senate
Finance Committee that administrative efforts would prove insufficient
and legislation would be needed. 368

364. See, e.g., Mark H. Ely & Evelyn Elgin, New Tax Shelter Penalties Target Most Tax Planning, 97 TAX NOTES TODAY 235-37 (Dec. 8, 1997);
Daniel Halperin, Here's Why the New Tax Shelter Rules Are Good, 97 TAX
NOTEs TODAY 245-80 (Dec. 22, 1997); Holden, supra note 362, at 379-80; Calvin Johnson, Corporate Tax Shelters, 1997 and 1998, 98 TAX NOTES TODAY
187-84 (Sept. 28, 1998).
365. Announcement 2000-12, 2000-1 C.B. 835, supplemented by
Announcement 2000-55, 2000-1 C.B. 1268; Rev. Rul. 2000-12, 2000-1 C.B.
744 (regarding debt straddle shelters); Notice 2000-61, 2000-2 C.B. 569
(Guam trust tax shelter); Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255 (regarding the
"Son of BOSS" transaction); Notice 2000-15, 2000-1 C.B. 826 (listed transactions).
366. Reg. § 1.6011-4T, T.D. 8877, 65 Fed. Reg. 11,205, 11,207-11
(Mar. 2, 2000); Reg. § 301.6111-2T, T.D. 8876, 65 Fed. Reg. 11,215, 11,21822 (Mar. 2, 2000); Reg. § 301.6112-1T, T.D. 8875, 65 Fed. Reg. 11,211,
11,213-14 (Mar. 2, 2000).
367. Unofficial Transcript of IRS Hearing on Corporate Shelter
Regs, 2000 TAX NOTEs TODAY 121-15 (June 20, 2000).
368. Sax Statement, supra note 265.
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Treasury released a white paper on corporate tax shelters in
2000, following its penalty report to Congress and the Joint Committee's report on both penalties, generally, and corporate tax shelters. 369
Treasury and the Joint Committee agreed on certain points, such as
increasing the @ 6662 penalty amounts on understatement and negligence,
but disagreed on others, such as how a tax shelter ought to be defined.37 0
In general, the Joint Committee argued for more robust disclosure
requirements than did Treasury and also for a greater expansion of the
registration requirements. 371 Treasury wanted to impose a tax on taxindifferent parties (e.g., tax exempt organizations), as these parties were
an essential element in many tax shelters. 372 The Joint Committee recommended expanding the scope of the aiding and assisting penalties. 373
Both concluded that Circular 230 should be amended to subject
tax advisors to professional discipline for inappropriate advising. The
Joint Committee wanted Congress to authorize monetary fines for Circular 230 violations. 374 Substantively, it proposed aligning Circular 230
with the statutory definitions and standards. Treasury announced that
it would propose amending Circular 230, and it quickly requested comments on revising the standards for tax shelter opinions as well as general
practice standards contained in Circular 230.375 In 2001, Treasury proposed changes to Circular 230 in order to strengthen the standards regarding factual due diligence and legal analysis. 376 The proposal was to repeal
the tax shelter opinion requirements added in 1984, which followed the

369.

JCT STUDY, supra note 253; U.S.

TREAS. DEP'T, THE PROBLEM OF

CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS: DISCUSSION, ANALYSIS AND LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
(1999); TREAS. PENALTY REPORT, supra
TAX'N, 106TH CONG.,

JCX-25-00,

note

254; see also JOINT COMM. ON

COMPARISON OF RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING

TO CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS MADE BY THE DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY AND THE
STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION (2000)

[hereinafter JCT

COMPARI-

SON OF RECOMMENDATIONS].
370.

JCT

COMPARISON OF RECOMMENDATIONS,

supra note

369,

at

3-6.
371. Id. at 8-11, 17-20.
372. Id.
373. Id. at 14.
374. Id. at 21.
375. REG-111835-99, 65 Fed. Reg. 30,375 (May 11, 2000) (advance
notice of proposed rulemaking).
376. REG-111835-99, 66 Fed. Reg. 3276 (Jan. 12, 2001) (notice of
proposed rulemaking and notice of public hearing).
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then-existing ABA approach but became largely irrelevant after the 1986
tax reform. Those requirements, which focused on opinions written for
potential investors that were not the lawyer's clients, were largely irrelevant to the wave of tax shelters that had begun rising in the 1990s.
Treasury proposed using two Circular 230 sections to govern
tax shelter opinions: @ 10.33 and @ 10.35.37 For purposes of both, the
definition of a tax shelter would be as found in @ 6662, which was a much
broader definition than the one previously used in Circular 230.378 The
new @ 10.35 would apply to all tax shelter opinions that concluded that
the federal tax treatment of a tax shelter item was (at least) more likely
than not the proper treatment. 379 Section 10.33 would be revised to apply
to all tax shelter opinions not governed by @ 10.35 and that would be
used to promote, market, or recommend a tax shelter. 380 Section 10.33
would require a practitioner who provided a written opinion with respect
to a tax shelter item to comply with a series of requirements, such as
identifying the relevant facts and providing a reasoned analysis, specifically including relevant judicial doctrines and anti-abuse rules, and
reaching a conclusion as to the likelihood that the tax treatment was proper.381 The opinion would also need to state whether it was written to
establish reasonable belief (that the position was more likely than not
proper) under the @ 6662 exception or reasonable cause and good faith
under the @ 6664 exception. 3 2 Section 10.35 addressed more likely than
not opinions, which would provide a basis for establishing reasonable
belief under @ 6662 or reasonable cause and good faith under @ 6664.383
These opinions would be subject to requirements similar to those of
@ 10.33, but the opinion would have to unambiguously conclude that the
tax treatment of the tax shelter items was more likely than not the proper
treatment. 38 4 Treasury proposed modifying the @ 6662 and @ 6664 regulations so that only opinions that complied with Circular 230 would
be sufficient.385

377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.

Id. at 3279.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3279-80.
Id. at 3280.
Id.
Id. at 3281.
Id.
Id.
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Tax lawyers supported Treasury's approach but strongly criticized details of its proposals. One criticism was as to the definition of
tax shelter, claiming that it would cover written advice given in routine
tax planning, such as like kind exchanges, and another criticism was that
the provisions were too formalistic and burdensome, essentially creating an IRS form for tax shelter opinions. 386 In its report, the Tax Section of the NYSBA recommended combining @ 10.33 and @ 10.35 into a
single section that set forth statements of general principles rather than
merely detailing requirements. 387 The report recommended clarifying
some details and cross-referencing to the I.R.C. provisions addressing
tax shelters. 388 It forcefully criticized the definition of tax shelters. 389 The
ABA Tax Section also recommended combining @ 10.33 and @ 10.35 to
cover tax shelter opinions.390 The Tax Section's suggested strategy was
to foster full disclosure of the tax risks of a tax shelter.391 It also criticized the proposed tax shelter definition, recommending that, instead,
"tax shelters" be re-defined to "identify transactions in which there is a
reason to require full discussion by the practitioner of all material tax
issues relating to the transaction." 392 Under its recommendations, a tax
shelter would be a "transaction that has a significant purpose of tax avoidance" and has "at least one of five other characteristics of a potentially
abusive transaction." 393 The Tax Section suggested that a tax shelter
opinion that did not reach a more likely than not conclusion should have
to disclose that it did not offer grounds for penalty protection under
@ 6662 or @ 6664.394
Despite the criticisms of the definition of tax shelters, in 2003
the Treasury stuck with its 2001 proposal to use the @ 6662 definition.395

386.

Unofficial TranscriptofIRS Hearing on Circular 230 Regs Is

Available, 30 TAX PRAC. 274 (May 28, 2001).
387. NYSBA Offers Suggestions on Circular230, 31 TAX PRAC. 245
(Aug. 24, 2001). The report also recommended clarifying some details and
cross-referencing relevant I.R.C. provisions.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. ABA Tax Section Offers Definition of 'Tax Shelter'for Circular 230 Regs, 2001 TAX NOTEs TODAY 158-15 (Aug. 13, 2001).
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. REG-122379-02, 68 Fed. Reg. 75,186 (Dec. 30, 2003).
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This included any plan with a significant purpose of avoiding tax. 396 A
single section, @ 10.35 would apply to any written advice concerning a
tax shelter item, that is, a "tax shelter opinion." 397 The new @ 10.35 would
apply if the opinion was a marketed tax shelter opinion or a more likely
than not tax shelter opinion. 398 It also would exclude preliminary written advice if the expectation was that the same practitioner would later
provide written advice that satisfied the tax shelter opinion requirements. 399 It excluded limited scope opinions, which meant that the requirements only applied to those items covered.4
The response to Treasury's 2003 proposals were much like those
on earlier proposals. The Tax Section worried that the tax shelter opinion definition was so broad it would cover informal advice on routine
transactions.4 0 1 It also made recommendations for better regulating limited opinions, advice expected to be followed by a formal opinion, and
self-marketed opinions.40 2 The American College of Tax Counsel criticized the proposed definition of "tax shelter," arguing that virtually
everything atax lawyer does would be covered.4 03 But if, as they expected,
Treasury was wedded to its definition, then, at least, the requirements
should only apply to marketed opinions and opinions written for penalty protection.4 0 4 In connection with the latter, they suggested amending
the @ 6662 and @ 6664 regulations to require that only opinions that complied with Circular 230 could be used to avoid penalties. 4 5 The NYSBA
Tax Section, the City Bar of New York, and the Boston Bar Association

396. Prop. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c)(2), 68 Fed. Reg. at 75,189.
397. Prop. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c)(4), 68 Fed. Reg. at 75,189-90.
398. Prop. 31 C.F.R. § § 10.35(a), 68 Fed. Reg. at 75,189.
399. 68 Fed. Reg. at 75,187.
400. Id.
401. ABA Sec. of Tax'n, Comments on Proposed Rulemaking: Circular 230 (2004), in ABA Comments on Proposed Circular 230 Changes on
Tax Shelters, 2004 TAX NOTES TODAY 32-28 (Feb. 12, 2004).
402. Id.
403. Letter from Louis Mezzullo, Chair, Am. Coll. of Tax Couns.,
to IRS (Feb. 12, 2004), in College of Tax CounselAddress Changesto Circular 230, 2004 TAX NOTEs TODAY 33-21 (Feb. 12, 2004).
404. Id.
405. Id.
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expressed concerns and made recommendations similar to the Tax Section and the American College of Tax Counsel.4 06
3. 2004: American Jobs CreationAct and Circular230
In 2004, after years of official hearings and reports, Congress overhauled the tax shelter penalty and registration scheme. 40 7 Congress
eliminated the @ 6662 defense for noncorporate taxpayers with substantial authority for a tax shelter position and a reasonable belief it
was more likely than not the proper treatment. 4 08 Congress enacted
@ 6662A to replace the @ 6662 accuracy related penalty on tax shelter
understatements and imposed a two-tier penalty, with the higher
one applicable if a "reportable" tax-avoidance transaction were not

406. N.Y. St. Bar Ass'n Tax Section, Report on Proposed Amendments to Circular 230 (2004), in NYSBA Comments on ProposedCircular230
Amendments, 2004 TAX NOTES TODAY 58-46 (Mar. 24, 2004); Letter from
Bryan Skarlatos, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., to Gregory F. Jenner,
Acting Assistant Sec'y (Tax Pol'y), U.S. Treas. Dep't (Apr. 6, 2004), in City
Bar Association Asserts that Proposed Circular 230 Amendments Are Too
Broad, 2004 TAX NOTES TODAY 73-40 (Apr. 6, 2004); Bos. Bar Ass'n, Comments on Proposed Amendments to Circular 230 (2004), in Boston Bar Association Comments on Proposed Changes to Circular 230, 2004 TAX NOTES
TODAY

127-31 (June 21, 2004).

&

407. The new wave of shelters received considerable public scrutiny in Congress, beginning in November 2003. The Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations held a two-day hearing on tax shelters and
prominent accounting firms. See Tax Shelter Hearings, supra note 351. Senate
investigators subpoenaed documents KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst
Young and other prominent accounting firms. ABA Panel, supra note 351.
408. This had been eliminated for corporate taxpayers in 1994.
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 744, 108 Stat. 4809,
5011 (1994) (amending I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C)). This was eliminated for noncorporate taxpayers in 2004. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L.
No. 108-357, § 812(b), 118 Stat. 1418, 1578-79. In 1989, legislation had carried
it from § 6661 into § 6662. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub.
L. No. 101-239, § 7721(a) & (c)(2), 103 Stat. 2106, 2395-97, 2399 (repealing
I.R.C. § 6661 and replacing it with former I.R.C. § 6662); Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 323(a), 96 Stat. 324, 61315 (codified as former I.R.C. § 6661; amended by Tax Reform Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1504(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2743). Note that I.R.C. § 6694
continues to contain a "more likely than not" exception for tax shelter items.
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properly disclosed.4 09 It also precluded a reasonable cause and good
faith defense to a penalty if the tax opinion were a disqualified opinion
(i.e., it failed specifications) or came from a disqualified advisor (i.e.,
one with specified compensation or financial interests).4 1 While before
2004 there had been a requirement for a taxpayer to report entering
one of six types of transactions, there was no financial penalty for
failing to comply with the disclosure requirement; the penalty was the
inability to claim the understatement was due to reasonable cause and
good faith under @ 6664(c). 41 1 In 2004, Congress enacted a financial
penalty on a taxpayer who failed to disclose any information required
by Treasury on any transaction "of a type which the Secretary determines as having a potential for tax avoidance or evasion." 41 2 The penalty applied even if there was not an understatement of tax, and it was
in addition to any accuracy related penalty.413 Before 2004, under
@ 6111 a tax shelter organizer was required to register it. 4 14 However, in
2004 the burden was shifted to the tax advisors. The new law required
that a "material advisor" had to file an information return with respect
to a reportable transaction and maintain a list of participants in the
transaction, together with information relating to the transaction, and
disclose the list and accompanying information and documents to the
IRS on request. 4" A material advisor was one who provided tax-related
assistance or advice and derived gross income of at least a specified

409.

American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357,

§ 812(a), 118 Stat. 1418, 1577-78 (codifying I.R.C. § 6662A(c) (2004)); H.R.
REP. No. 108-755, at 599-604 (2004) (Conf. Rep.); Ira B. Shepard & Martin J.,
McMahon, Jr., Recent Developments in FederalIncome Taxation: The Year
2004, 7 FLA. TAX REV., 2005 special issue, at 47, 114.
410. Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 812(a), 118 Stat. at 1577-78 (codifying
I.R.C. § 6662A(d)(3)(B) (2004)); H.R. REP. No. 108-755, at 602.
411. H.R. REP. No. 108-755, at 599-600.
412. Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 811(a), 118 Stat. at 1575-76 (codifying
I.R.C. § 6707A(c) (2004)); see also Shepard & McMahon, supra note 409,
at 114.
413. H.R. REP. No. 108-755, at 595-99; I.R.C. § 6707A(f) (2004)
(codified by Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 811(a), 118 Stat. at 1575-76).
414. H.R. REP. No. 108-755, at 606-07; see also Shepard & McMahon, supra note 409, at 115. Compare I.R.C. § 6111(a) (2000), with I.R.C.
§ 6111(a) (2004).
415. Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 815, 118 Stat. at 1581-83 (codifying
I.R.C. § 6112 (2004)); H.R. REP. No. 108-755, at 609-11.
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amount.4 16 The new law enabled courts to impose injunctions against
material advisors who failed to meet these requirements."
Congress also showed its support for Treasury's increased
administrative actions against tax shelters; Congress affirmed Treasury's
authority to impose standards on written advice it identified as having
the potential for tax avoidance or evasion, as well as granting authority
to censure (rather than only suspend or disbar), fine, or impose an injunction on practitioners who violated Circular 230.418 Treasury then finalized its changes to Circular 230, which included mandating one set of
requirements for "covered opinions" (rather than "tax shelter opinions")
but also subjected all other written advice to a different and less onerous set of requirements.4 19 In Treasury's proposed regulations, there had
been no requirements for other written advice. The potential regulation
of written advice other than formal opinions and tax shelter advice had
been one of the chief concerns of the tax bar, but it was now explicitly
covered and, furthermore, Congress had explicitly addressed Treasury's
right to regulate any written advice.4 2 Thus was created a two-tier structure with the more onerous covered opinion requirements avoidable by
practitioners using a disclaimer so that the advice would be subject only
to the more general set of requirements for other written advice.4 21 A
covered opinion was one addressing federal tax issues arising from (1)
a listed transaction; (2) a plan or arrangement with the principal purpose of avoiding or evading tax; or (3) any plan or arrangement with a
significant purpose of avoiding or evading tax if the opinion was (a) a
reliance opinion (i.e., it concludes with at least a more likely than not
standard), (b) a marketed opinion, (c) subject to conditions of confidentiality, or (d) subject to contractual protection.4 22 Covered opinions were

416. H.R. REP. No. 108-755, at 609.
417. Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 820, 118 Stat. at 1585 (amending I.R.C.
§ 7408); H.R. REP. No. 108-755, at 614; Shepard & McMahon, supranote 409,
at 116.
418. Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 822, 118 Stat. at 1586-87 (amending 31
U.S.C. § 330(b)); H.R. REP. No. 108-755, at 616.
419. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c) (2005), T.D. 9165, 69 Fed. Reg. 75,839,
75,842 (Dec. 20, 2004).
420. Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 822, 118 Stat. at 1586-87 (adding 31
U.S.C. § 330(d) (2004)); 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b) (2005), 69 Fed. Reg. at 75,842.
421. See Shepard & McMahon, supra note 409, at 110; Sheppard,
supra note 279.
422. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2) (2005), 69 Fed. Reg. at 75,842.

904

FloridaTax Review

[Vol 24:2

required to address all relevant facts, relate applicable law to relevant
facts, provide an evaluation of the significant federal tax issues, and give
an overall conclusion.4 2 3 One opportunity for opting out of the covered
opinion rules was to limit the scope of the opinion and its usefulness
for penalty avoidance.4 2 4 The more general opt-out strategy would be stating that the opinion was not written to be used, and could not be used,
for penalty avoidance."' Since any written advice with a more likely than
not conclusion would be considered a reliance opinion and thus a covered opinion, even emails and other informal writings would need a disclaimer if the covered opinion requirements were not met.42 6
Although 2004 was a milestone in the regulation of tax advisors, with Congress strengthening statutory regulation and both expanding and affirming Treasury's powers, the legislation in 2004 had not been
as wide sweeping as the Senate had proposed. But Congress would soon
revive and enact some of those proposals. The Senate had proposed that
the general standard for the undisclosed positions under both @ 6662 (taxpayers) and @ 6694 (preparers) be raised to a reasonable belief that the
tax treatment was more likely than not the proper treatment. 4 27 The Senate also had proposed to codify a definition of the economic substance
doctrine so as to provide a uniform definition for courts to use and to
incorporate that definition into @ 6662 so as to provide a strict-liability
penalty on taxpayers that entered transactions without economic substance (i.e., no exceptions, including reasonable cause and good faith
would be available). 42 As discussed above, Congress soon raised the
@ 6694 standard to more likely than not but almost immediately

423. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c) (2005), 69 Fed. Reg. at 75,842.
424. 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.35(c)(3)(v), (e)(3) (2005), 69 Fed. Reg. at
75,843-44. This strategy would be available for reliance opinions that are not
described in 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2)(i)(A) (2005) (listed transactions), 31
C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2)(i)(B) (2005) (principal purpose of avoidance or evasion),
or 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(5) (2005) (marketed opinion).
425. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(4)(ii) (2005), 69 Fed. Reg. at 75,842. This
strategy would be available for reliance opinions not described in 31 C.F.R.
§ 10.35(b)(2)(i)(A) (2005) (listed transactions) or 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2)(i)(B)
(2005) (principal purpose of avoidance or evasion).
426. Arthur L. Bailey & Alexis A. MacIvor, New Circular 230
Regulations Impose Strict Standardsfor Tax Practitioners,57 TAX EXEC. 28
(2005).
427. H.R. REP. No. 108-755, at 613, 671-72 (2004) (Conf. Rep.).
428. Id. at 666-69.
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lowered it to substantial authority, which met the @ 6662 taxpayer standard.429 But Congress retained the more likely than not standard in
@ 6694 as to tax shelters, thus strengthening the tax shelter standard for
preparers. 430 As to the Senate's 2004 economic substance proposal, that
too returned for consideration and became law in 2010.431 Though there
was no counterpart for preparers, the strict liability nature of the penalty on clients made it relevant for all tax advice.
4. The Fall of Circular230?
While the tax bar formally supported Congress's advances in the war
on tax shelters in 2004, there was not much support for that year's
Circular 230 changes. 43 2 Beginning almost immediately and continuing for almost a decade, the tax bar and various practitioners critiqued
the two-tier written advice regulation Treasury had created. 433 On the

429. See T.D. 9436, 73 Fed. Reg. 78,430 (Dec. 22, 2008); Notice
2009-5, 2009-1 C.B. 309.
430. Compare I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B) (2004), with I.R.C. § 6694(a)
(2)(C) (2008). See also American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108357, § 812, 118 Stat. 1418, 1577-80; Tax Extenders and Alternative Minimum
Tax Relief of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 506, 122 Stat 3765, 3880. Note that
the § 6662 more likely than not standard had been eliminated for relevance to
corporate taxpayers with tax shelter items in 1994 and noncorporate taxpayers in 2004.
431. I.R.C. §§ 6662(b)(6), 7701(o) (as amended by Health Care and
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1409, 124 Stat.
1029, 1068-70); see also Notice 2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411. The ABA Section of Taxation criticized the changes, remarking the amendments fail to
resolve many pre-existing ambiguities in the economic substance doctrine
and create more ambiguities such as when the doctrine is relevant. ABA Sec.
of Tax'n, Request for Guidance on Implementation of Economic Substance
Legislation, in ABA Members Seek More Guidance on Codification of Economic Substance Doctrine, 2011 TAX NOTEs TODAY 12-13 (Jan. 18, 2011).
432. The American Jobs Creation Act (AJCA) allowed the IRS to
impose a monetary penalty on a practitioner who violated provisions of Circular 230. Pub. L. 108-357, § 820, 118 Stat. at 1585; see also T.D. 9165, 69 Fed.
Reg. 75,839 (Dec. 20, 2004).
433. See ABA Sec. of Tax'n, Comments on Proposed REG138367-06 Relating to Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, in ABA
Tax Section Members Offer Suggestions on Proposed Circular 230 Regs, 2012
TAX NOTEs TODAY 229-26 (Nov. 27, 2012) [hereinafter ABA REG-138367-06
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one hand were the burdensome technicalities for covered opinions,
which generated seemingly countless articles and presentations on
navigation.4 34 On the other hand were the boilerplate disclaimers
affixed to almost every routine communication, which avoided the burden of complying but confused clients and accomplished nothing

Comments] (supporting the proposed elimination of the covered opinion standards in 31 C.F.R. § 10.35); ABA Sec. of Tax'n, Comments on the 2007
Amendments to Section 6664 Tax Return Preparer Penalty, in ABA Members
Comment on RecentAmendments to PreparerPenaltyRules, 2008 TAX NOTES
TODAY 67-63 (Apr. 3, 2008); Bailey & MacIvor, supra note 426; Letter from
Dennis B. Drapkin, Chair, ABA Sec. of Tax'n, to IRS & U.S. Treas. Dep't
(Dec. 5, 2005), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative
/taxation/migrated/pubpolicy/2005/051205circ230.pdf
[https://perma.cc
/MW7X-PGNL] (regarding final Circular 230 Regulations); Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., The 'New' More Likely Than Not Standard, 120 TAX NOTES 1345
(Sep. 29, 2008); N.Y. St. Bar Ass'n Tax Sec., Report on Proposed Amendments to Circular 230 Relating to Standards with Respect to Written Tax
Advice, in NYSBA Tax Section Endorses ProposedAmendments to Circular
230, 2012 TAX NOTEs TODAY 248-27 (Dec. 26, 2012) [hereinafter NYSBA 2012
Comments] (calling for the elimination of 31 C.F.R. § 10.35); Richard A.
Shaw, Chair, Testimony on Circular 230 Before the IRS (Feb. 19, 2004),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/taxation
/migrated/pubpolicy/2004/0402c230.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YLV7-8SRU]
(suggesting changes to Circular 230 regarding tax shelters that Congress
implemented in the AJCA, but Congress also made changes not suggested);
Dustin Stamper & Sheryl Stratton, Solomon: IRS, Treasury May Need to
Alter Circular230Approach, 48 TAX PRAC. 225 (Dec. 30, 2005); Sheryl Stratton & Scott Antonides, Circular 230 Dominates PanelDiscussions, 48 TAX
PRAC. 1 (Oct. 7, 2005) (noting the recent alterations to Circular 230, including
those to marketed opinions. were the biggest subject of debate among ABA
Tax Section members).
434. Robert P. Rothman, Tax Opinion Practice, 64 TAX LAW. 301,
327-31 (2011); Comm. on Closely Held Bus., ABA Sec. of Tax'n, Ethical
Issues in Representing Taxpayers Before IRS Collection, Exam & Other
Divisions, in 2010 ABATAX-CLE 0122075 (Jan. 22, 2010); Comm. on Standards of Tax Prac., ABA Sec. of Tax'n, Panel: Circular 230: An In-House
View on the Ethics of Opinion Writing, in 2009 ABATAX-CLE 0925009
(Sep. 25, 2009); Comm. on Civil & Crim. Tax Penalties & Comm. on Standards of Tax Prac., ABA Sec. of Tax'n, Panel: Circular 230 in Everyday Practice: A Series of Hypotheticals, in 2005 ABATAX-CLE 0917015 (Sep. 17,
2005).
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important.4 35 The combination and contrast of the two seemed remarkably ineffective, if not silly. Eventually, Treasury was persuaded to
drop its most ambitious attempt to regulate tax advice. In 2012, it proposed eliminating the covered opinion rules and, instead, set forth
general requirements for all written advice, such as basing it on reasonable assumptions and reasonably considering all relevant facts.4 36
Instead of detailed specifications for advice, Circular 230 now would
emphasize reasonableness and diligence.4 3 7 The tax bar supported the
proposal, and the changes were finalized in 2014.438 The new simplicity
of Circular 230 led one prominent commentator to predict that "for
many tax practitioners, the most difficult aspect of the new Regulations will be explaining to their non-tax colleagues why it is no longer
necessary to have (and why they should remove) the Circular 230 disclaimer from every piece of correspondence ."41
But to whom did the Circular 230 written advice guidelines
apply? As mentioned above, in 2004, as part of its support for Treasury's
efforts to curtail tax shelters, Congress modified 31 U.S.C. @ 330, which
is the statute that authorizes Treasury to regulate practitioners or, more

&

435. Scott Antonides, Treasury Officials Wrestle with Covered
Opinion Rules, 2005 TAX NOTES TODAY 181-10 (Sep. 20, 2005) ("'Putting disclaimers on everything cheapens the disclaimer' and does little to encourage
client- practitioner communication." (quoting Michael J. Desmond, Acting
Deputy Tax Legis. Couns.)); Kip Dellinger, The E-Mail Caveat is Dead/ Long
Live the E-Mail Caveat!, 145 TAX NOTES 103 (Oct. 6, 2014) ("The original
e-mail caveat was never a requirement for tax practitioners. It was a defense
mechanism to opt out regarding . .. covered opinions."); Burgess J.W. Raby
William L. Raby, Accuracy-Related Penalties and Circular 230 Caveats, 49
TAX PRAC. 41 (Jan. 27, 2006) ("The most noticeable effect of Circular 230 on
tax practitioners and those who deal with them has been an ever-present disclaimer in e-mails and letters... ").
436. REG-138367-06, 77 Fed. Reg. 57,055, 57,056-58 (Sept. 17,
2012) (notice of proposed rulemaking).
437. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35, which was for covered opinions, was to be
replaced. 77 Fed. Reg. at 57,056.
438. See ABA REG-138367-06 Comments, supra note 433, at 433;
NYSBA 2012 Comments, supra, at 433; Antonides, supra note 435.
439. Richard M. Lipton, Proposed Regulations Radically Overhaul 'Tax Shelter Opinions' and Other Rules in Circular230, 118 J. TAX'N 6,

7 (2013).
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technically, "representatives of persons before the Department of the
Treasury.""' Congress added a final paragraph:
Nothing in this section or in any other provision of law
shall be construed to limit the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury to impose standards applicable to
the rendering of written advice with respect to any
entity, transaction plan or arrangement, or other plan or
arrangement, which is of a type which the Secretary
determines as having a potential for tax avoidance or
evasion."4
Treasury then amended Circular 230 to define "practice before the
Internal Revenue Service" to include "rendering written advice with
respect to any entity, transaction, plan or arrangement, or other plan or
arrangement having a potential for tax avoidance or evasion," which
tracked the statute except for the final statutory clause that limited the
covered arrangements to those so identified by Treasury.44 2
While Treasury had long before claimed its right to regulate tax
shelter opinions, its modifications to Circular 230 could be read as claiming a right to regulate virtually all tax advice. This is notable as neither
Congress nor the ABA nor heretofore Treasury had issued any general
tax advising standards. The return preparation standards of @ 6694 only
applied to post-transaction advice, and though the Tax Section Opinion
Task Force had interpreted ABA Opinion 85-352 to guide all tax advice,
it formally only covered return positions. A great deal of time had been
spent over the decades debating return position standards and tax shelter opinion requirements but not general tax advising standards.
But could Treasury's authority be read so broadly as to include
all written advice with tax minimization potential? In light of the Loving
and Ridgely decisions in 2014, the claim to this authority was significantly uncertain. On the logic of those cases, it was unclear which tax
lawyers were subject to Circular 230. Under those cases, Circular 230
only covered those representing taxpayers in an audit or similar

440. SupraPart III.B.3.
441. 31.U.S.C. § 330(d) (2004) (added by American Jobs Creation
Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 822(b), 118 Stat. 1418, 1587).
442. 31 C.F.R. § 10.2(a)(4) (2007) (published: T.D. 9359, 72 Fed.
Reg. 54,540, 54,545 (Sept. 26, 2007)).
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proceeding. If that were true, only written advice provided by a lawyer
who was a representative in such a proceeding would be covered. On
the logic of these cases, merely providing written advice would not subject the advisor to Circular 230 any more than merely preparing a
return could.4 4 3 As a prominent tax lawyer put it at the time: "If I write
a tax opinion and give it to my client for their advice, how is that practice before the IRS? It's just practicing law. . . . The entire validity of
this set of rules that we all thought were sacrosanct . . . is now completely called into question."4
Whether or not written tax advice of lawyers otherwise not subject to Circular 230 could be regulated by Circular 230 was substantially
unclear by 2014, and so was the authority of Treasury to have implemented through Circular 230 much of what it had in the preceding
30 years. After her retirement, Karen Hawkins, who as the Director of
the Office of Professional Responsibility was responsible for enforcing
Circular 230 from 2009-2015, said that the Loving and Ridgely cases
prompted "the clever among us to find great sport in identifying" the
sections of Circular 230 left jeopardized.4 4 5 She described the two cases
as "eviscerating" Circular 230.446
5. The Tax Shelter War Is Over
In the war on tax shelters, Congress had held multiple hearings, which
had generated many reports as well as legislation tightening penalty standards and implementing new registration requirements, while Treasury
had persistently worked to focus Circular 230, but what proved the most
effective response was criminal prosecution.44 In 2000, the IRS
announced that some shelters were not merely abusive but criminal and

443. Indeed, in 2017, a U.S. District Court would reject Treasury's
claim that Circular 230 applies to tax professionals who offer written tax
advice within the meaning of 31 U.S.C. 330(d), regardless of whether they
represent clients in a typical tax controversy before the IRS. Sexton v. Hawkins, 119 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 2017-1187 (U.S.D.C. Nev. 2017).
444. Amy S. Elliot, Hawkins Asserts Her Authority to Regulate
Lawyers, CPAs, 147 TAX NOTES 516 (May 4, 2015) (second omission in original) (remarks of Richard M. Lipton, Baker McKenzie).
445. Hawkins, supra note 1, at 652.
446. Id.
447. Michelle M. Kwon, The Criminality of "Tax Planning," 18
FLA. TAX REV. 153, 158-59 (2015).
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that investors might be prosecuted.4 4 8 In 2002, the IRS began providing
incentives for tax shelter investors to come forward and avoid penalties
in exchange for providing information, including information on promoters.4 4 9 In 2003, the Justice Department announced it was taking a
harderline against white collar crime, including tax shelters.4 5 The government then developed an aggressive prosecution policy targeting tax
shelter advisors, ratherthan just the tax shelter investors.4" Before, prosecutions of tax lawyers and other advisors were rare and usually only
in connection with the prosecution of their investor clients.4 2 The new
strategy targeted advisors, even if the investors were not targeted.4 53

448.

Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255; Kwon, supra note 447, at

520-21.
449. ABA Panel, supra note 351.
450. Schumacher, supra note 338, at 520; Memorandum from
Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att'y Gen., to U.S. Attorneys (Jan. 20, 2003),
https://assets. hcca-info.org/Portals/0/PDFs/Resources/Conference_Handouts/ClinicalPracticeCompliance_Conference/2006/Tues/501-%20Handout%201.pdf [https://perma.cc/GV6C-REGM] (regarding principles of
federal prosecution of business organizations); Notice 2000-44, 2000-2
C.B. 255.
451. Kwon, supra note 447, at 158-59; Schumacher, supra note
338, at 520; see also Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696
(2005) (holding government was unable to meet the burden of showing intent
or proof of conscious wrongdoing); United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130 (2d
Cir. 2008) (overreaching prosecution strategy of the government led to dismissal of an indictment for KPMG accountants).
452. Schumacher, supra note 338, at 516-17; see also Goldberg v.
United States, 789 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1986); Durham Farms # 1, J.V. v.
Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 2000-159, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 2009, aff'd, 59 F. App'x
952 (9th Cir. 2003); Bouskos v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1987-574, 54 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1117 (1987); Maginv. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1985-304, 50 T.C.M. (CCH)
208 (1985).
453. Schumacher, supra note 338, at 512; see, e.g., United States v.
Mastropieri, 685 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1982). Even when investor clients were
considered co-conspirators with the advisors, they often were not indicted
and, at times, offered settlements allowing resolution of their cases by paying
civil penalties. Schumacher, supra note 338, at 520-24 (examples include
KPMG's deferred prosecution agreement admitting wrongdoing; indictment
of Ernst & Young partners; and Paul Daugerdas, the lead tax shelter promoter
at Jenkens & Gilchrist). KPMG entered into a deferred prosecution agreement
with the government that admitted wrongdoing concerning tax shelters.
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The line between civil and criminal prosecution is willfulness.
Those who know their activities violate their tax Code obligations have
committed a crime." To prevail, the government has to prove the defendant's willfulness beyond a reasonable doubt, which can be difficult
because the complexities and uncertainties of tax law means there is
almost always some doubt as to what is required. But in these tax shelter cases, the burden could be met because not only did the advisors
knowingly misapply the tax law, they engaged in far more egregious conduct, such as creating the "facts" for the investors to claim as the rationale for investing and then actively concealing their roles and deceiving
others, including the IRS."'

Letter from David N. Kelley, U.S. Attorney, S. Dist. N.Y., to Robert S. Bennett, Esq., Skadden, Arps, at 2 (Aug. 26, 2005) (transmitting the KPMG
Deferred Prosecution Agreement), https://www.justice.gov/archive/usao/nys
[https://perma.cc/2945-7XYF]
/pressreleases/August05/kpmgdpagmt.pdf
[hereinafter KPMG DPA]. Deutsche Bank agreed to pay a fine for assisting
KPMG. Nathan Vardi, Deutsche Bank Will Pay $554 Million for Illegal Tax
Shelter Activity, FORBES (Dec. 21, 2010, 2:11 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites
/nathanvardi/2010/12/21/deutsche-bank-will-pay-554 -million-for-illegal-tax
-shelter-activity/ [https://perma.cc/3VNY-WT5G].
454. See Kwon, supra note 447, at 155-56, 161-65; Tanina Rostain,
Sheltering Lawyers: The Organized Tax Bar and the Tax Shelter Industry, 23
YALE J. ON REG. 77, 86-92 (2006); see also Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S.
192, 201-02 (1991) (normally, prosecutor must negate criminal's claim of
ignorance, but tax law is special according to Supreme Court due to tax law
complexity).
455. Schumacher, supra note 338, at 543; Press Release, Dep't of
Just., Jenkens & Gilchrist Attorneys, BDO Seidman Accountants, and Bankers
Charged in Criminal Tax Fraud Related to Tax Shelters Generating over Seven
Billion Dollars of Fraudulent Tax Losses (June 9, 2009), https://www.justice
.gov/opa/pr/jenkens-gilchrist-attorneys-bdo-seidman-accountants-and-bankers
-charged-criminal-tax-fraud [https://perma.cc/Z4KX-66RK] [hereinafter Press
Release, Tax Fraud Charges]; Press Release, U.S. Att'y, S.D.N.Y., Former
Accounting Firm Partner Pleads Guilty to Tax Shelter Fraud (July 9, 2009),
https://www.justice.gov/archive/usao/nys/pressreleases/July09/greismanrobertpleapr.pdf [https://perma.cc/HK7J-XSA5]; Press Release, Dep't of Just., Former
Jenkens & Gilchrist Attorney Sentenced to 15 Years in Prison for Orchestrating
Multibillion Dollar Criminal Tax Fraud Scheme (June 25, 2014), https://www
.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-jenkens-gilchrist-attorney-sentenced-15-years
-prison-orchestrating-multibillion-dollar [https://perma.cc/LTX7-QH9J]; see
also COMISKY ET AL., supra note 348, ¶ 1.08; ABA Panel, supra note 351.
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The first high profile case began in 2004, when the Justice
Department initiated a grand jury investigation against KPMG. 456 Eventually, a group of KPMG partners and employees, along with investment
advisory firm and tax lawyer R.J. Ruble were found guilty of criminal
tax evasion. 457 For its part, KPMG admitted wrongdoing, paid a $450
million fine, and committed itself to cooperation with the government. 458
Its deferred prosecution agreement required KPMG to abandon certain
areas of its tax practice and to adhere to higher standards than otherwise required by law or regulations, such as not issuing covered tax opinions to individuals or private entities unless the opinion reached the
"should" standard nor to prepare returns for them with positions at less
than more likely than not. 459
For his work in designing and marketing opinions on tax shelters, tax lawyer R.J. Ruble was indicted on over 40 counts of tax evasion and ultimately was convicted on ten counts and sentenced to over
six years in prison. 460 His law firm, Sidley Austin was spared criminal
charges. 461 Ruble had been a partner at Brown & Wood where he developed his cookie-cutter opinion letter practice. 46 2 When Brown & Wood

456. Kwon, supra note 447, at 158; David Cay Johnston, Grand
JuryIs Investigating KPMG's Sale of Tax Shelters, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2004),
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/20/business/grand-jury-is-investigating
-kpmg-s-sale-of-tax-shelters.html [https://perma.cc/EF2W-MGBV].
457. Press Release, U.S. Att'y, S.D.N.Y., Three Defendants in Tax
Shelter Fraud Trial Sentenced to Prison (Apr. 2, 2009), https://www.justice
.gov/archive/usao/nys/pre ssrelease s/April0 9/larsonetalsentencingpr.pdf
[https://perma.cc/59D3-J6C2] [hereinafter U.S. Att'y, Three Defendants]; see
also COMISKY ET AL., supra note 348, ¶ 1.08.
458. United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 349-50 (S.D.N.Y
2006), aff'd, 541 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008); see also COMISKY ET AL., supra note
348, ¶ 1.08.
459. The exact level of confidence of a "should" opinion is debated,
but it is generally understood to be an opinion with greater confidence than
"more likely than not" (510o) and less confidence than "will" (90%). Jasper L.
Cummings, Jr., The Range of Legal Tax Opinions, with Emphasis on the
'Should' Opinion, 98 TAX NOTES 1125, 1126 (Feb. 17,2003); ABA Panel, supra
note 351.
460. U.S. Att'y, Three Defendants, supra note 457; see also
COMISKY ET AL., supra note 348, ¶ 1.08; Kwon, supra note 447, at 198.
461. ABA Panel, supra note 351.
462. Id.
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merged with Sidley Austin, Ruble was told to cease his shelter opinion
practice, but he continued it, concealing it by keeping his opinions out
of the firm database.4 63 When Sidley Austin discovered Ruble's deception, it notified the IRS and then fired him.4 64 Even though Sidley Austin escaped criminal prosecution, it paid a $39.4 million civil penalty to
the IRS and implemented an unprecedent compliance program to oversee its tax practice. 465
While there were other criminal prosecutions of tax shelter lawyers, the most high profile would be that of three former shareholders
of the law firm Jenkens & Gilchrist, especially Paul Daugerdas who was
the head of the firm's Chicago office and its tax practice. 466 The story of
Paul Daugerdas would eventually make the cover of American Lawyer,
the pages of the Wall Street Journal, and Forbes, where he was named
in the magazine's gallery of the ten most notorious tax cheats. 467 In 2009,
the government announced his indictment, along with those of the other

463. Id.
464. Id.
465. Id.
466. For example, in 2008, a former Arnold & Porter tax lawyer,
Peter Cinquegrani pled guilty to conspiracy to commit tax fraud, aiding and
abetting tax evasion, and aiding the submission of false and fraudulent documents to the IRS. Press Release, Tax Fraud Charges, supra note 455; Press
Release, U.S. Att'y, S.D.N.Y., Former Jenkens & Gilchrist Attorney Pleads
Guilty in Manhattan Federal Court to Creating Illegal Tax Shelters That Generated Billions of Dollars in Fraudulent Tax Losses and Other Charges (Sept.
13, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/archive/usao/nys/pressreleases/Septemberl2
/GuerinPleaPR.html [https://perma.cc/2GVR-CE6T]; see also COMISKY
ET AL., supra note 348, ¶ 1.08. He had been involved with Ernst & Young LLP
accountants in that firm's tax shelter practice, which led to criminal charges
against partners and to the firm agreeing to certain restrictions on its practice,
such as refraining from planning, promoting, or recommending any "listed
transaction." Press Release, U.S. Att'y, S.D.N.Y., Manhattan U.S. Attorney
Announces Agreement with Ernst & Young LLP to Pay $123 Million to
Resolve Federal Tax Shelter Fraud Investigation (Mar. 1, 2013), https://www
.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney-announces-agreement-ernst
-young-llp-pay-123-million-resolve [https://perma.cc/WA2D-MAU6]; see
also COMISKY ET AL., supra note 348, ¶ 1.08.
467. See, e.g., Peter J. Reilly, Judge Urges Prison Furlough for
Author of "BiggestTax FraudEver," FORBES (May 6, 2020), https://www.forbes

.com/sites/peterjreilly/2020/05/06/judge-urges-prison-furlough-for-author-of
-biggest-tax-fraud-ever/#538bb78945dc [https://perma.cc/JTB8-DE4C].
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two shareholders in his firm, two bankers, and the accounting firm BDO
Seidman.4 68 The indictment alleged the conspirators had designed, marketed, implemented, and defended cookie-cutter tax shelters that
defrauded the government from 1994 through 2004.469 They also were
alleged to have taken steps to conceal the shelters, especially steps to
conceal the fact that investors were not seeking a profit but merely completing pre-planned series of steps and then claiming tremendous tax
benefits. 470 The case was high profile in large part due to the revelation
of the fees Daugerdas had personally made for his involvement: $95 million. 4 1While his income tax liability on this amount was over $32 million, he, perhaps predictably, used his own shelters to claim that the
liability was less than $8,000.472 His law firm entered into a nonprosecution agreement, paid a civil penalty of $78 million, and agreed
to cease the practice of law, bringing to an end a prominent law firm
that had once numbered over 600 lawyers. 473 Daugerdas was convicted
in 2013 on seven counts, including conspiring to evade taxes and defraud
the government and corruptly endeavoring to obstruct and impede the
internal revenue laws as part of what prosecutors described as the biggest criminal tax fraud in history.474 In 2014, he was sentenced to 15 years

468. COMISKY ET AL., supra note 348, ¶ 1.08; Press Release, Tax
Fraud Charges, supra note 455.
469. COMISKY ET AL., supra note 348, ¶ 1.08.
470. Id.
471. Id.
472. Id.
473. Chad Bray, Tax-Shelter Case Brings Convictions, WALL ST. J.
(May 25, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230406650
4576343882600125752 [https://perma.cc/Z8JS-QSTG]; ABA Panel, supra
note 351.
474. Jason B. Freeman, Outline, Civil and Criminal Tax Penalties
Important Developments Criminal, 2014 ABATAX-CLE 0920009 (Sep. 20,
2014); Press Release, U.S. Att'y, S.D.N.Y., Jenkens & Gilchrist Attorney
Found Guilty in Manhattan Federal Court of Multibillion-Dollar Criminal
Tax Fraud Scheme (Nov. 1, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr
/jenkens -gilchrist-attorney -found-guilty -manhattan-federal -court
-multibillion-dollar [https://perma.cc/9HS2-DX7G]; see also COMISKY ET AL.,
supra note 348, ¶ 1.08.
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in prison, ordered to forfeit $165 million (the proceeds of his offenses),
and ordered to pay $371 million as restitution.4 75
Prosecuting Paul Daugerdas and other tax professionals deterred
taxpayers perhaps, but it especially deterred tax professionals without
whom tax shelters could not be designed, documented, and carried out.4 76
Thus, their prosecution had a magnifying ripple effect.4 77 The coverage
of the American Lawyer, the Wall Street Journal, Forbes, and the like
probably ensured this result. After her retirement, Karen Hawkins
reflected on her career at the IRS Office of Professional Responsibility
and concluded that it was the criminal prosecutions of tax shelter professionals and the consequent implosion of firms responsible for slowing the spread of the second generation of tax shelters.4 78 She did not
credit the decades of deliberation and debate of professional standards
proposed and refined and then finalized in Circular 230, nor did she credit
the changes to the tax penalty sections nor the tax shelter registration
requirements of the I.R.C. by Congress. With respect to Circular 230,
she said its value was not in its disciplinary standards but rather the in
terrorem effect it has on professionals who fear professional humiliation and loss.4 79 If that is true, then it is no surprise that, in the end, the
fear of the humiliation and losses of criminal conviction proved even
more powerful.
Perhaps another factor reducing the allure of these tax shelters
was that around the same time fraudulent advising and practices were
bringing down firms such as Arthur Andersen and corporations such
as ENRON, Global Crossing, WorldCom, Qwest, and Tyco. 4 80 These

475.

Freeman, supra note 474; COMISKY ET AL., supra note 348,

¶ 1.08.
476. Victor Fleischer, "The Tax Shelter War Is Over," CONGLOMERATE (Oct. 28, 2006), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2006/10/the_tax_shelter
.html [https://perma.cc/A98H-M442]; Susan Cleary Morse, The How and
Why of the New Public Corporation Tax Shelter Compliance Norm, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 961, 962 (2006); Schumacher, supra note 338, at 546.
477. KPMG DPA, supra note 453; Schumacher, supra note 338, at 546.
478. Hawkins, supra note 1, at 654.
479. Id. at 655.
480. Reed Abelson & Jonathan D. Glater, Enron's Collapse: The
Auditors; Who's Keeping the Accountants Accountable?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15,
2002),
https://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/15/business/enron-s-collapse-the
-auditors-who-s-keeping-the-accountants-accountable.html [https://perma.cc
/XV9Y-RRUG]; George A. Chidi, Jr., Global Crossing Battles Accounting
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highly visible disasters communicated to professionals that the negative
consequences of fraud and aggression sometimes are borne by the professionals and their clients rather than just third parties. It seems likely
thatthe congressional response to these events, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
also did a great deal to change corporate compliance norms or at least
to keep professionals and corporate employees too busy with compliance to spend much time devising new tax fraud schemes.4 81 Indeed,
Pamela Olson, former Assistant Secretary at Treasury for Tax Policy
pointed to this compliance work in justifying her declaration, "The tax
shelter war is over. The government won."48 2 The government had won,
but Treasury had not.
IV. CONCLUSION

Looking back over 1985-2015, we see professional standards developed
in reaction to significant problems in tax administration and developed
by ongoing negotiation between the bar, Congress, and Treasury. By the
end of that period, Congress had become the preeminent arbiter of professional standards by legislating the answer to the return position disclosure question that the ABA PR Committee had twice answered.
Treasury and Circular 230 both rose and fell during that time, taking
down the idea of centralized professional regulation for the tax field.

Controversy, CNN (Feb. 12, 2002), https://www.cnn.com/2002/TECH
/internet/02/12/global.crossing.probe.idg/index.html [https://perma.cc/EZU8
-GW7N]; Simon Romero & Alex Berenson, WorldCom Says It Hid Expenses,
Inflating Cash Flow $3.8 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 26, 2002), https://www
.nytimes.com/2002/06/26/business/worldcom-says-it-hid-expenses-inflating
-cash-flow-3.8-billion.html [https://perma.cc/37EB-MHL2]; Andrew Ross
Sorkin, 2 Top Tyco Executives Charged with $600 Million FraudScheme,
N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 13, 2002), https://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/13/business/2
-top -tyco -executives -charged-with-600 -million-fraud-scheme .html
?searchResultPosition=1 [https://perma.cc/6W7L-CF77]; Shawn Young et al.,
Qwest Engagedin Fraud, SEC Says, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 22, 2004), https://www
.wsj.com/articles/SB109836893305151847 [https://perma.cc/4WRG-XGLH].
481. Morse, supra note 476, at 971.
482. This is how she began her remarks at a University of Minnesota School of Law symposium on the future of tax shelters. She attributed
the victory to, among several other factors, the impact of Sarbanes-Oxley.
Companies are too busy dealing with section 404 auditors to have time for tax
shelters. See Fleischer, supra note 476.
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Despite the decades spent considering the lawyer's duty on return positions, which is a task not even considered the practice of law and one
that is not usually the practice of lawyers, it is curious that there never
developed an explicit standard for tax planning advice, which is the usual
practice of lawyers. Moving forward, the development of professional
responsibility standards, including plan advising standards would benefit from deliberation informed by empirical research into the diversity
of the tax bar and the variety of firms, specializations, and practices
across the nation. This research would be useful to developing strategies to constrain bad faith tax lawyering and strategies to sustain good
faith lawyering.
A. Looking Back
In the early writings on ethics for tax lawyers, there was broad consideration of topics: natural law, communism, patriotism, consumerism,
education, the business of lawyering, and moral improvement.4 83 The
writings on the duties of tax lawyers and their clients framed the return
position disclosure issue. Professor Jerome Hellerstein (NYU.) argued
for disclosing any position the government would oppose.4 84 Norris Darrell (Sullivan & Cromwell) and Randolph Paul (Paul, Weiss, Rifkind,
Wharton & Garrison) focused on the strength of the government's anticipated opposition.4 85 Professor Gerald Wallace (NY.U.) argued that so
long as one believed the government's anticipated position to be wrong,
there was no duty of disclosure.4 86 Professor Boris Bittker (Yale) did not
focus on anticipating the government's position but rather on assessing
the reasonableness or the honesty of the taxpayer's position.4 87 The historically pivotal decision was to organize an ethics task force that then
posed the question to the PR Committee.4 88 The PR Committee deduced
its response from the ABA model legal ethics, giving no consideration
to the taxpayer's legal obligations or any special role the tax lawyer might

483. Hatfield, 1945-1965, supra note 2, at 8, 11-15, 48-50, 54-55.
484. Id. at 52.
485. Id.
486. Id. at 52-53.
487. Id. at 53.
488. Hatfield, 1965-1985, supra note 2, at 686; see discussion
supra Part II.A.2.
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have in the tax system.4 89 Perhaps because it was made without any tax
context-specific considerations, the PR Committee's first answer in 1965
did not age well, and it was unclear if its second answer in 1985 was
much or any different than its first.490
In 2008, Congress decided substantial authority would be the
return standard for undisclosed positions and reasonable basis the
standard for disclosed positions.4 91 These standards were the same as
for taxpayers.4 92 When the question was posed in 1964, taxpayers were
subject to the negligence penalty standard, but there was no comparable penalty for preparers. 493 When the Tax Section and PR Committee
thoroughly reconsidered Opinion 314, neither chose to align the lawyer's standards with the taxpayer understatement standard, which had
been imposed in 1982.494 Had the PR Committee aligned the lawyer's
standards with the taxpayer's standards, perhaps the 1985 opinion would
have endured rather than been rendered largely irrelevant by eventual
congressional intervention.
The congressional answer to the disclosure question transformed
the return position issue for lawyers from one of professional ethics into
one of law. When both Congress in the @ 6694 preparer penalty standard and Treasury in Circular 230 replaced realistic possibility with substantial authority, the change was more significant than the difference
between a 33% and 40% chance the position would be sustained. 495 With
the imposition of the substantial authority standard, Opinion 85-352
became largely irrelevant for practical purposes and, more importantly,
so did the ABA and its model legal ethics. The ethics rules on which
both Opinion 314 and Opinion 85-352 were premised were those applicable to all lawyers, but Opinion 85-352's practical relevance for return

489. Hatfield, 1965-1985, supra note 2, at 686-89; see discussion
supra Part II.A.2
490. Hatfield, 1965-1985, supra note 2, at 690-85; see discussion
supra Part II.A.2, B.2-3.
491. The disclosed position standard was fixed in 2007. The undisclosed position was fixed in 2008, replacing the more likely than not standard
which was added to § 6694 in 2007 but removed retroactively in 2008. See
discussion supra Part II.C.3.
492. See discussion supra Part II.C.3.
493. See discussion supra Part IIA.1.
494. Hatfield, 1965-1985, supra note 2, at 696-96; see discussion
supra Part II.A.2.
495. See discussion supra Part II.C.3.
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positions was replaced by a higher standard adopted in federal law and
regulations.4 96 It was the law rather than legal ethics that finally answered
the disclosure question. While there had been a statutory and Circular
230 answer to that question for years before the substantial authority standard was adopted, the statute and Circular 230 had been drafted to follow the ABA's lead, which was deferential to the idea of a self-governing
profession, at least generally.4 97 But Congress and Treasury stepped
ahead of the ABA with the substantial authority standard, and, unlike
the AICPA, the ABA never stepped-up.4 98
The codification of the substantial authority standard is not, however, the only instance of replacing professional ethics with statutory
provisions. Although not issued by a self-governing profession, Circular 230 is a professional code, aiming to unite multiple professions. Beginning in 1986, Treasury tried aligning Circular 230 standards with the
I.R.C.4 99 The progressive mirroring of the I.R.C. in Circular 230 undermined the notion of professional standards as such.5" Another element
showing the rise of law over professional ethics was that the solution to
the problem of the second wave of tax shelters proved to be criminal
prosecution.50 1 The tax shelter problem was a failure of professionalism. Without the unprincipled tax advisors at work, the tax shelters could
not be designed or implemented. Yet, in the end, the in terrorem effect
of criminal convictions for conspiracy and fraud proved more important
to improving the behavior of professionals than did the decades spent
refining professional standards. 0 2
Why was professional ethics replaced by law in these situations?
In its first attempt to align Circular 230 with I.R.C. penalty standards,

496. Hatfield, 1965-1985, supra note 2, at 687-69, 697-98; see discussion supra Part II.C.3.
497. See discussion supra Part II.B.2-3.
498. See discussion supra Part II.C.3-D. The AICPA modified its
standards in 2010 so the standard of the relevant taxing authority applies, and
only if there is no such standard does the realistic possibility standard apply.
2010 AICPA Statement, supra note 305,
4-5; see also GALLER & LANG,
supra note 260, at 137 n.12.
499. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
500. It also caused confusion and other problems in those charged
with administering Circular 230, according to Karen Hawkins, supra note 1,
at 656.
501. See discussion supra Part III.B.5.
502. See discussion supraPart III.B.5.
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Treasury cited the erosion of professional standards as its motivation. 503
The idea that in some bygone era tax lawyers were more ethical has been
mentioned as far back as tax lawyer ethics have been discussed. Indeed,
at the 1952 Tax Law Review banquet one participant noted that if "civic
and moral obligation were being fulfilled" to a "reasonably satisfactory
extent," there would not have been so much discussion of ethics issues
during the banquet.' 4 While we may recall the lawyers writing in that
era for their emphasis on the dual duties of tax lawyers, perhaps we overlook that the reason it was their emphasis was their belief that professional standards were eroding. Professor Hellerstein thought lawyers
helping clients evade taxes was widespread. 5 Edmond Cahn worried
that lawyers were losing their sense of moral responsibility, civic nobility, and even professional status, content to be "skilled merchant-clerks"
who were the "jackals of the bourgeoise," desiring only to "live the same
lives, obtain for their wives the same types of coats, and ride around in
the same automobiles" as their mercantile neighbors.506 Although it was
not a new concern, convinced there was a crisis due to the erosion of
standards and with over 20 years of ABA guidance seemingly ineffective, the post-1985 response of aligning professional and legal standards
seemed likely to be more effective.
There is another reason law replaced professional ethics on these
issues: there is more than one tax profession involved in tax practice.
The return position standards of the ABA and AICPA have largely mirrored one another, until the AICPA adapted to the substantial authority
standard but the ABA did not. 507 However, enrolled agents have only
Circular 230, and the hundreds-of-thousands of unenrolled preparers
have no professional code. 508 Although the position standards of @ 6694
have driven the tax lawyer ethics discussion for decades, that section
was not adopted by Congress in 1976 to govern lawyers or even CPAs
or enrolled agents but rather the masses of unenrolled, otherwise

503. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
504. Hatfield, 1945-1965, supra note 2, at 9.
505. Id. at 16-17.
506. Id. at 10-11.
507. Hatfield, 1965-1985, supra note 2, at 691; see discussion
supra Part II.A.2, B.1, C.3 & D.
508. Of course, these were the practitioners excluded under Loving. See discussion supra Part IID.
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unregulated preparers.509 But over time, @ 6694's standard increased and
aligned with Circular 230, preempting the ABA's return position
standards."'
The right relationship between the tax law and professional standards has long been pondered. Early on, Boris Bittker said the disclosure issue for lawyers needed to be deduced from the taxpayer-client's
legal obligations rather than from professional ethics." Later on, others expressed similar ideas in their criticisms of Opinion 314.512 The relationship between the law and ethics has been dynamic, with each affecting
the development of the other. The reasonable basis standard of Opinion
314 reflected the taxpayer negligence standard, even if the connection
was not explicit in that opinion.513 The final impetus for reconsidering
Opinion 314 was Congress enacting the substantial understatement penalties on taxpayers. 1 4 In those discussions, some in the tax bar suggested
Congress set the standard. 5 For many years, the congressional standard
reflected the bar's ethical standard before eventually preempting it. 516
Whatever the debate over the right relationship between legal and ethical standards, by 2008 it was the legal standard that dominated.
One of the earliest reports on tax lawyer ethics came from the
ABA Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section in 1949, but for most
of the 1950s there were no formal, committee-level activities." In 1952,
there was an important, informal discussion of tax lawyer ethics at the
Tax Law Review banquet. 518 But from the time the Tax Standards Committee was formed in 1962 until the deliberations leading up to the 1985
Opinion 352, the deliberation of tax lawyer ethics was often at the

509. See discussion supra Part IIA.1.
510. See discussion supra Part II.C.3.
511. Hatfield, 1945-1965, supra note 2, at 30.
512. Hatfield, 1965-1985, supra note 2, at 691-93.
513. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
514. Hatfield, 1965-1985, supra note 2, at 694-95; see discussion
supra Part II.A.2.
515. Hatfield, 1965-1985, supra note 2, at 694-95; see discussion
supra Part II.A.2..
516. See discussion supra Part IIB.
517. Hatfield, 1945-1965, supra note 2, at 8-9. The 1949 report was
on the importance of natural law to tax jurisprudence. The importance of
natural law was commonly discussed at the time in light of its abandonment
by German lawyers during the Nazi era.
518. Id. at 9.
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committee level and often between committees, such as the PR Committee responding to a request or proposal from the Tax Section. 519
However, beginning in the 1980s, a new dynamic emerged. The
Tax Section and other bar and professional organizations were very busy,
investing countless hours in preparing comments on Treasury proposals, reports to congressional committees, and testifying before Congress.520 This back-and-forth was usually reactive (and perhaps
over-reactive) to the tax maladie du jour rather than deliberative, and
the process was political rather than philosophical." 1 Political changes
and realities impact Congress and Treasury and have their own effects
on the tax bar, and the membership of committees and leadership roles
(be it in Congress, Treasury, or the tax bar) changes. This does not lend
itself to consistency in institutional positions across time, which meant
no coherent philosophy of professional responsibility was developed by
the Tax Section or others. When unexpectedly faced by a more likely
than not @ 6694 standard imposed by Congress in 2007, the Tax Section
rallied to the substantial authority standard that it had long opposed, for

example.522
Between 1985 and 2015 we see the rise and fall of Treasury and
Circular 230 in regulating substantive tax advice. Treasury's foray was
to implement opinion standards for tax shelters in 1982.523 There was
resistance from some members of the tax bar, who said Treasury lacked
the technical authority and had an irremediable conflict of interest. 2 4
But eventually, signaling their willingness to take seriously the government's struggle against tax shelters, the Tax Section supported Treasury's
move. 2 5 Then only a couple of years later, Treasury moved to regulate
return positions. 52 6 While there were some who objected, once again, to
Treasury's involvement with the substance of tax practice, the weight
of the comments from the organized tax bar were as to the details of

519. Hatfield, 1965-1985, supra note 2, 683-88, 696-98; see discussion supra Part II.A.2.
520. See, e.g., discussions supra Parts II.B & III.B.2.
521. Karen Hawkins identifies over-reactions to the tax maladie du
jour as one of the reasons Circular 230 is "broken." Hawkins, supra note 1, at
652-53.
522. See discussion supra Part II.C.3
523. Hatfield, 1965-1985, supra note 2, at 701-05.
524. Id. at 707-12.
525. Id. at 714.
526. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
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that involvement, not the principle of it.527 The dispute over those detailsthat is, the appropriate standard-continued for decades, but, as a mark
of how accepted the idea of Treasury regulating the tax bar had become,
the formal comments from the Tax Section never questioned the
premise. 52
Despite formal support from the Tax Section and other bar organizations for Treasury expanding its regulation under Circular 230, and
with support for the same from Congress, the approach did not bring
the second wave of tax shelters to an end. While it was a substantive
I.R.C. change that won the government's first war on tax shelters, it was
the Justice Department's criminal prosecutions, combined with the
impact of Sarbanes-Oxley that won the government's second war on tax
shelters. Whatever the relative contributions of each of these to that success, no one ever credited Circular 230. Karen Hawkins, who was charged
with enforcing Circular 230 credited the "highly visible and criminal
prosecutions and professional firm implosions," rather than Circular
230.529 Indeed, Circular 230's Byzantine covered opinion rules, which
consumed years of effort and time to implement, and which prompted
an exceptional number of articles and presentations to lawyers on compliance, in the end will be remembered only for the ubiquitous disclaimer
on e-mails and all sorts of communications, alerting the recipient to the
fact that it could not be used for tax penalty defense.530
Treasury also failed in its effort to regulate the otherwise unregulated return preparation industry and, thereby, cost itself much of its
authority to regulate tax lawyers.531 The Loving and Ridgely cases created considerable uncertainty as to who, other than those representing
clients in proceedings before the IRS is subject to Circular 230. The
uncertainty stretches from the position standards required of tax lawyers preparing returns, which may not be so significant given that those
same standards are essentially found in @ 6694, to the written advice
requirements, which have no statutory or professional association
counterparts. 3

527.
528.
529.
530.
531.
532.

2

See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
See, e.g., discussion supra Parts II.C.3 & III.B.2.
Hawkins, supra note 1, at 654-55.
See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
See discussion supra Part I.D.
See discussion supra Part III.B.5.
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The blow these cases dealt to Treasury's statutory authorization
to regulate tax practitioners can be remedied by Congress whenever it
is persuaded to do so. But that authorization, even if combined with a
grant of sufficient financing may be insufficient for Treasury to do what
is needed. There are inevitable problems with placing the regulation of
tax professionals in the tax collecting agency. The root problem is the
conflict of interest, which is not an ad hominem attack on those charged
with enforcing Circular 230 but rather a description of the bind in which
they operate. After her retirement, Karen Hawkins reflected on those
tax lawyers who objected to Treasury's move into regulating tax advice
with its tax shelter option standards by pointing out the obvious conflict of interest. She said, "Practitioners were right to express the conflict concerns they had even in 1982. It makes no sense to me to have
the function with the potential to destroy careers housed within, and
financially and administratively dependent upon, the agency most likely
to be adversarial to those being regulated." 33 She added that, in the year
she arrived (2009) "OPR had become little more than a specialty division within the IRS' tax compliance enforcement mechanism," threatening Circular 230 referrals to facilitate enforcing the tax law against
tax practitioners.534 Indeed, she said 85% of OPR case referrals were for
tax practitioner non-compliance.535 She described the practice of IRS field
personnel "checking the tax compliance record of a practitioner who submitted a power of attorney" as part of a strategy to get an aggressive or
uncooperative practitioner out of the way by using the practitioner's personal tax compliance problems.536
Although Hawkins decided the skeptics had been right, the skeptics of Treasury regulating more and more of tax practice were long
ignored. In addition to individual skeptics, both the tax sections of the
NYSBA and the Boston Bar Association Tax Committee doubted Treasury should proceed. 537 But the ABA Tax Section "warmly support[ed]"
Treasury regulating tax lawyers, and in its formal comments it never
questioned the premise of Treasury's involvement. 538 Treasury set out
to gather under its regulation hundreds-of-thousands of preparers in a

533.
534.
535.
536.
537.
538.

Hawkins, supra note 1, at 658.
Id. at 657.
Id.
Id. at 656.
Hatfield, 1965-1986, supra note 2, at 709-12.
Id. at 714; see, e.g., discussion supra Parts II.A.2, B.3.
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never before regulated multi-billion dollar industry, not only without asking Congress but by publicly announcing it had no need to do so.539 The
rightness of the principle of uniform regulation by a single government
agency had grown so almost self-evident that it was presumed rather
than debated.
Treasury would have been better served had the organized tax
bar, whose very profession encourages skepticism, continued to robustly
debate the premise of Treasury expanding its scope rather than just debating the details of that expansion. Perhaps one of the negative consequences of the institutionalized back-and-forth on Treasury and
congressional proposals was that outliers tended to have their views
excluded. To the extent that arguing against the expansion of Circular
230 to cover opinions or returns positions was dismissed as arguing for
tax shelters or against professional responsibility, in the long run, it was
Treasury and Circular 230 that were weakened.
One of the curiosities of tax lawyer ethics development through
2015 is that no standard for tax plan advising ever became the focus of
discussions. When the Tax Standard Committee was formed in 1962, it
was charged with investigating the peculiarities of the practice of law
in the tax field."' But as recounted above, in 1964 that committee's focus
on return preparation fixed the discussion trajectory for decades.
While the return position issue is similar for taxpayers and advisors, and
obviously an important issue for tax administration, the preparing of
returns has never been considered the practice of law and, except for a
brief period, was not even considered subject to Circular 230. It is interesting that the dominating professional ethics issue for tax lawyers would
involve an activity unique neither to lawyers nor professionals. While
there is no empirical research into how many lawyers routinely prepare
income tax returns, planning rather than compliance is usually considered the normal work of tax lawyers. It is true that the Tax Section's Opinion Task Force explicitly considered the Opinion 85-352 return position
standard to apply to tax planning too, but it is also true that the ABA
PR Committee did not mention that.14 1 It is true that various guidelines
developed for tax shelter opinions and the written advice requirements
under Circular 230 may be useful to tax lawyers devising plans, but those
guidelines and requirements were developed in reaction to waves of

539.
540.
541.

See discussion supra Part IID.
Hatfield, 1965-1985, supra note 2, at 683.
Id. at 698-99; see discussion supra at Part II.A.2.
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specific types of abuses. Given that the @ 6662 taxpayer understatement
penalty standards are now aligned with the @ 6694 preparer standards,
planning that is penalty-free for the taxpayer should be for the preparer
as well, but that is convenient happenstance. Thus, there are standards
and guidelines relevant to plan advising but none squarely on it, and,
after decades of extensive discussion of professionalism and problems
related to tax lawyering by bar committees, Treasury, Congress, and others, that is a curious absence.
B. Moving Forward
In significant part, from the 1980s onward, the development of professional responsibility standards for tax lawyers has been a reactive dickering over standards-their meanings, their relationships, their uses, and
their consequences. These negotiations would have benefitted greatly
from knowing the mix of good faith actors among tax lawyers. Consider the debate over the reasonable basis standards of Opinion 314. Many
insisted that if one took the standard sincerely, it was sufficient.4 2 Others described it as a laugh-out-loud test.543 If it is clear that good faith
compliance with the reasonable basis standard is consistent with inappropriate advice, then the pressing issue is improving the standard. But,
how many tax lawyers advise in good faith? To the extent tax lawyers
advise in bad faith, the discussion of their professional responsibility
should be less about improving the standards and more about enforcing
them. But to the extent tax lawyers advise in good faith, the discussion
should be about helping them meet the standards, which is a discussion
about education and support rather than enforcement.
To the extent the problem is bad faith lawyering, then it probably does not matter if the standard is realistic possibility of success rather
than substantial authority, or even if it is reasonable basis rather than
more likely than not. Bad faith actors are unlikely to sweat those distinctions. Perhaps setting the position standard higher makes it easier
to document the failure insofar as it would be easier to show a position

542. Hatfield, 1965-1985, supra note 2, at 696-97.
543. Professor Bernard Wolfman famously characterized the
Opinion 314 reasonable basis position as one you could articulate without
laughing. Hatfield, 1965-1985, supra note 2, at 696-697. He characterized
Opinion 85-352's realistic possibility standard as a giggle test. 1987 Wolfman
Letter, supra note 114; see also discussion supra Part II.A.3.
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lacks substantial authority than to show it lacks a reasonable basis. But
the practice routines of Paul Daugerdas were criminal. At his trial, there
were no expert witnesses needed to bicker over professional standards.
While the fees he collected are extraordinarily uncommon, how common are his standards?
To the extent the problem is that, despite their good faith efforts,
tax lawyers still fail to give appropriate advice, then we should ask if,
say, the difference between substantial authority and realistic possibility is a useful distinction. If a tax lawyer is trying to understand and
apply the law, the distance between a position with some reasonable basis
and one more likely than not to be sustained seems likely useful. But to
follow the Joint Committee's explanation, is it helpful to tell the lawyer
to take no comfort at a 30% chance of appellate survival but to relax
completely at 40%? Is that level of precision helpful to good faith actors?
Without empirical research on how these decisions are made and how
expressions like these may or may not be relevant, the debate is endlessand useless.
Of course, both enforcement and support are needed, but it would
be useful to know the mix of good faith and bad faith tax lawyers. One
of the interesting points during a tax shelter craze is that not all tax lawyers get involved. Whatever the explanation for why not all lawyers get
involved, it is unclear how many lawyers do and how many do not. After
all, not all inappropriate planning is ever discovered, and presumably
quite little is. That makes it difficult, and perhaps impossible, to discover
the frequency of bad and good advice, much less bad and good faith advisors. We are not surveilling the thoughts or conversations of tax lawyers, so we can count neither how many inappropriate plans tax lawyers
create nor how many they destroy.
Though we do not know the mix of good and bad faith actors,
we know there are both. We also know that enforcement has educational
aspects, and the in terrorem educational effects may be especially important. More importantly, the question may not be as to the number of good
faith and bad faith tax actors but the number of good faith and bad faith
actions. The line between us and them, the good and the bad, does not
run between us so much as within us. And we may seduce ourselves to
the dark side. In 1952 the exceptionally prolific writer on tax lawyer ethics Merle Miller wrote:
It is easy to kill off someone else's scheme, and it is easy
to examine critically any proposal that would seem to
give an unwarranted advantage to the taxpayer. But it
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is most difficult to maintain that critical attitude with
respect to one's own creations. For when we start with
a problem we want to solve, we are soon enmeshed in
the same wishes which motivate our clients and we are
thereby rendered easier to please with our own answers
and less critical of the outcome."'
It may be the fear of enforcement that, on occasion, brings pivotal
clarity to even the most honorable tax lawyer, if we presume that
even the most honorable is occasionally tempted, weak, confused, pressured, or, enamored with his or her own creation. A bit of fear can grab
one's attention, and, at some time or another, that is probably good for
each of us.
Whether we are working on the enforcement effort or the support effort, we might clarify whom we have in mind. Is it Wall Street
tax lawyers, mid-sized firm tax lawyers in Jacksonville, or small firm
tax lawyers in Boise? It seems likely to make a difference. The processes
by which tax advising decisions are made in different types of firms differ, and if we do not understand those processes, then we do not understand how to improve either enforcement or support. There will be
differences due to client types, lawyer-client dynamics, and also, for
some, intra-client dynamics. There will be variations on firm size. A tax
lawyer may work alone, be the only expert in a firm of a few dozen, or
a member of a tax department of many dozens in a firm of a few thousand. The substantive issues tax lawyers face also matter, and presumably would vary not only by firm size but by regional industry:
petrochemicals in Houston, pharmaceuticals in Indianapolis, textiles in
Greensboro, and timber in Snohomish. Empirical research into tax advice
decision-making processes and how those processes vary by firm size,
location, and practice area is a piece missing in the puzzle of improving
and sustaining professional responsibility standards.
Another important piece is how enforcement or support efforts
relate to the work of non-lawyers in the tax field. Lawyers and CPAs
are fairly similar professions, but the tax field also includes enrolled
agents whose training and experiences and practices are much less similar to lawyers and the commercial return preparers who belong to an

544. Merle H. Miller, Morality in Tax Planning, 10 N.Y.U. ANN.
INST. FED. TAX'N 1067, 1076 (1952); see also Hatfield, 1945-1965, supra note 2,
at 40.
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industry wholly unlike the bar. Karen Hawkins identified one of the central problems with Circular 230 as its having been written for lawyers
but applying to advisors who are not lawyers and thus do not have the
training to understand." Indeed, much of Circular 230 reads like a legal
ethics code, while other parts read like a statute. While this may be helpful for lawyers, it is not for others. Whether the work is on the enforcement side or the support side, care should be given to the likely impact
of the effort for the non-lawyers who also work in and in many contexts
dominate the work in the tax field.
Similarly, care should be given to how professional regulation
efforts may impact taxpayers. If we pause to ponder if the distance
between realistic possibility and substantial authority is helpful to the
good faith lawyer, we should pause to ponder if it is helpful for the taxpayer navigating the same law. More likely than not is probably more
intuitive to a taxpayer than substantial authority or realistic possibility,
though this too is a question better answered by empirical research. In
any event, the relationship between tax professional and taxpayer obligations is so close that the two should always be considered together,
whether the work is on enforcement or education and support.
To return to the bigger picture, it is useful to divide primary
responsibilities between those authorities concerned with these issues.
It is ultimately the job of Congress and Treasury to police the bad actors
in the tax field. While it is good for the bar to punish bad actors, it is
necessary that the government do so in order to defend the revenue that
is its lifeblood. Cooperation between the bar and government-reports
and hearings and so forth-is, no doubt, helpful but the weight of the
policing authority has to be on Congress and Treasury.
The government has a role in educating tax professionals, but
the weight of education and support must fall on the bar associations.
Yet the educational and support strategies for improving tax practice
should not be considered primarily the responsibility of the ABA regardless of its high profile or historic work. The state bar tax sections, through
their legal education programs and committee work, devote countless
hours to improving tax practice. There is also the unused opportunity
for state bar tax sections to seek formal guidance on tax ethics issues
from their own authorities much as the Tax Section did from the PR Committee. Given the differences that exist between state bars, reflecting
regional practice areas, lawyer demographics, and law firm sizes, the

545.

Hawkins, supra note 1, at 650-51.
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ethical issues pressing in one state may differ from another. Of course,
state bar ethics authorities seem quite unlikely to enforce return position or other relatively refined standards, as they never have. But that is
not so important if the bar's primary responsibility is support rather than
enforcement. After all, the ABA PR Committee has no disciplinary
authority at all, yet its formal opinions proved very influential, and not
just on Congress and Treasury but also on good faith lawyers who were
better able to articulate for themselves, their colleagues, and their clients what it is they should be doing. Helping good faith lawyers know
what it is they should be doing and articulating that for themselves
and others is not a burden the government can carry on its own, nor can
the ABA.
The ongoing engagement of the tax bar with professional responsibility issues is most important. Even the earliest generation of writers
on these topics thought the ethics of tax advisors and their clients were
too low and that the moral improvement of both was an important work
to be done. Thus, we have an old rather than a new job to do, and as
moral improvement has no end point, we should not be dismayed that
the work is ongoing. It is not just human nature that makes moral improvement an endless task, but that the membership of the tax bar is always
in flux: new lawyers coming, old lawyers going, and changes in tax law
and administration, as well as changes in practice areas and legal education and the profession more generally. Whereas the development of
tax lawyer standards from 1985-2015 was reactive to the tax maladie
de jour, there is the opportunity for more deliberation, specifically focused
on understanding the complexity of the tax bar so that we can better
understand how to improve the quality of tax advice-and perhaps even
the lives of those who give it.

